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ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a growing sentiment that the conventional event
tree/fault tree methodology, used in current nuclear power plant probabilistic risk
assessment studies, has weaknesses in treating complex scenarios whose development is
strongly affected by operator actions. This .report discusses these weaknesses, reviews
potential alternative methodologies, and proposes an improved approach, called the
Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM), designed to analyze the risk associated
with dynamic nuclear power plant accident sequences.
DETAM provides a framework for treating stochastic variations in operating crew
states (defined by substates characterizing the accident diagnosis, the planned actions, and
the crew quality) as well as stochastic variations in hardware states. Plant process
variables, used when determining the likelihood of stochastic branchings, are treated
deterministically. Scenario truncation and grouping mechanisms are employed to limit the
size of the model.
To demonstrate the capabilities of DETAM, it is applied towards the analysis of a
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident. This application shows that the
methodology can be practically employed in realistic analyses, and that useful insights
concerning potential risk contributors (e.g., scenarios and dependencies not identified by
conventional models) and the effectiveness of operating procedures can be generated.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In current probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies for nuclear power plants, the
propagation of an accident scenario from an initiating event to some final plant damage
state is analyzed in two steps, largely as described in WASH-1400 [1]. In the first step,
event trees are used to model the scenario as a sequence of successes and failures of
mitigating safety systems and operator actions, i.e., as a sequence of "top events." In the
second step, the likelihood of the scenario, the probability of the joint occurrence of the top
events defining the scenario, is determined. This step often uses fault trees to analyze the
individual top events.
In recent years, the event tree/fault tree approach has gained widespread acceptance
as being a mature methodology for analyzing accident scenarios. This viewpoint stems
from a number of factors, including: the demonstrated usefulness of the approach (e.g., for
structuring information on plant response to abnormal conditions, and for assessing
proposed plant improvements using that information [2]), the nuclear industry's
accumulated experience with PRA since WASH-1400, and the favorable results of critical
reviews. In particular, the Lewis Commission's review of WASH-1400 [3] states that
"...it is incorrect to say that the event-tree/fault-tree analysis is fundamentally
flawed, since it is just an implementation of logic."
Ref. 3 concludes that event tree/fault tree methodology, when coupled to an adequate data
base, is the best available tool to quantify the probabilities of nuclear reactor accidents.
Of course, it is widely recognized that many of the detailed models currently used in
risk studies, as well as the data base, need improvement. Recently, much attention has
been focused on the issues of human errors and common cause failures. However, these
efforts focus on improving the implementation of the event tree/fault tree methodology,
rather than revising the methodology itself. Not only is the methodology currently seen as
an important tool that can be used to solve real design and operations problems, it is
widely viewed as being synonymous with PRA.
Is this confidence in the event tree/fault tree methodology completely warranted?
With the hindsight provided by the accident at Three Mile Island, by the occurrence of
other significant precursors, and by over 15 years of PRA applications since WASH-1400,
are there reasons to believe that improvements in this basic structure may be needed?
Given the rarity of severe accidents, these questions cannot be answered by a simple
comparison of PRA results with observed data. For example, it is a simple matter to show
that if we hypothesize the existence of a class of "TMI-like" accidents leading to core
damage with mean frequency of 10-3 per reactor-year (an order of magnitude higher than
the total core melt frequencies predicted by many PRAs), the probability of not observing
such an accident in any U.S. plant in the 12 years following Three Mile Island is
roughly 0.4. It follows that PRA models which do not identify any accidents in this
hypothesized class cannot be proven right or wrong solely on the basis of statistics for core
damage accidents.
The purpose of this report is to provide a partial answer to the above questions. The
report shows that there are a number of potentially significant issues that are not
well-treated by the event tree/fault tree methodology, and that there is an alternative
methodology, called the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM) that can be used
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Figure 1.4 - Event Tree for Seabrook Top Event SL [6]
to treat these issues. An application of DETAM to a specific accident initiator (a
pressurized water reactor steam generator tube rupture) demonstrates the potential of the
method, and also provides useful insights regarding the accident.
In the remainder of this section, the structural and quantitative characteristics of the
event tree/fault tree approach are examined. It is shown that the static nature of the
event tree/fault tree approach can, in certain cases, lead to an incorrect characterization of
scenario frequencies. In Section 2, alternative methodologies for dynamic accident
sequence analysis are reviewed. This review includes extensions of the event tree/fault tree
methodology, as well as more dynamic analysis methods. The dynamic event tree analysis
approach is identified as being particularly promising; the implementation of this approach
for accident sequence analysis, called the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM)
is described in Section 3. In Section 4, a demonstration DETAM model is constructed for
the analysis of a PWR steam generator tube rupture accident. The results of the
demonstration analysis are discussed in Section 5; the discussion includes a comparison of
results with the results from two representative conventional event tree/fault tree analyses.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks, including a discussion of areas for further
work.
1.2 Conventional Event Tree/Fault Tree Analysis
Two principal styles for applying event trees and fault trees to accident sequence
analysis are used in current PRA studies: the "fault tree linkinI" approach, and the "event
tree with boundary conditions" approach (more popularly the 'large fault tree/small event
tree" and "large event tree/small fault tree" approaches) (4]. Briefly, the fault tree linking
approach usually employs event trees whose top events represent failures of plant frontline
systems (e.g., auxiliary feedwater, high pressure injection). Component-level or
supercomponent-level cut sets are developed for each tree sequence and for each plant
damage state by analyzing the logic trees created by linking the fault trees (and success
trees, if needed) for the different top events. Note that operator actions and support
system (e.g., electric power, service water) failures are generally included in the fault trees,
rather than in the event trees. The accident sequence and plant damage state frequencies
are determined by quantifying the frequency of each cut set. Figure 1.1 shows a reduced
version of the event tree used for the NUREG-1150 analysis of postulated steam generator
tube rupture (SGTR) accidents in the Sequoyah plant [5].
Whereas the fault tree linking approach defines accident sequences in terms of
component-level cut sets, the event tree with boundary conditions approach defines
sequences in terms of top event successes and failures. The frequency of each accident
sequence is computed as the product of the initiating event frequency and the conditional
frequencies of succeeding top event failures (and successes). For example, consider
Sequence 14 in Figure 1.2, a reduced version of the early response SGTR tree used in
Ref. 6. The conditional frequency of this sequence', given the SGTR initiating event (SG),
is written as:
'This report adopts the "probability of frequency" formalism discussed in Ref. 7. The term
"frequency" is used to quantify the stochastic uncertainty associated with random events
(e.g., event tree top event failures). The term "probability" is used to quantify state of
knowledge uncertainties (e.g., the uncertainty in the value of a conditional frequency.
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Fr{Sequence 14|SG} = Fr{TT|SG}*Fr{EF|SGTT}*Fr{NL|SG,TT,EY}
*Fr{RW SG,TT,EFNL}*Fr{HP I SG,TT,LT,NL,RW}
*Fr{OR I SG,TT,EF,NL,RW,HP}*Fr{SL I SG,TT,EF,NL,RW,HP,OR}
*Fr{DUji SG,TT,EP,NL,RW,HPOR,SL}
Eq. (1.1) shows that the conditional frequency of failure for a given top event (often termed
"conditional split fraction") depends on the successes and failures of preceding top events.
Thus, the structure of the event tree provides the boundary conditions required to quantify
a given top event. Recent applications of the event tree with boundary conditions
approach often define top events in terms of safety system trains (rather than entire
systems). Furthermore, operator actions and support system train successes/failures are
treated using separate top events, rather than as supporting events in a frontline system
fault tree.
Regardless of the particular style of analysis, the event tree/fault tree methodology
does not, nor is it intended to, lead to models that directly simulate the integrated,
dynamic response of the plant/operating crew system during an accident. Instead, as
indicated above, an accident scenario is described as a set of successes and failures.
Furthermore, each scenario is associated with a single plant damage state. Thus, an event
tree/fault tree model can be replaced by a set of logic statements (i.e., a set of rules)
deterministically associating sets of top event or component successes and failures with
plant damage states. Assuming for sake of example that Sequence 14 in Figure 1.2 leads to
core damage, the logic statement underlying this sequence can then be written as:
{SG n TT n EF n NL n RW n HP n OR n SL n 0-9} -4 {Core Damage} (1.2)
A number of structural characteristics of this static, logic-based approach for
modeling accident scenarios are of interest. First, variations in the ordering of the success
and failure events do not affect the final outcome of a scenario or its frequency. (If
ordering does make a difference, the event tree would have to be expanded in order to
handle possible permutations of events.) Second, variations in event timing do not affect
scenario outcomes or frequencies (as long as these variations are not large enough to change
"failures" to "successes," or vice versa). Third, the effect of process variables and operator
behavior on scenario development are incorporated through the success criteria defined for
the event tree top events. Fourth, the boundary conditions for the analysis of a given top
event (or basic event, when dealing with cut set representations of accident scenarios) are
provided in terms of top event (basic event) successes and failures; variations in parameters
not explicitly modeled are not treated.
In some risk analysis applications, it appears that some of these characteristics can
affect the scenario identification process. For example, Ref. 8 describes a fault-tolerant
computer system reliability analysis application in which variations in the ordering of
events can be significant. Section 2 of this report presents a simple process control system
example, obtained from Ref. 9, illustrating the potential importance of dynamics when
multiple system failure modes are possible. Ref. 10 employs order-dependent "scenario
trees" in place of conventional event trees in an analysis of a test reactor.
For commercial nuclear power plant applications, on the other hand, static
relationships between top events and plant damage states can be reasonably assumed (at
least within a given accident phase) as long as the top event success criteria are defined in
broad terms, e.g., when "system failure" means that the system is unable to perform its
3
(1.1)
function adequately. In such cases, the use of event trees to identify accident sequences
leading to a given plant damage state is, as pointed out in Ref. 3, just an exercise in logic.
Thus, the event tree/fault tree methodology appears to be a good approach for identifying
logically correct, or, at least, conservative relationships between top event successes and
failures and plant damage states. However, it is less clear that the methodology is
completely adequate for quantifying the risk associated with all potentially significant
scenarios.
To illustrate this point, consider the well-known Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2)
accident. Figure 1.3 shows a modified WASH-1400 event tree for that accident obtained
from Ref. 11. Key elements in the actual course of the scenario are shown in that tree;
hence, the early failure of auxiliary feedwater and its recovery 8 minutes later is
represented as a transition between sequences (Ref. 12 uses a similar representation to
model more general aspects of the accident). Note that sequences TMQ and TMQU are
not treated in the original WASH-1400 tree due to physical differences between the Surry
reactor treated in WASH-1400 and TMI-2. Note also that, although the accident started
with a loss of main feedwater (represented by top event M), the ordering of events K and
M is not judged to have a significant impact on subsequent scenario development.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the gross sequence of events at TMI-2 reasonably well.
However, it fares less well as a quantitative tool. The key to correct quantification of the
sequence is to determine the likelihood that the operators will throttle high pressure
makeup (represented by top event U), given that the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV)
fails to reclose (top event Q). The tree shows that the reactor is tripped, main feedwater is
not available, auxiliary feedwater is operating, the PORV has opened on demand, and the
PORV has failed to reclose. It does not show that the pressurizer level rises as an eventual
consequence of the PORV failing to reclose; this information, of course, is necessary to
correctly quantify the likelihood that the operators would deliberately cause the failure of
top event U. The fact that the event tree does not provide this information does not
necessarily preclude an experienced analyst from correctly analyzing the scenario. It does,
however, make the job much more difficult, especially considering that numerous scenarios
may require a similar, detailed analysis.
In general, as discussed further in Section 1.3, the static, logical structure of a
conventional event tree/fault tree analysis does not explicitly provide all of the information
needed to quantitatively analyze dependencies between top events. This point has not
gone unnoticed in nuclear power plant PRAs; to improve the analysis with respect to these
issues, a number of strategies are employed. First, as an aid to event tree construction,
event sequence diagrams (ESDs) are often used to qualitatively model the progression of an
accident scenario. These diagrams depict not only possible courses of the accident in terms
of hardware state changes, they also indicate salient physical variables during the accident.
In recent PRAs, ESDs can also indicate the section of the emergency operating procedures
relevant to a particular point in the sequence. The ESDs, however, do not provide the
timing of events, nor do they provide complete information on the process variables.
Therefore, one event sequence, either in the ESD or in the event tree constructed from the
ESD, may represent many chronological scenarios.
A second approach is to employ conservative assumptions, thereby eliminating the
need to analyze dependencies between multiple events. For example, Figure 1.1 assumes
that scenarios involving a steam generator tube rupture and subsequent failure of auxiliary
feedwater will lead to core damage; thus, the conditional frequency with which operators
successfully perform bleed and feed cooling need not be quantified. The main problem with
this approach is economic rather than technical since it can lead to an incorrect
identification of significant scenarios and, therefore, a non-optimal allocation of risk
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management resources. To reduce the degree of this problem, iterative analyses are usually
performed; scenarios identified as being risk-significant using conservative assumptions are
treated more carefully (e.g., using detailed operator recovery models) in the next round of
analysis.
A third approach is to arrange the event tree structure in order to best represent
dependencies between top events. Normally, the top events are arranged in the nominal
order in which they are demanded in the course of an accident. In some situations,
however, there may be some ambiguity in the orderin , depending on the definitions of the
top events. For example, in Figure 1.1, top event Qs which represents the loss of integrity
of the faulted steam generator) is placed after top event Od (which models the operators
initiating primary system cooldown and depressurization within 15 minutes after the
initiating event). This ordering accounts for changes in the likelihoods of relief valve
challenges and failures, given the success or failure of Od. However, it can be shown that
some of the actions modeled in Qs are actually performed before Oa is questioned. In this
case, the analyst selects an ordering that emphasizes the dependencies judged to be most
important. Even if the actual ordering of events is unambiguous, the analyst may select a
top event ordering that allows for tree simplification.
A fourth approach, intended to treat some of the time-dependent aspects of plant
response to an accident, is to explicitly model different phases in an accident scenario.
Ref. 6, for example, employs separate event trees for the "early response" and "long term
response" of plant safety systems. In this case, top events associated with a given safety
system may appear more than once in a sequence, and some differences due to variations in
event ordering may be treated. The separate treatment of different accident phases can
also be observed in the Accident Progression Event Trees employed in NUREG-1150 (e.g.,
[13]). In both of these cases, however, events are treated as being order-independent
during a particular accident phase.
A fifth approach is to provide detailed, offline analyses to support the analysis of a
given top event. Ref. 6 provides a separate event tree (see Figure 1.4) for top event SL in
Figure 1.2; this tree is used to treat some of the detailed, dynamic interactions between the
operators and the plant during a steam generator tube rupture scenario. As another
example, Ref. 14 describes how simple plant simulation models are used to determine the
amount of time required until an undesired plant state (e.g., core melt) is reached. These
calculations determine the amount of time available for operator actions. Denoting the
time available by T and the time required for operator actions by r, the frequency that the
actions will be performed prior to reaching the undesired state is simply Fr {r < T}. Note
that r and T exhibit both random and state of knowledge uncertainties. The distribution
for the latter is developed with the aid of the plant simulation model; the distribution for
the former is developed largely using judgment, sometimes supplemented with auxiliary
models. Ref. 15, for example, describes a discrete event simulation model for operator
actions during a loss of offsite power scenario used to determine the distribution of r.
Each of these approaches, used singly or in combination, leads to an improved
representation of an accident scenario. Because the event tree/fault tree framework is
retained, however, the resulting analysis still has an essentially static structure. Ref. 16
questions this framework from the viewpoint of human reliability analysis. Ref. 17, in
discussing accident precursors that have been observed in U.S. plants, points out that the
event trees and fault tree models used in PRAs have not been formally verified by
comparison with actual experience. Such a comparison is difficult to make in the case of
complex scenarios. The drawbacks of the event tree/fault tree methodology with respect to
complex scenario analysis are discussed in the following section.
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1.3 Dependencies in Accident Sequence Analysis
As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the "defense-in-depth" design characteristic of
nuclear power plants means that a risk-significant accident scenario must involve multiple
failures. In turn, this means that an accurate estimate of plant risk requires an accurate
assessment of the frequency of multiple failures.
Formally, the frequency of the joint occurrence of any two events A and B is given
by
Fr{A,B} = Fr{A}-Fr{BIA} (1.3)
where Fr{B A} is the conditional frequency of event B, given the occurrence of event A.
Fr{B I A} quantifies the degree of dependence between A and B. If the events are
completely independent (the fact that one has occurred does not affect the likelihood that
the other will occur), then Fr{B I A} = Fr{B}. If they are completely dependent, the
occurrence of event A guarantees the occurrence or non-occurrence of event B (the
respective conditional frequencies are 1 and 0).
In PRA accident sequence analysis, many of the event tree top events are neither
completely independent nor completely dependent, but are modeled as being one or the
other for ease of analysis. Clearly, incorrect risk estimates and a non-optimal allocation of
risk management resources can result if caution is not exercised in such modeling. Errors
can be made on the overly conservative side (e.g., by assuming that failure of A leads to
failure of B when the two are actually only partially dependent) or on the overly optimistic
side (e.g., by assuming that top events A and B are independent). The latter case is of
special concern, since incorrect assumptions of independence can lead to sequence frequency
estimates that underestimate the true frequencies by orders of magnitude. In order to
avoid such errors, great care in identifying and quantifying dependencies between the event
tree top events is required.
The event tree/fault tree methodology provides information needed to analyze three
important types of dependent events [18]. First, the initiating event indicates if common
cause failures of top events should be considered immediately. For example, if the
initiating event is an earthquake, multiple top events that are nominally independent may
be affected by the same earthquake, and the failure frequencies used in the analysis must
be conditioned on the occurrence of the earthquake. This is a dependency example in
which the top event failures are correlated, rather than directly linked.
The second type of dependent event directly treated is one where, given a particular
set of top event successes and failures, the likelihood of success of other top events need not
be analyzed (success or failure is deterministically guaranteed or irrelevant). In Figure 1.2,
for example, the failure of top event RW, which represents the refueling water storage
tank, ensures that there is insufficient water for high pressure injection. Thus, top event
HP is guaranteed to fail. This dependency is due to a functional coupling of the affected
top event (HP) with other top events in the event tree. Functional couplings can be
generally categorized according to the top events involved: a) the first top event represents
a support system (e.g., power, control, or cooling system) for the second, or b) the first top
event represents frontline system operation or operator actions that lead to changes in the
plant process variables; these changes, in turn, affect the likelihood of success for the
second top event. The first case is treated at the event tree level in the event tree with
boundary conditions approach. In the linked fault tree approach, it is generally treated as
a shared equipment dependence at the fault tree level, described below.
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The third type of dependency that is naturally treated using the event tree/fault tree
methodology arises when multiple top events share a set of components (or basic events).
In this case, the joint frequency of failure of the affected top events can be easily developed
using normal fault tree analysis techniques; the conditional frequency of failure can then be
developed using Eq. (1.3). Note that when dealing with shared equipment dependencies in
the linked fault tree approach, the conditional frequencies need not be evaluated explicitly.
Instead, this type of dependency is treated by logic tree reduction when evaluating the
linked fault tree modeling an accident sequence.
Dependencies falling outside of the above three categories (common cause initiators,
functional coupling, shared equipment) are not as well treated by the event tree/fault tree
approach. These other dependencies involve situations where the status of the plant
cannot be defined solely in terms of top event successes and failures. Of particular interest
in this study are complex scenarios whose development is strongly affected by operator
actions.
As discussed in the preceding section, the event tree/fault tree methodology
represents each accident scenario as a set of hardware failures and operator errors. The
latter are treated in much the same fashion as hardware failures, and often treated at a
very broad level, e.g., failure to depressurize the reactor coolant system in r minutes.
There are two major consequences resulting from this representation.
First, many of the conditions affecting operator errors (e.g., previous decisions by the
operating crew, behavior of plant process variables) are not explicitly included in the
model. For scenarios dominated by hardware failures, this is not an important concern.
However, for scenarios involving multiple human errors in nominally separate tasks, the
lack of contextual information can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the level of
dependence between the errors and, therefore, erroneous quantitative results. For example,
PRA models rarely treat events in which operators turn off safety systems when these
systems are needed, although this was a prime contributor to the TMI-2 accident. In the
absence of a context provided by a description of the dynamic progression of the accident,
it is difficult for an analyst to develop accurate conditional frequencies for such events.
Second, the treatment of human error in an analogous fashion to the treatment of
hardware failure inhibits accurate modeling of the remainder of the accident sequence
following an error. The likelihood that an operating crew fails to perform a required task
correctly (within a given amount of time) is treated explicitly. However, the different ways
in which the crew may perform the task incorrectly, and the resulting dynamic responses of
the plant/crew system to these different errors, are not treated. Therefore, the proper
boundary conditions for establishing the conditional frequencies for top events downstream
of the task performance failure are not provided. Moreover, from the standpoint of risk
management, the lack of realistic treatment of the scenario following human error can lead
to an incomplete identification of factors important to risk, and of alternatives that can be
employed to reduce risk.
In order to address these weaknesses in the event tree/fault tree representation of an
accident scenario, it must be recognized that: a) plant operators and plant components are
interacting parts of an overall system that responds dynamically to upset conditions, b) the
actions of operators are dependent on their beliefs as to the current state of the plant, and
c) the operators have memory; their beliefs at any given point in time are influenced (to
some degree) by the past sequence of events and by their earlier trains of thought. Each of
these observations points to a need for an accident sequence model whose structure differs
significantly from that of current event trees and fault trees. Such a model must carry
information on the following [19]:
7
0 Current hardware status
9 Current levels of process variables
0 Current operator "state of mind"
0 Scenario history
a Time
With this information, dependencies between system failure events can, in principle,
be more accurately identified and quantified. Note that the process variable levels are
included because they affect the actuation of automatic systems and provide cues to the
operators, thereby providing an important link in the interaction between the operators
and the plant hardware. Time is included not only because the process variable
calculations are time dependent, but also because time can be a key performance shaping
factor for modeling operator behavior.
1.4 Summary
In nuclear power plant risk assessments, accurate estimation of the frequency of
accident scenarios and the overall plant risk requires an accurate treatment of dependencies
between multiple failure events. The event tree/fault tree methodology currently used is
fundamentally well suited to treat dependencies that can be expressed in static, logical
terms. It is not as well suited to treat dependencies associated with time-dependent
processes or continuously varying variables. In particular, the methodology does not
explicitly carry information concerning the evolution of process variables and operator
state that may couple a number of failure events together.
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2.0 ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES FOR DYNAMIC SCENARIO ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, an improved methodology for assessing the risk associated
with complex, dynamic accident scenarios must carry information on current hardware
status, current levels of process variables, current operating crew "state of mind," scenario
history, and time. This chapter reviews a number of extensions and alternatives to the
event tree/fault tree methodology designed to treat some aspects of dynamic systems and
scenarios. The methodologies reviewed are:
0 extended event tree modeling,
* event sequence diagram modeling,
0 GO-FLOW [20],
* Markov modeling,
* DYLAM [21], and
0 discrete event simulation.
Not included in this review is the digraph-based fault tree construction methodology.
The basic methodology is described in Refs. 22 and 23. Briefly, the analyst constructs a
directed graph (digraph), consisting of nodes and directed arcs between the nodes, to
represent the system of interest. The nodes indicate the values of process variables at
different points in the system or events impacting the system, and the arcs indicate causal
relationships between the nodes. Weights (gains) are also assigned to the arcs, to indicate
the sign and (qualitative) strength of the relationships between nodes. Thus, a "+1"
weight on an arc leading from Node A to Node B typically indicates that a small increase
in the value of A will lead to a small increase in the value of B, whereas a "+10" indicates
that a large value of B will result. Since the digraph provides a logic model for system
behavior, it can be transformed into a fault tree. The fault tree is then used to determine
the likelihood that unacceptable outcomes (e.g., undesired process variable levels) are
achieved.
The methodology described in Refs. 22 and 23 is widely used in the chemical process
industry for system analysis. Numerous variations, designed for alternate applications,
have been proposed. For example, Ref. 24 presents an extended digraph methodology,
developed for the purpose of disturbance analysis/fault diagnosis, called the Logic
Flowgraph Methodology (LFM). The LFM employs a "causality network," used to treat
process variable interactions, and a "condition network," used to treat the effects of system
hardware on the process variables and on each other. The methodology employs predefined
operators to handle the various interactions, and is designed to provide input to a computer
code that will automatically generate fault trees. Ref. 25 describes a "quantitative
digraph" (QD) approach intended for accident sequence analysis. This approach uses
quantitative operators rather than qualitative (logical) operators; its aim is to determine
the likely trajectories through state space that lead to an undesired end state.
The inherent problem with the digraph methodology is that it eventually employs
fault trees (i.e., logic-based, time-independent models). Thus, without extensive
modification, it cannot treat the dynamic scenarios of interest in this report.
Of the methodologies covered in this review, only the extended event tree and event
sequence diagram methodologies have been explicitly designed for a plant level accident
scenario analysis. The GO-FLOW and DYLAM methodologies are generally intended for
analyzing the reliability of individual systems (Ref. 26 describes how DYLAM can be
applied to plant level risk analysis). The Markov analysis and discrete event simulation
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methodologies are general methodologies for treating stochastic systems and can, in
principle, be applied to plant level analysis. However, to date, most applications are also
aimed at the system level (Ref. 27 provides an exception to this general rule). Partly for
this reason, none of the methodologies is designed to accommodate a completely integrated
model for operator cognitive activity; most applications of these methodologies do not treat
human error at all. Three exceptions that treat human error are the extended event tree
analysis reported in Ref. 28 (which uses an approach very similar to that used in
conventional event tree/fault tree analysis), the event sequence diagram model described in
Ref. 12 (which treats errors of commission using a statistical approach), and some recent
applications of DYLAM [29,30]. Only the last-named applications treat to any extent the
operating crew's state of mind. The purpose of this review, then, is to determine which
methodology is the best candidate for improvement; the chosen methodology is then
extended to allow a broader, integrated treatment of operators, as discussed in the
following chapters of this report.
To make the review concrete, a sample problem involving a holdup tank and three
discrete control loops is adopted from Ref. 9. This problem is simple to analyze, yet
possesses a number of characteristics important to the analysis of dynamic scenarios
allowing comparison of the different methodologies. (Operator modeling issues, which are
not illustrated by this problem, are discussed for those few analyses which have considered
human errors.)
Figure 2.1 shows the holdup tank. The tank level is regulated by the actions of three
control loops. Under normal conditions, the tank level is maintained between levels ai and
a2 by balancing the flow out of the tank through the valve with the flow into the tank via
Pump 1. If the valve fails closed, the running pump stops, or the 50% backup pump
(Pump 2) starts, the tank level will change. Level sensors will then attempt to actuate
equipment to maintain the tank level between a, and a2. The control laws are given in
Table 2.1. Failure occurs when the tank level (L) rises above "b" (Tank Overflow) or when
it falls below "a" (Tank Dryout).
For simplicity, it is assumed that:
0 control loops can be modeled as single entities (components);
e possible pump loop states are: {on, off, failed on, failed off}; possible valve loop
states are: (open, closed, failed open, failed closed};
e loops can fail on demand or during operation; the latter failures are Poisson
processes;
e operation failures not leading to changes of state (e.g., an open valve sticking
open) are included with demand failures;
e failed loops cannot be repaired;
0 relevant failure modes and flow parameters are as given in Table 2.2; and
0 the loops are nominally independent, i.e., the failure of a loop does not directly
influence the likelihood of success or failure of a second loop.
Note that this problem differs from that in Ref. 9 in the definition of possible loop states
(Ref. 9 only employs "on" or "off" loop states) and in the modeling of failures on demand.
This problem has two characteristics that apply to more general dynamic problems.
First, as discussed in more detail in Section 2.2, the response of the overall system depends
on the order and timing of the failure events. For example, an accident sequence initiated
by the closure of the valve will differ from one initiated by the stoppage of Pump 1.
Further, the system response following the initiating event will vary according to the value
of the tank level (L) when the next failure occurs. Second, system control depends on a
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continuous process variable, the tank level (L). (In contrast with a number of other
control problems, system control is performed in discrete stages, rather than with a
continuous controller.)
Because the system responds dynamically to an initiating event, an event tree is a
more natural tool than a fault tree for modeling the holdup tank. A simplistic,
hardware-oriented tree for the system's response to the initiating event "Pump 1 Fails Off"
is shown in Figure 2.2. The tree models the different failure modes of the loops explicitly,
since these can lead to different system failure modes. Note that since the valve has a
larger flow capacity than Pump 2 (see Table 2.2), the valve behavior overrides the behavior
of Pump 2 in the first two sequences.
If the dynamics of the system are ignored, the sequences in Figure 2.2 can be
quantified quite simply. For example, the conditional frequency of Sequence 2, given the
initiating event, can be approximated by (see Table 2.2)
Fr{Sequence 21 Initiating Event} '== #v + Ayr (2.1)
where r is time interval since the occurrence of the initiating event. (The last term in the
equation represents a scenario in which the valve closes successfully on demand, but later
transfers open.)
Overlooking the system dynamics does not affect the failure logic shown in
Figure 2.2. However, it can lead to inaccurate frequency estimates for the two undesired
outcomes (dryout and overflow). Further, it prevents the accurate assessment of the
frequency distributions for the times to achieve these outcomes. This last piece of
information is important, since it indicates the amount of time likely to be available for
recovery from the initiating event. These issues are discussed in the following section.
2.2 Event Tree Limitations
To better illustrate the dynamic response of the holdup tank to the initiating event
"Pump 1 Fails Off," some of the different possible system response scenarios are shown in
Figure 2.3. The scenarios include changes in loop states, failures (denoted by an asterisk),
changes in tank level, and changes in the rate of change of tank level (dL/dt). For
example, starting with Box 1, three possible state changes may occur. Either the valve
may transfer closed (with rate Ay), Pump 2 may start spuriously (with rate Ap), or the
tank level may drop to a, (before either of the two failure events occurs).
Figure 2.3 shows that the behavior of the holdup tank system is fairly complex. This
is because of the control laws specified in Table 2.1. These govern the sequence of demands
on the control loops, which in turn, determines the possible sequences of specific failure
modes. Thus, the sequences 1 -. 10 -411 -417 and 1 -4 10 -418 lead to two different outcomes
(dryout and overflow, respectively), even though they both involve the sequential failure of
Pump 2 and the valve. In the former scenario, the valve fails to close on demand (i.e., the
valve is failed open) when the tank level reaches a control region boundary (L = a,),
whereas in the latter, the valve fails closed before a, is reached.
As a result of this complex dynamic behavior, the simplistic quantification of
Eq. (2.1) can lead to erroneous results. As an example, the first term in Eq. (2.1) models
the likelihood of demand failure for the valve as the frequency that the valve will fail on a
single demand. However, scenarios can be easily generated where the valve is demanded
more than once. One such sequence of events is: valve closes when L = a,, Pump 2 fails
on, valve opens when L = a2, valve fails to close when L = a,. This sequence is partially
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represented in Figure 2.3 as the path 1 -+ 2 -+ 3 - 4 - 13 -+ 14. Although a number of events
are involved, it is not very unlikely. Assuming that the demand failure frequency does not
change with the number of demands and that the failure time scale is much larger than the
time scale for tank level changes, the likelihood of this single sequence is approximately
given by
P{sequence} = (1 - #v). (1 - #y) -v (2.2)
which could easily be of the same order as #y. Similar results can be obtained for all other
sequences in which the valve eventually fails to close when L = a,. Thus, Eq. (2.1) could
be significantly non-conservative.
A second result of neglecting the system dynamics is that the distribution of the
times to overflow and dryout cannot be accurately obtained. Consider the sequences
1 -4 10 -+ 18 and 1 - 19 -4 20 in Figure 2.3. Both involve the premature closing of the valve
and the premature stopping of Pump 2, and both lead to overflow, but the order of failures
is reversed. In the first case, the tank level continues to drop after the failure of Pump 2,
and there is very little time available for the valve to fail. (If the valve doesn't fail in this
mode, dryout is likely to occur.) In the second case, the failure of the valve leads to a
quasi-stable tank level. Therefore, much longer times to overflow can be expected.
This application shows that a hardware-oriented application of the event tree
methodology does not properly quantify the likelihood of the dynamic event sequences,
since it does not treat the physical behavior of the system. Further, the event tree cannot
be used to determine the distribution of the time to an undesired end state for these
sequences.
2.3 Expanded Event Trees
Chapter 1 identifies five different strategies that are often employed (singly or in
combination) in an event tree analysis to deal with issues associated with dynamic accident
scenarios. These involve the use of: event sequence diagrams, conservative assumptions,
top event ordering, event tree modules for different accident phases, and detailed offline
analyses (e.g., for thermal hydraulic plant behavior). A sixth strategy, related to the
fourth, is to use a more detailed (i.e., an expanded) event tree.
Typical modifications of the event structure that could lead to better treatment of
process variables and time dependence include:
0 explicit inclusion of key values of process variables in top events (e.g. system
pressure > 2200 psig),
0 treatment of accident phases (including the use of repeated top events),
e use of multiple branches under a top event heading, and
0 treatment of detailed operator actions.
The above modifications have been implemented to some extent in a number of
studies. A study of Babcock and Wilcox plants to determine the risk significance of
Category C events (i.e., events that require significant safety system and timely operator
response to mitigate) has produced a substantially expanded event tree for the loss of
feedwater event (see Figure 2.4) [28]. The tree treats operator actions (e.g., top events D,
G, and L) and functional headings in considerable detail. Ref. 28 states that the large tree
is useful for providing deeper insights concerning the impact of physical events (e.g., minor
overcooling), recovery actions, and cognitive errors. Furthermore, the detail of the tree
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allows a reasonable mapping of actual loss of feedwater events into the tree (for use in a
precursor analysis).
Other uses of expanded event trees are provided in Ref. 31 (in a human reliability
analysis) and in the NUREG-1150 Accident Progression Event Trees (APETs) created for
the analysis of events following core damage (e.g., [13]). In the latter case, over 100 top
events can be used. Further, there can be more than two branches per top event.
Figure 2.5 shows a portion of a simple expanded event tree created for the holdup
tank problem (assuming that the initiating event is the failure of Pump 1). It can be seen
that this tree is simply a reformatted version of the diagram provided in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.5, however, is much less compact. It could become extremely large when
accounting for the different possible orderings of failure events in different sequences.
Conceptually, it is important to note that, unlike Figure 2.3, the expanded event tree does
not convey as easily the idea of competing processes. For example, the notion that the first
transition to occur following the initiating event is the outcome of three parallel random
processes (water level dropping towards a,, valve failure, Pump 2 failure) is much clearer
in Figure 2.3.
This is not to say that the expanded event tree cannot be used to solve the problem.
As long as the branching frequencies (or "conditional split fractions") are specified
correctly, the sequence frequencies can be properly quantified. For example, consider the
first branching shown in Figure 2.5. The frequency that the tank level (L) falls to a, before
any failures occur is given by
Fr{L reaches a, before failures} = Fr{(Ti- 2 < T 1io) AND (Ti-2 < Ti-19)} (2.3)
where the subscripts refer to the transitions shown in Figure 2.3, i.e.,
T1-2 mtime for level to reach a, (assuming no failures)
_L o - a,
TI.10 afailure time for Pump 2
Tj.1g 3failure time for the valve
L o initial tank level
4v rate of level decrease due to open valve
Assuming that the failures of Pump 2 and the valve are independent Poisson processes with
rates Ap and Ay, respectively, it can be easily shown that
Fr{L reaches a, before failures} = e-(Ap + Ay)Ti- 2  (2.4)
The frequencies of subsequent branches in the tree can be similarly found with only slightly
more algebra. Note that, since the distribution for the overall scenario duration is a
desired output, distributions for the transition times must be developed along with the
branching frequencies for each scenario.
This discussion shows how event trees can be used to explicitly handle process
variables through expansion (assuming that there is a process variable simulator to update
the process variable values). Human actions can be incorporated in expanded event trees
in the same manner as used for conventional event trees (e.g., as shown in Figure 2.4). The
scenario history is explicitly represented by the ordering of the top events in the tree
structure; this same ordering provides a limited treatment of time progression as well.
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On the other hand, it can be seen that the event tree representation will become
extremely complicated when several process variables, several components, and multiple
component states must be treated. In addition to the extremely (if not excessively) large
trees required, the analysis will require an assessment of the branching frequencies and
transition times, and can become quite burdensome when dealing with multiple parallel
processes. The methodology does not treat the cognitive activity of the operating crew,
and does not treat time dependence explicitly. Regarding the latter point, loops or even
simple events at multiple points in time (e.g., multiple relief valve challenges) cannot be
treated without some arbitrary truncation rules (to limit a priori the number of repetitions
allowed for a given top event). These limitations can be overcome. To do this, however,
requires a time-dependent extension of the event tree concept, as described in Chapter 3.
2.4 Analytical Methodologies
As shown in the preceding section, the expanded event tree methodology has only a
limited capability for treating systems whose time-dependent behavior is important. This
section reviews three analytical methodologies capable of treating time dependence to a
greater extent: event sequence diagrams, the GO-FLOW methodology, and Markov
modeling. The difference between these methodologies and the simulation-based
methodologies discussed in Section 2.5 is that the former require the analyst to explicitly
define system states and transitions between states. The latter require the analyst to
define rules of behavior for the system. The system states, and the likelihood of a given
accident scenario trajectory through state space, are defined implicitly as the outcome of
the modeling rules.
2.4.1 Event Sequence Diagrams
Event sequence diagrams (ESDs) can be viewed as generalized event trees. Like
event trees, they show possible scenarios stemming from an initiating event. Unlike event
trees, they are not necessarily restricted in their presentation of event sequences. For
example, Figure 2.3, which is actually an ESD, includes failure event ordering in its
definition of accident scenarios. More generally, ESDs can provide a more literal
representation of the plant state, indicating the behavior of key process variables and even
operators, as well as hardware state changes. ESDs have been used for some time in
conventional risk assessment studies as qualitative aids for event tree construction; more
recently, they have been used as quantitative tools in a study of a simple chemical process
system [32], in a phased mission study [33], and in a risk assessment for a research reactor[10].
It should be noted that the terminology "event sequence diagram" is not universally
used for these quantitative analyses, perhaps to reduce the possibility of confusion with the
qualitative diagrams used as event tree precursors. For example, Ref. 10 refers to its
scenario models as "scenario trees." However, "ESD" is a useful label for the class of
models lying in between the extended event trees described earlier and the dynamic event
trees described in Chapter 3.
One particular ESD analysis, described in Ref. 121, provides a useful illustration of
the potential advantages and disadvantages of ESDs for quantitative accident scenario
analysis. Ref. 12 proposes a simple state-transition model for treating time-dependent
accident scenarios. For a given initiating event, the different states of the plant are
represented using the sequences in the conventional event tree for that initiating event.
'Again, the authors of Ref. 12 do not refer to their model as an ESD.
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Thus, a dynamic scenario can be treated as a sequence of transitions between event
sequences, as illustrated in Figure 2.6. ESDs showing possible transitions are then
developed (see Figure 2.7).
The objectives of the analysis are: to determine the frequency that the plant arrives
at a particular state (event tree sequences) at time ti, and to determine the likelihood that
the plant stays in that state until an undesired event (e.g., core uncovery) occurs.
Achievement of the first objective requires the modeling of operator error, including errors
of commission; achievement of the second requires knowledge of the time remaining until
the undesired event occurs. This requires a model for the ongoing physical processes in the
plant.
It is worth noting that, unlike conventional event tree analyses, Ref. 12 uses the
event tree sequences to represent the instantaneous plant state, rather than the
combinations of overall success or failure of the different accident mitigating systems.
Thus, the restoration of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) 8 minutes into the TMI
accident is represented as a transition from Sequence 4 to Sequence 2 in Figure 2.6. In a
conventional event tree analysis, on the other hand, it would be recognized that the
criterion for AFWS success was met (the system was restored in sufficient time), and,
therefore, the scenario does not ever follow the lower branch for AFWS.
To implement the general concept, Ref. 12 presents a limited analysis of TMI-like
accidents. It is presumed that a loss of feedwater event occurs at a pressurized water
reactor, and that an auxiliary feedwater system and a high pressure injection system
(HPIS) are potentially available to mitigate the initiating event. The initial state
frequencies are determined using the frequency of the sequence and the (hardware)
unavailabilities of the mitigating systems (AFWS and HPIS). Recognizing that runtime
failures are extremely unlikely, the analysis focuses on state transitions due to operator
misdiagnosis; the likelihood of misdiagnosis is treated statistically using a Bayesian model,
where the evidence used is obtained from four stuck-open pilot-operated relief valve
(PORV) events. The likelihood of remaining in a given state until core uncovery occurs is
computed assuming that the three transition times respectively associated with: turning off
the HPIS, recovering from misdiagnosis, and closing the PORV block valve, are
exponentially distributed. The time to core uncovery is calculated using a response surface
based on the predictions of a simple thermal hydraulic model; uncertainties in the model
predictions are treated explicitly.
In the limited implementation covered in Ref. 12, the transition frequencies do not
depend on the scenario history (i.e., the analysis is Markovian, as discussed in the following
section). The ESD framework can, in principle, accommodate scenario history if the
number and order of transitions between states are tracked (as in Figure 2.3). The
difference between this approach and the DYLAM and dynamic event tree approaches
described later is that time is not used as an explicit parameter for branching. All
branches in the ESD are determined by changes in system state; time enters only as an
implicit parameter quantifying the length of stay in a state (which can affect the branching
frequencies).
Figure 2.3 shows how ESDs can better represent a dynamic accident scenario than a
comparable event tree. Thus, although this ESD is quantified in the same manner as the
extended event tree [e.g., see Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4)], the analyst is provided with a clearer
picture of the multiple competing processes, aiding the formulation of the proper
probabilistic model for the branching frequencies. Ref. 12 shows how ESDs can be used to
quantify scenarios involving more complicated process physics and operator actions.
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The primary drawback of the approach is its requirement that all system states and
state transitions be explicitly defined at the beginning of the analysis. For complex
systems, this can lead to the development of an extremely large ESD. Even more
importantly, it is not clear how the states (and transitions) should be defined to treat the
cognitive activity of the operators. Although Ref. 12 treats the difficult error of
commission problem, it does so on a behavioral basis. When data for errors are available
and judged to be relevant (Ref. 12 analyzes such a case), the analysis can be performed in a
straightforward manner. When data are not available, as is often the case when
investigating rare events, the modeling framework needs to be extended to treat the
processes underlying the operator actions.
2.4.2 GO-FLOW
One of the key requirements of an improved accident scenario analysis methodology
is that it be able to treat time dependence. One area where time dependence is of interest
involves phased mission scenarios. These are scenarios in which the progression of an
accident can be divided into a predetermined number of phases of specified duration, and in
which the model boundary conditions can be different in each of the phases [34,35]. For
example, early in an accident, a certain cooling system may be called upon to perform at
100% capacity, whereas later in the accident, only 50% output may be needed. A phased
mission analysis will account for the different success criteria for each phase. It can also
account for variations in failure frequency parameters for the phases.
A conventional approach towards phased mission analysis (using the event tree/fault
tree methodology) is to distinguish the accident phases in the event tree, and to develop
separate system fault trees for each phase. As pointed out in Ref. 36, this can lead to a
complex representation, especially since basic failure events must be distinguished
according to accident phase. Ref. 36 shows how the GO-FLOW methodology, introduced
in Ref. 20 as a time-dependent availability methodology, can be used to treat the phased
mission problem in a more compact manner. The name "GO-FLOW" indicates that this
methodology is derived from the earlier GO methodology [37], but concentrates on
modeling the flow of physical signals in a system.
GO-FLOW can be viewed as an upgraded reliability block diagram methodology.
Similar to the reliability block diagram approach (see, for example, [38]), the analyst
creates a diagram showing how a signal propagates through the system of interest. The
probability of output at any pcint in time is determined algebraically, using the standard
laws of probability. Unlike rehability block diagrams analyses (but similar to a GO
analysis), a number of predefined operators are used to assist the analyst to create a
GO-FLOW chart. The operators represent different failure modes, logic operators, and
signal generators. The last are used to send signals into the model at predefined times, and
can therefore be used as triggers that signal the beginning and end of each accident phase.
A second difference between GO-FLOW and conventional reliability block diagrams
is due to the former's emphasis on physical signals. Unlike reliability block diagrams, the
output of a GO-FLOW analysis is the probability that a signal (e.g., flow, electric current)
exists at a given point in time. Whether signal existence represents "success" or "failure"
must be specified by the user.
To briefly illustrate the GO-FLOW approach in the context of the holdup tank
example, Figure 2.8 and Tables 2.3-2.5 show a GO-FLOW model for the first two phases
of a holdup tank accident scenario which follow an initial failure of Pump 1. These two
phases represent the period where the tank level drops, and the (instantaneous) period
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where the control laws for the tank change when the level reaches a,. The figure shows the
GO-FLOW operators used to model component failure modes, and the linkages between
the operators; these operators are defined in Figure 2.9. Of particular interest in the
phased mission analysis is the Type 40 operator; this is used to link the outputs of the
different model parts used to model the different phases. The tables define the signals
entering the system, the time points for which results are to be generated, and the stepwise
computation procedure used to compute the probability of an output signal at the different
time points. This probability is developed using the probability of input signals,
information concerning the existence of subinput signals, and the operator definitions of
Figure 2.9.
The holdup tank problem is not a typical problem for GO-FLOW, since the
methodology is designed to handle binary systems in phased mission situations. An
additional modeling assumption, required to develop the model shown, is that the analyst
is only interested in the time-dependent probability of success. Any deviation from
nominal behavior defined by Table 2.1 is treated as failure and is not further modeled.
With this assumption, the duration of the first phase in the accident is known (it is
specified by the initial tank level and the valve flow rate) and the problem is also a binary
one.
In the case of more prototypical applications, the primary advantage of GO-FLOW
identified by Refs. 20 and 36, as compared with -the event tree /fault tree approach, lies
with is compactness of representation of the phased mission problem. Ref. 36 provides an
example, involving a number of multicomponent systems, which shows that a complex
phased mission analysis can be performed with a single GO-FLOW model. It is also shown
that the system's time-dependent availability function can be developed in a single run.
However, the methodology has some drawbacks. GO-FLOW is not designed to
easily provide structural information regarding the system (i.e., the minimal cut sets), nor
are importance measures computations provided. This information, routinely provided by
fault tree and event tree analyses, is quite important when trying to decide how to reduce
the system risk/unavailability. Further, GO-FLOW does not directly treat common cause
failures, which frequently dominate the unavailability of redundant systems. An analyst
can work around some of these problems (for example, an extra operator can be introduced
to deal with common cause failure), but this can lead to model elements that don't directly
correspond to actual objects in the system, and diminishes the easy interpretation of the
GO-FLOW model.
With regard to the issues emphasized in this report, it is important to recognize that,
as mentioned earlier, phased mission analysis deals with situations where the changes in
system performance requirements (and other boundary conditions) are predetermined.
Thus, GO-FLOW can be used to analyze more dynamic problems, such as the holdup tank
problem, only after some simplifications in the problem statement.
2.4.3 Markov Models
Markov modeling is a well-known technique that can be used for assessing the
time-dependent availability of many dynamic systems (e.g., see [39-41]). To apply this
technique, the analyst constructs a state-transition diagram indicating the possible
(discrete) system states and the possible transitions between states.
In a "Markov chain" process (to use the terminology of Ref. 41), transitions between
states are assumed to occur only at discrete points in time. In the case of uniform time
intervals, therefore, transitions can occur at t=O, t=At, t=2At, etc. The weight on an arc
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going from State j to State i, pij, is then defined as the conditional probability of transition
from state j to i, given that the system is currently in state j. Notationally,
pij a P{transition from j to i in next At I currently in state j} (2.5)
In a "discrete Markov process", on the other hand, transitions between states are allowed
to occur at any point in time. The transition time from state j to state i, Tij, is assumed
to be exponentially distributed with rate Aij, and Aij (instead of pij) is the weight assigned
to the arc connecting State j and State i.
Eq. (2.5) shows that the essential feature of a Markov model for a system is that the
system is assumed to be memoryless. Transition probabilities therefore depend only on the
current state, and not on how the system arrived in the current state (i.e., what path was
followed in the state-transition diagram), or how long it took to arrive in the current state.
This assumption places some restrictions on the applicability of Markov analysis to general
dynamic systems.
Once the weights are assigned to the arcs, the probability that the system is in a
given state at a given point in time can be found quite easily. In the case of a discrete
Markov chain, the column vector of time-dependent state probabilities, P(t), is developed
using:
P(t) = Mp*P(t - At) (2.6)
where
P(t) E column vector of state probabilities Pj(t)
P (t) P{in state j at time t}
MP Ematrix of state-transition probabilities pij
In the case of a continuous Markov system analysis, P(t) is found by solving a coupled set
of first order, constant coefficient, ordinary differential equations:
= My*P(t) (2.7)
where M, is the matrix of coefficients whose off-diagonal elements are the transition rates
Aij and whose diagonal elements are such that the matrix columns sum to zero. The
simple forms of Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) are due to the assumption that the system is
memoryless. Both equations can be easily solved, given the initial probability vector P(O).
It can be seen that Markov models are simple in concept. The challenge is to define
a set of states useful for the problem of interest, and to quantify the likelihood of the
transitions between states.
Refs. 9 and 42 present an application of Markov chain modeling to the problem of
process system reliability analysis. In this application, the discrete system states are
defined in terms of ranges of process variables as well as component status. Ref. 43
formulates a more general representation allowing for the continuous variation of process
variables.
To illustrate the approach adopted by Refs. 9 and 42, consider the holdup tank
problem described in Section 2.1. (As noted earlier, this is a slightly generalized version of
a sample problem presented in Ref. 9.) In this problem, the system state at any point in
time is defined by the current statuses of the pumps and valve, and by the current level of
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the tank. Thus, for example, the initial system state is {Pump 1 On, Pump 2 Off, Valve
Open, L = Lo} where Lo is the initial level of the tank. The transition probabilities (pij)
are therefore dependent both on the failure processes for the components and on the tank
level change process. The latter process is not entirely deterministic because the rate at
which the level changes is a function of component status.
Two simplifying assumptions are employed to allow the development of the pij.
First, it is assumed that any component status change in a given time interval takes effect
at the end of the interval. Thus, a transition such as
{Pump 1 On, Pump 2 Off, Valve Open, L = L1}
{Pump 1 Failed Off, Pump 2 On, Valve Failed Open, L = L2}
is ruled out (i.e., pij = 0) because at the beginning of the time step, the rate of tank inflow
matches the rate of outflow. The flow mismatch and tank level changes resulting from the
failures of Pump 1 and the valve, and the startup of Pump 2, are not applied until the next
time step.
Second, it is assumed that, given that the tank level is within a given control range
(e.g., at L < a2), the probability density function for the level is uniform. The pij then
depend only on the particular control region currently occupied, and not on the exact value
of the tank level. As a result, the state definitions only need to indicate ranges of L; the
initial state is, for example, {Pump 1 On, Pump 2 Off, Valve Open, a, L < a2}.
To show how these assumptions are used to develop the pij, consider the transition
State j - State i
where
State j {Pump 1 Failed Off, Pump 2 Off, Valve Open, a, L < a2}
State i E{Pump 1 Failed Off, Pump 2 On, Valve Failed Open, a < L < a'}
In order for this transition to occur in the next At, a) Pump 1 must stay failed, b) Pump 2
must start on demand (when the tank level reaches ai) and not fail while running, c) the
valve must either fail to close on demand (when the tank level reaches ai) or transfer open
after successfully closing, and d) the current tank level must be such that, after At, the
new tank level will be in the new control region (a < L < ai). Letting 4y represent the rate
at which the tank level changes due to the open valve, this means that the current tank
level is restricted by
L < ai+ IyAt (2.8)
(assuming that IyAt is sufficiently small that the tank level cannot drop below the dryout
level in the next At, i.e., that L > a + eyAt). Neglecting the possibility of repair, the
transition probability can be approximated by
pij - 1-[(1 - #p)(1 - ApAt)]-[#v + AvAt]- IVA (2.9)
[0v + AvAt]. [ I t1[a2- ail
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The last bracketed term arises from the assumption of a flat probability density
function for L within a control region. In principle, this can be better treated by more
finely dividing the tank level regions. Such an approach, however, will lead to a much
larger transition matrix Mp, and is likely to be impractical, as discussed below.
The primary strength of this Markov approach for treating process systems is that,
unlike the methodologies discussed earlier, it treats the dynamic behavior of systems. The
methodology explicitly accounts for process variable variation and control laws modifying
system configuration according to process variable variations. The methodology also
incorporates time explicitly, and can be extended to cover situations where problem
parameters are time dependent (e.g., using the method of stages [39]). An additional useful
characteristic is that, like other analytically based approaches, it calculates results for rare
event sequences as easily as it does for likely event sequences. This can be contrasted with
the results obtained from simulation approaches, discussed in Section 2.5, where rare event
sequences may not be sampled at all.
The primary weakness of the approach is that it requires explicit evaluation of the
transition matrix Mp. This matrix can get unmanageably large for even a modest number
of process variables and component states; if there are m process variables and n
components, the (square) matrix is of dimension
[m n
i 1 j=1
where
ki = number of possible values for process variable i
lj = number of possible states for component j
In the simple holdup tank problem used in this section, each of the three components has
four possible states, and the tank level can have one of five values. Even including the fact
that two of the tank level values (L < a and L > b) represent absorbing conditions for
which detailed breakdowns of component status are not needed this problem requires the
evaluation and manipulation of 194 x 194 = 37636 coefficients (pij). Computer algorithms
for developing the pij, such as that described in Ref. 9, are required for practical
application of the methodology.
Even when the pj are computed automatically, the problem of matrix manipulation
can become important for realistic problems (where the number of components is likely to
be much larger). The problem of large transition matrices in systems not involving process
variables is generally treated by using state ordering and merging techniques that exploit
the low likelihood of multiple failure events (for small enough At) and system symmetries
(e.g., [44]). Ref. 42 applies failure modes and effects analysis to group the components in a
dynamic system analysis. Formal extensions of state merging methods for treating
dynamic systems need to be explored.
A second disadvantage of the Markov approach is inherent in its basic assumption; it
neglects past events when computing transition probabilities. In the case of simple
systems, this is often a reasonable approximation. However, in problems involving
operator actions or complex physical phenomena, past history can be important, since this
can affect the decision making process of the operators. The memoryless assumption can
be rectified by redefining system states to include past history (e.g., by including process
variable derivatives as part of the state definitions), but this will clearly increase the size of
the transition matrix.
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A third problem is pointed out by Ref. 9: the procedure to mechanically generate the
transition matrix can become extremely complicated when there are more than three
process variables involved. This is largely a problem of dividing the control region into
disjoint partitions and defining failure values of variables within the partition boundary.
2.5 Simulation Modeling
Computer-based simulation modeling, in which the response of the system is encoded
impli ly as a set of rules in a computer program, rather than an explicit mathematical
structure (such as an event tree or transition probability matrix), provides an attractive
alternative to analytical modeling for treating large, complex, dynamic systems. This
section discusses two different simulation approaches: an event-tree like methodology that
employs the physical equations for process variable behavior (DYLAM), and discrete event
simulation.
2.5.1 DYLAM
The dynamic logical analytical methodology, or DYLAM, provides a framework to
explicitly treat time, process variables and system behavior [21,26]. In contrast with the
other methodologies discussed earlier, it integrates the equations governing system physical
behavior with a hardware model; the effects of hardware failures are propagated inductively
through the system (via changes in the equation boundary conditions). DYLAM analyses
have been performed for a number of systems, including chemical process systems. Recent
references employing DYLAM have also integrated models for operator behavior [29,30],
although these have not yet been applied to a full plant-level accident scenario study.
The general procedure used to employ DYLAM is conceptually direct. First, a
physical model for the system is constructed. If needed, a model for the operating crew is
also constructed. The physical model predicts the response of system process variables to
changes in component status (e.g., hardware failures). It is constructed by linking physical
models for system components, where the component models predict the changes in process
variables due to changes in component states. A model for a pump, for example, may
consist of a set of equations for the pump head, each equation applying to a different pump
state. The operating crew model described in Ref. 29 quantifies the time dependent state
of stress of the operators and the "salience" of key indicators/cues (also time dependent).
Both the stress and the salience functions are computed as deterministic functions of the
scenario history.
The next step is to define the undesired system states. These are defined in terms of
process variable levels, rather than hardware states, and are used to determine when a
particular accident sequence simulation should be terminated.
Finally, the system model is used to simulate all possible accident sequences as
follows. Starting at t = 0 and some user-defined initial state, the system model is used to
determine the change in process variable levels (if any) in the next At. (Ref. 26 indicates
how At can be chosen to reflect the failure rates of the system components; however the
choice of At is up to the user's discretion.) At the end of the first time interval (0,At), all
possible combinations of component states, i.e., all possible system hardware states, are
identified and their likelihood calculated. These states are then used to provide boundary
conditions for the next round of process variable updating; the generation of an event
sequence continues in this manner until an absorbing state is reached.
It should be noted that the calculations of the likelihoods for the different component
states incorporate the behaviors of control systems and operators. For the latter,
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Ref. 29 describes the treatment of three error types: slips, lapses, and mistakes. In general,
slips are errors resulting from unintended actions (e.g., when an operator pushes a button
without intending to do so). Ref. 29 models the impact of a slip as an error of omission,
since the slip prevents the performance of the intended action. Such errors are generated
during the simulation in two ways. First, when the crew stress exceeds a fixed threshold, it
is assumed that the actions originally planned by the operators are not performed. Second,
when the salience of a given cue falls below a fixed threshold, it is assumed that the
operators will not perceive the cue (and therefore will not perform the associated action).
Lapses, errors due to the operators' forgetting of key information, are treated as
misreadings of key indicators (e.g., perhaps the value read from a meter is forgotten and an
incorrect value is used in the operators' decision making) and subsequent performance of
actions based on incorrect information. The stress function is used to determine the
probability of a lapse. Finally, mistakes, which represents errors in intentions, are treated
as being due to gaps or misinformation in the knowledge base of the operators.
Of the three error types, both the slips and mistakes are treated as being
deterministic. In the case of slips, the stress and the salience models generate errors in the
same manner that the plant physical model for process variables generates demands for
hardware systems. Mistakes are generated when the operators' knowledge does not match
the requirements of the scenario. Lapses, on the other hand, are treated stochastically,
since the current crew stress level affects the probability of a lapse.
DYLAM can be viewed as an alternate representation of an extended Markov model.
DYLAM explicitly models the time-dependent state transitions implied by the Markov
transition matrix; it differs from a Markov model in that the transitions probabilities can
depend on scenario history. DYLAM can also be viewed as a simulation-based dynamic
event tree generator. Event tree branchings occur at discrete points in time. Each
branching can (and usually should) result in multiple branches, each branch corresponding
to a possible set of system changes.
Clearly, in order to practically apply DYLAM to realistic problems, rules for limiting
the event tree expansion need to be provided. One such rule is provided by the undesired
states defined prior to the start of the simulation. These states are used as absorbing
states; all event sequences reaching absorbing states are terminated upon arrival. A
number of branching and stopping rules are described in Ref. 26, including: a) sequence
termination when the sequence probability drops below a user-specified level, and
b) sequence termination when the number of failures in a sequence exceeds a user-specified
level. The latter is equivalent to the pruning of high order minimal cut sets.
Figure 2.10 illustrates the logical branching in an application of DYLAM to the
holdup tank problem. Not shown are the process variable calculations (the simple
equations governing tank level rate of change), or the probability calculations. The figure
shows two situations where sequence expansion is truncated on the basis of probability:
when multiple failures must occur in a single time interval, and when a component must
fail randomly before a control region boundary is reached (the time scale of Figure 2.10 is
such that the tank level will take roughly a single At to reach a different control region).
This example shows how DYLAM can handle dynamic aspects of the interaction
between time dependent process variables, hardware, and control systems. As discussed
above, DYLAM can model scenarios in which past events can affect the likelihood of state
transitions (e.g., through using arbitrary transition time distributions). In addition,
because DYLAM uses the physical equations governing system behavior to determine
system success and failure, it reduces a certain amount of judgment required of analysts.
In particular, it eliminates the need of the analyst to judge success criteria (both number of
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components and duration of operation), especially in complicated cases (e.g., intermittent
operation).
From a structural viewpoint, one important drawback of DYLAM is that it is limited
to the treatment of accidents where the number of different possible scenarios is relatively
small. In cases where the characteristic time scales of important dynamic processes is
small compared with the duration of the accident scenario, a small At must be used and
the number of possible scenarios increases geometrically. For example, if m components
are modeled, if each component has n possible states, and if k time steps are simulated, the
total number of sequences to be treated (in the absence of any truncation rules) is given by
# sequences = nm (2.11)
As a practical matter, truncation rules must be used on realistically sized problems. The
development of an efficient set of rules for complex scenarios, as well as of the physical
model implemented within DYLAM, is likely to be non-trivial and problem-specific. Note
that when truncation rules are used, DYLAM is not guaranteed to identify rare event
sequences, even if these sequences have extremely large consequences. (On the other hand,
an explicit Markov model will, in principle, identify these sequences.)
From an accident scenario analysis viewpoint, DYLAM provides a useful framework
for treating deterministic aspects of operator actions. The more recent DYLAM-based
models described in Refs. 29 and 30 represent major advances in the treatment of dynamic
scenarios as compared to conventional PRA analyses. The primary drawback of these
models is that stochastic aspects of the cognitive behavior of operators are not fully
integrated into the analysis.
A second problem with DYLAM in accident scenario analysis applications is that the
scenario calculations have the potential to be long and costly. This is because of DYLAM's
integrated treatment of plant process physics, as well as the potentially large number of
scenarios to be treated. (Discussions with the current developers of DYLAM indicate that
this problem becomes exaggerated to the point of impracticality when complex cognitive
models are coupled into the analysis.) Computational limitations can be partially dealt
with if an efficient algorithm is used to resolve the system equations. Computation times
can also be expected to decrease as increasingly fast computers become available.
2.5.2 Discrete Event Simulation
Discrete event simulation is a Monte Carlo simulation technique applicable to
dynamic systems. Unlike DYLAM, simultaneous tracking of all possible scenarios is not
done. Indeed, since this approach allows system state changes to occur at arbitrary points
in time, an infinite number of different scenarios is possible. Rather, a pattern of system
responses to an initiating event is built up by repeated sampling.
To simply illustrate the discrete event simulation approach, consider the event
sequence diagram for the holdup tank shown in Figure 2.3. Following the initial failure of
Pump 1, only three possible events can occur: 1) the tank level drops to a,, 2) Pump 2 fails
on, or 3) the valve fails closed. The failure times for the valve and pump are random
variables, whereas the occurrence time for the first event is deterministic.
In order to determine which event occurs first, the failure time distributions for the
valve and the pump must be sampled from. Assume that, for the given trial, the resulting
sample for the times {T 1-2,T 1 _10 ,T 1-19} are {t 1-2 ,t 1 -1 0 ,t 1 -19 }, and that t 1-2 < t i-i < t 1 -10.
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To organize the simulation, the event occurrence times are put into the simulation's
"master schedule" (also called event calendar or pending list) in the order of their
occurrence times, as shown in Figure 2.1la. This master schedule is a key entity in a
discrete event simulation. It indicates what events are scheduled to occur and when they
are scheduled to occur. Furthermore, because event occurrence is associated with the
execution of some subroutine in the simulation, the master schedule implicitly defines the
set of actions to be performed as a result of event occurrence.
Figure 2.11a shows that there are no other events scheduled before the tank level
reaches ai (i.e., Event 1). Therefore, the simulation clock is advanced to time t = t 1 2 , and
the event "level reaches a," is executed, with two consequences. First, an immediate
demand is placed on the valve to close, as per the control laws in Table 2.1 (as in
Figure 2.3 it is assumed that Pump 2 will start if L = ai and the valve fails to close). This
is the fourth scheduled event in the sequence. Second, the originally scheduled Events 2
and 3 (the failure of the valve and Pump 2) are no longer relevant; these events are
removed from the master schedule. The resulting master schedule after these changes is
shown in Figure 2.11b. Figures 2.11c and d continue the development of the scenario, and
Figure 2.12 illustrates the time-dependent tank level for the scenario.
This example shows how a scenario is treated by dynamically modifying the master
schedule. The execution of a given event can inject additional events into the schedule or
can lead to the removal of events from the schedule. More generally, the execution of an
event can lead to arbitrarily complex changes in the current system state, the master
schedule, or even in the rules used to model system responses to change; the only limiting
factor is the ability of the analyst to encode these changes into the simulation. It can be
seen that this simulation approach can be used to model more complicated processes,
including operator behavior.
Note that once the event occurrence times are generated, the scenario depicted in
Figure 2.12 can be followed deterministically. Variability in system behavior due to
randomness (or state-of-knowledge uncertainty) can be represented only after repeated
trials.
Currently, discrete event simulation is not widely used in risk and reliability
assessment. Monte Carlo simulation has been used to determine fault tree cut sets and to
quantify top event probabilities (e.g., [45]), and is almost universally used to perform
uncertainty propagation. However, largel because the issue of system dynamic response is
a relatively recent one in risk assessment (e.g., see [19,21]), discrete event simulation, with
its capability for treating dynamic systems, has only been used in a few analyses.
Refs. 46, 15, and 47 describe discrete event simulation analyses based on the
simulation language SIMSCRIPT 11.5 [48]. Ref. 46 treats delays in the physical response of
a chemical process system to failure events. Ref. 15 models the recovery of electric power
in a nuclear plant risk assessment; the variable task completion times for operators
responding to a loss of power are modeled explicitly.
Ref. 47 describes a discrete event simulation computer code (also written using
SIMSCRIPT 11.5) for system availability analysis. In this code, called DYMCAM (for
dynamic availability model), components are modeled as separate objects (i.e., the code
creates separate subroutines for each component). Note that this approach allows the
construction of a system model whose objects correspond directly with objects in the actual
system. At the cost of some loss of computational efficiency, such a one-to-one model can
be more transparent and, therefore, more easily maintainable than the models associated
with some of the other methodologies described earlier.
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Similar to the CAT methodology [49] and GO-FLOW [20], DYMCAM treats links
between components using physical signals; a generic component is pictured in Figure 2.13.
Changes in component status can be triggered by changes in the input signals, external
events (e.g., maintenance actions), or simple random failures. The former are governed by
rules encoded in the simulation. Table 2.6 provides an example of these rules, used to
model an active component (e.g., a pump). Ref. 47 also describes an analysis of the holdup
tank problem. This analysis requires some small extensions of DYMCAM, in order to treat
the continuous process variable L (tank level).
At the accident sequence level, Ref. 27 performs a discrete event simulation of a
shutdown heat removal system which accounts for the dynamic response of the system as
subsystem failures arise. The method also treats increases in component failure rates as
the scenario progresses (due to increasing temperatures). Ref. 27 states that the simulation
model compares favorably with a similar Markov approach, not only because of its
increased level of detail, but also because the problem is such that the Markov model
transition matrix becomes too large for practical analysis.
More recently, Refs. 50 and 51 describes a simulation model (written in SIMSCRIPT
11.5) for control room crews in nuclear power plants intended for eventual use in accident
scenario analysis. The model treats the cognitive activities of each individual operator, and
the communication between the operators. It has been used with quite good success to
simulate the behavior of ten different crews performing training exercises for a steam
generator tube rupture accident.
It can be seen that discrete event simulation has the ability to treat all of the issues
of interest in dynamic accident scenario analysis: hardware state, process variables,
operator state of mind, scenario history, and time. However, there are at least two
technical issues that need to be better resolved before it can be practically employed.
First, it is well known that, even when dealing with simple simulation models, direct
Monte Carlo sampling is often an inefficient method for developing estimators of average
system performance. The method becomes progressively worse when attempting to
estimate higher moments of system performance measures (e.g., when estimating the
variance), since the estimates rely on good sampling from the tails of the distribution for
the performance measures. This problem is greatly exaggerated when simulation is used in
risk assessment, because such an assessment, almost invariably, deals with extremely rare
events. On the other hand, improved sampling schemes are usually very problem specific
and expensive to develop. Ref. 15 employs a simplistic conditional Monte Carlo scheme in
which it the sampling is conditioned on a limited number of predefined system failure
states. Ref. 52, in a simulation analysis of a feedback control system first analyzed in
Ref. 22, employs various variance reduction techniques (including stratified sampling,
importance sampling, and antithetic variates) to obtain improved results. However, not
only is the effectiveness of a given variance reduction technique usually quite
problem-specific, the integration of these techniques with a model can greatly complicate
the model.
A second problem arises when trying to use the results of the simulation. The output
of the event trees and fault trees conventionally used in risk assessment includes not only a
"bottom line" estimate of the system risk, but also structural information indicating the
important contributors to risk. Armed with the knowledge of the most important event
sequences, in the case of event trees, or minimal cut sets, in the case of fault trees, the
system designer can take steps to reduce the overall risk.
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On the other hand, partly because it involves more detail, a discrete event simulation
analysis does not yield such information as easily. Counters can be provided to indicate
the failure events occurring in each trial; these can be used to estimate the frequency of
various cut sets. However, because these cut sets will not be minimal, some post
processing will be needed to filter out non-critical failures from the output. More
importantly, this approach is not useful when attempting to determine the importance of
other parameters governing system behavior. For example, it cannot directly identify
important continuous parameters (e.g., the value of a control setpoint), nor can it single
out critical operational policies that affect risk (e.g., decision rules for taking equipment
out of service for maintenance). Note that in the event tree/fault tree approach, answers
to these questions are also not provided directly, but can be readily obtained by back
tracking through the model (the computational path between input and results tends to be
more transparent because system dynamics are not treated in detail).
2.6 Evaluation of Methodologies
The ability to treat dynamic accident scenarios comes at a price; the addition of the
time dimension leads unavoidably to a more complicated analysis. Almost all of the
methodologies reviewed in this chapter are significantly more complex and have more
extensive data requirements than the conventional event tree methodology. (GO-FLOW
is the lone exception, but it does not appear that the GO-FLOW approach can be easily
extended to treat the issues of process variables and operator behavior central to this
report.) The question is not if there is a simple methodology to handle dynamic scenarios,
but rather which of the available methodologies has the greatest potential for near-term
practical application in PRA studies.
Within the group of analytical methodologies reviewed, event sequence diagrams are
currently being used to qualitatively model accident scenarios, and can be extended to
treat accident scenarios, as demonstrated by Ref. 12. Markov models 2 can treat process
variables with appropriate state definitions [9,431. Scenario history can also be treated to
some extent with careful state definitions. The method of stages [39], for example, can be
used to treat non-exponential distributions for transition times.
The primary drawback of these analytical approaches is their requirement that all
system states and state transitions be explicitly defined at the beginning of the analysis.
For complex systems, this can lead to the development of an extremely large model. Even
more importantly, it is not clear how the states (and transitions between states) should be
defined to represent the operators' state of mind. This problem must be addressed by the
simulation-based methodologies, of course. However, the latter are allowed to develop
these definitions implicitly in the form of rules that can be scenario-dependent and
employed only as the scenario is generated.
Both of the simulation methodologies described in this chapter can deal with the
issues of time, process variables, and scenario history. DYLAM presents a more structured
representation of an accident sequence, but requires a good deal of computer memory (to
store the accident sequences). Note that this difficulty with problem size is simply a
different manifestation of the same issue faced by the analytical methodologies. This
problem is dealt with in Markov modeling using state-merging techniques; DYLAM
2Most implementations of simulation models can be viewed as being Markovian with the
proper definition of "system state." For the sake of classification, this report distinguishes
these implementations from the conventional, analytically-based Markov models in which
the state transition matrix is defined and manipulated explicitly.
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employs truncation rules limiting the extent of event sequence branching to accomplish the
same goal. A more important issue involves the treatment of operator actions; current
implementations of the DYLAM framework allow only for limited stochastic variability in
operator actions. This limitation appears to be due to the treatment of operator behavior
within the existing structure of DYLAM (originally designed to develop hardware-oriented
accident scenarios), instead of within a modified structure designed explicitly to
accommodate operators.
Discrete event simulation, on the other hand, allows the treatment of more general
processes (i.e., processes too complex to represent accurately using a small number of
discrete states). It presents a more object oriented view of the system being modeled, and
lends itself to the creation of computer models whose objects (e.g., data structures and
subroutines) have a one-to-one correspondence with actual objects in the system being
simulated. This is a benefit when attempting to ensure that a model is maintainable. A
discrete event simulation analysis is expected to require less computer memory than a
comparable DYLAM analysis, but could easily require more computer time; this is because
each stored sequence in DYLAM must be generated from scratch in the Monte Carlo trials.
Intelligent sampling schemes are needed to reduce the run time requirements. These
schemes can greatly increase model complexity. A second drawback is that, in order to
take advantage of the flexibility offered by discrete event simulation (as compared with
DYLAM, for example), the analyst must develop much more detailed models for the
processes of interest. This clearly takes additional resources. Moreover, it tends to
increase the sensitivity of the overall model predictions to inaccuracies in its submodels. A
third potentially important drawback of the discrete event simulation approach is that its
results are not easily decomposed; the analyst must perform some additional
post-processing, and may even have to perform additional diagnostic runs, to identify the
principal contributors to risk.
Considering the needs of a dynamic accident scenario analysis, a DYLAM-based
approach appears to be the best candidate for near-term applications. Compared with the
analytical modeling approaches, it does not require the explicit definition of plant states
prior to the analysis. Compared with discrete event simulation, a DYLAM-based
approach:
* bears closer similarity with conventional event trees (which aids understanding by
those not familiar with the methodology), and
0 preserves the notion of discrete accident scenarios (which is useful for decomposing
risk for the purpose of risk management).
As demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., [27,47,51]), discrete event simulation remains
a promising approach. However, the amount of work required to develop a practical
method for risk analysis appears to be significantly greater.
The drawbacks with the current DYLAM methodology in the context of dynamic,
plant level scenario analysis are twofold. First, as discussed in Section 2.5.1, DYLAM has
a limited treatment of the stochastic behavior of operators (only lapses are modeled
stochastically, and these are treated in a binary fashion analogous to hardware failures).
Further, being originally designed to treat hardware-oriented scenarios, DYLAM appears
to lack the flexibility to integrate a general stochastic model for operators. The second
drawback is that, as indicated by its developers, DYLAM appears to be an impractical tool
for a full plant-level accident scenario analysis due to the large number of scenarios to be
quantified and the computational requirements of current cognitive models to be coupled
with the analysis.
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These drawbacks do not invalidate the general DYLAM concept. Rather, they
indicate: 1) areas where the DYLAM structure needs to be extended, and 2) the need for
significant approximations in practical applications. The following chapter describes an
extension of the DYLAM concept, the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM),
which deals with these problems and enables the practical analysis of dynamic accident
scenarios.
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Table 2.1 - Control Laws for Holdup Tank Problem [9]
Liquid Control Unit State
Level
(x) Valve Pump 1 Pump 2
Open
Open
Closed
On
Off
On
Off
Off
On
Table 2.2 - Characteristic Parameters For Tank Problem [9]
Control
Unit
Rate of
Level Change
Failure
Mode
Failure
Rate
Fail to Open/Close
Transfer Open/Closed
Fail to Start/Stop
Failed On/Off
Fail to Start/Stop
Failed On/Off
#v (/demand)
Ay (/hour)
P (/demand)
Ap (/hour)
#p (/demand)
Ap (/hour)
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ai < x < a2
a 2  X
x < a1i
Valve
Pump 1
Pump 2
IV
Iy
4y/2
Table 2.3 - GO-FLOW Signals for Holdup Tank Problem
Signal Definition
1 Flow source for pumps
2 Tank mass (flow source for valve)
3 Duration of Phase 1
- Lo - a,
4 Start signal (at t = T + t)
Table 2.4 - GO-FLOW Time Points for Holdup Tank Problem
Time Point
1
2
3
Definition
Start of scenario
End of Phase 1
End of Phase 2
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Table 2.5 - GO-FLOW Computation Chart for Holdup Tank Problem (Page 1 of 2)
Node IniputOutput* 1 2
-- 1
2
-- 3
-- 4
1 5(3)
5
2
6
7(3)
8 6,7 8
1
1
0
0
S Ii1-1-ApS3(1)]
=0
S2(1) e-AvS3(1)
= 1
S6(1)-S 7(1)
= 1
1
1
TI
0
S1(2) -(1 - e-Ap[S3(2)+S3(1))
=1-e~ AP7-1
e APT1
S2(2)-e--Av[S3(2)+S3(1)I
= e~AVTI
S6(2)-Sr(2)
= e-(Ap+Ay)rI
9 1 9(4) S (1)-09(1) S1
09(1) = Pp+(l-Pp)S4(1)Pg 09(2) = O9(1)+[1-O9(1)]S4(2)Pg
= 0
Sg(1) = 0 S
(2).Og(2)
= 0
9(2) = 0
1
1
0
1
SI(3)-
(1 - e-AP[S3(3)+S3(2)+S3(1)])
= 1-eApTI
e-ApTI
S2(3) -e-Av[S 3(3)+S 3(2)+S 3(1)]
= e
S6(3). S 7(3)
e-(Ap+Ay)Ti
S1(3).09(3)
Og(3) = 09(2)+[1-0(2)]S4( 3)Pg
= #p
S9(3) = #p
*Numbers in parentheses indicate that operator output is dependent on the presence of the indicated subinput signal.
1
2
3
4
r,
3
6
7
Table 2.5 - GO-FLOW Computation Chart for Holdup Tank Problem (Page 2 of 2)
Node InputOutput*
10 2 10(4)
1
S 2(1). 0 1(1)
O10(1) = (1-Pp)[1-S4(1)Pg]
= 1
Sio(1) = 1
11 10 11
12 9,11 6
13 8 13
14 12 14
15 13,14 15
0
0
1
1
1
2
S2(2)0- O o(2)
O10(2) = [1-0 t0(1)][1-S4(2)Pg]
= 1
SIo(2) = 1
0
0
e-(Ap+Av)ri
1
e-(Ap+Av)TI
3
S2(3). O10(3)
O1o(3) = [1-Oo(2)][1-S4(3)P]
= 1-0v
Sijo(3) = 1 - #2
#v
e Ap+Av)Ti
04V5
*Numbers in parentheses indicate that operator output is dependent on the presence of the indicated subinput signal.
Table 2.6 - DYMCAM Rules for an Active Component [47]
Command
Case Input
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
stop
none
start
start
stop
stop
none
none
start
start
Power Process
Input Input
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
operating
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
Initial
State
failed
standby
standby
standby
standby
standby
operating
operating
yes
operating
operating
operating
operatinq
standby*
operating*
operating*
operating*
Final Process
State Output
failed
standby
standby
standby
standby*
failed
standby*
operating
standby
failed
standby
standby*
failed
operating
failed
operating
standby*
operating*
failed
operating*
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
Notes:
1) "Active components" are defined by
process variable input signals, and a
treated as active components.
this table; they have command, power, and
process variable output signal. Pumps are
2) The "*" denotes that the component is stuck in this state (i.e., this is a form of
failure). The "failure" state is used when the component is actually broken. Failure
can occur when attempting to operate in the absence of process input (as shown
above) or when a runtime failure occurs (treated elsewhere in the program).
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Level Signal
Inflow
Figure 2.1 - Holdup Tank Problem [91
2
Outflow
Valve
b
-a
T
Level Signal
Initiating Additional
Event Responses
Pump 1 Valve Pump 2
failed off
-----------
good irrelevant
failed
open
failed
closed
irrelevant
good
failed on
failed off
Sequence
1
2
3
4
5
Notes
level under
control
dryout
level under
control
overflow
level under
control
Figure 2.2 - Simple Hardware-Oriented Event Tree
for Holdup Tank Problem
See Box 12
See Box 6
Dryout
(L = a)
Overflow
(L = b)
Dryout
(L = a)
Dryout
(L = a)
Overflow
(L = b)
delayed transition
- - - - - - immediate transition
Overflow
(L = b)
Figure 2.3 - Event Sequence Diagram for Holdup Tank Problem
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Figure 2.4 - Expanded Event Tree for Davis-Besse Event (6/9/85) [28]
Initiating Event:
Pump 1 Fails Off
No Failures Before
Tank Level = al
Valve Stays Open Valve Closes
No Failures Before
Tank Level = c
Yes
N
Pump I Failed Off,
Pump 2 Off,
Valve Closed,
Level = a,
Pump I Failed Off,
Pump 2 Off,
Valve Failed Open,
Level = al
Pump 1 Failed Off,
Pump 2 Failed On,
Valve Open,
Level = at
Pump I Failed Off,
Pump 2 Failed On,
Valve Failed Closed,
Level Between u and a2
Pump I Failed Off,
Pump 2 Off,
Valve Failed Closed,
Level Between al and "2
Figure 2.5 - Initial Portion of Expanded Event Tree for Holdup Tank Problem
STATE
SLOCA AFWS HPIS State
1
2
3
4
Figure 2.6 - Ex -nt Sequence Transition Representation of an SLOCA Accident [12]
a.
b b a.
2 4 2 b.
c.
d.
Misdiagnosis, Turn Off HPIS
Recovery from a, Restart HPIS
Misdiagnosis, Turn Off AFWS
Recovery from b, Restart AFWS
Manual Start of AFWS
Switch Over to Condenser Hotwell
c,d
C4 )- 2
Figure 2.7 - Possible Sequences of Transitions for the SLOCA Event Tree [12]
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3
7
13
9
14
4
11
Figure 2.8 - GO-FLOW Chart for Holdup Tank Problem
(First Two Phases)
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. operator
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S 0 (t) (output)
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r2 SoMt I - Si(t)
So 
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Si Normally Closed Valve
So(t) = Si(t).0(t)
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Si Normally Open Valve
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S9 0 Parameters: P , PP
Figure 2.9 - GO-FLOW Operators [20,36]
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Figure 2. ]O - Example Application of DYLAM to Holdup Tank Problem
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Figure 2.]2 - Tank Level History (One Discrete Event Simulation Trial)
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Figure 2.]3 - Generic Component Model for DYMCAM
3.0 DYNAMIC EVENT TREE ANALYSIS METHOD (DETAM)
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding accident scenario analysis methodology review, it is shown that the
basic concept behind DYLAM [26], that of a time-dependent tree structure representing
scenarios, is a promising one for near-term applications. The most appealing feature of
this concept is that it can provide a dynamic context for operator actions (in terms of
process variable cues and hardware states), yet it preserves the notion of dominant accident
scenarios that is needed to interpret the results. Chapter 2 also points out, however, that
even the more recent dynamic models based on DYLAM (e.g., [29]) are limited in their
ability to treat the stochastic behavior of operators. These limitations appear to be due to
the implemented DYLAM structure (which is largely hardware oriented) and to the
complexity of current cognitive models for operators.
This chapter describes a imple generalization of the DYLAM concept intended to
address these issues, called the Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM). A
detailed application of dynamic event trees to a pressurized water reactor steam generator
tube rupture accident is provided in Chapter 4.
3.2 General Concept
A dynamic event tree is an event tree in which branchings (which, in the case of a
nuclear plant front-end model, reflect stochastic variability in the process) are allowed to
occur at different points in time. Figure 3 1 shows a simple dynamic event tree for a plant
model containing two binary systems, System A and System B. Three characteristics of
interest shown in this figure are: a) all possible combinations of system states must be
considered at each branching point, b) branchings are performed at arbitrary, but discrete,
points in time, and c) the number of event sequences can quickly grow to an unmanageable
size if various approximations designed to limit the problem are not applied. The last
point means that a practical application of the approach is likely to be a
simulation-oriented one. Event sequences are generated by user-supplied rules as the
analysis progresses, rather thar specified in their entirety as an initial step in the analysis.
Noting that the user is free to define the "systems" in Figure 3.1 and that each
system can have more than two states, it can be seen that a dynamic event tree can be a
very general model. To formalize the concept, we define five characteristic sets that define
the dynamic event tree approach. These are:
a the set of variables included in the "branching set"
* the set of variables defining the "plant state"'
e the set of "branching rules
0 the set of "sequence expansion rules"
0 the quantification tools
The "branching set" is the set of variables that determine the space of possible
branches (i.e., new event tree sequences) at any node in the tree. In the example of
Figure 3.1, branchings are determined by the joint status of Systems A and B; the
branching set can then be written as {Xa,Xb}, where Xa is the binary indicator variable for
the state of System a (e.g., Xa = 1 if System A is good and 0 if the system is failed) and Xb
'The term "plant state" is usec instead of the more typical "system state" because of the
PRA distinction between "plant" and "system" level analyses.
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is the indicator variable for System B.
The "plant state" is defined by the variables that influence the frequency assignments
for the various branchings. In Figure 3.1, the plant state at any node in the tree is defined
by the value of the branching set {Xa,Xb} (there are no other variables that may influence
frequency assignments). In general, the plant state may be a function of more variables
than those contained in the branching set since a number of characteristic variables may be
deterministic functions of the current event sequence, yet may affect the likelihood of
subsequent branchings.
The "branching rules" are the rules used to determine when a branching should take
place. In its simplest form, the branching rule set is a set of branching times (or a constant
At) selected prior to the analysis (in Figure 3.1, it is the set {tit 2}). Other branching
rules can be associated with a specific application. For example, in an accident scenario
analysis, it may be desired to allow hardware-associated branchings (e.g., system failures)
to occur only when a system is demanded. The use of such a rule would neglect failures of
equipment while running.
The "sequence expansion rules" are the rules used to limit the number of sequences
and, hence tree expansion. These rules should involve, as a minimum, sequence
termination when a maximum simulation time or one of a set of user-defined absorbing
states is reached. They will also usually include a rule for sequence termination when the
sequence frequency falls below a user-specified lower limit.
The quantitative tools are those used to compute the deterministic state variables
(e.g., process variables) as well as the branching frequencies.
Specific choices for each of these five sets define a particular application of the
dynamic event tree concept. For example, including the operator model described in
Ref. 29 (see Section 2.5.1), DYLAM can be characterized as shown in Table 3.1. In
general, choices regarding the characteristics of a dynamic event tree must be made
selectively in a practical analysis. For example, increases in the size of the branching set,
in the number of different values each Xi can take, or in the number of branching points
will lead to geometric increases in the number of sequences to be analyzed [see Eq. (2.11)].
The choices made in this study to model the integrated response of plant operators and
hardware to a dynamic scenario are described in the next section.
Clearly, the general dynamic event tree concept is not a new one. Indeed, the event
trees used in the formal field of decision analysis, from which the event tree concept used in
WASH-1400 was originally borrowed [1], often represent sequences of events (decisions and
random occurrences) over time. Extended event trees, including the trees shown in Ref. 28
and the Accident Progression Event Trees used to model plant behavior following core
damage (e.g., [13]), and event sequence diagrams also treat sequences of events (where time
is implicit in the event ordering). Ref. 53 describes a time-dependent event tree model
developed for the analysis of operator actions during an accident scenario. The DYLAM
approach [26], as shown above, can be viewed as being just a particular implementation of
dynamic event trees. Thus, this report's primary objective is not to delve into the basic
properties of dynamic event trees. Rather, it is to show how a new implementation of the
dynamic event tree concept can be extremely useful for analyzing complex accident
scenarios.
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3.3 General Implementation for Accident Scenario Analysis
In the context of dynamic accident scenario analysis, it is important that the choices
for the dynamic event tree characteristics be made in such a manner that those
time-dependent variables governing the likelihood of various operator actions are treated
explicitly. Thus, following the discussion in Section 1.3, an application of the dynamic
event tree analysis method to nuclear power plant accident scenarios requires the
treatment of: the plant process variables, the operators' understanding of the current
situation, the operators' internal conditions, and the actions planned by the operators.
The plant process variables (e.g., steam generator and pressurizer level, reactor
coolant system pressure) are important because they determine the timing of events (e.g.,
demands for safety system actuations, occurrence of undesired physical plant states).
Requirements for operator actions are often keyed to the process variables; these actions
lead to changes in the process variables which, in turn, lead to different required actions.
The operators' understanding of the current accident situation, called the crew's
"diagnosis state," clearly can affect the likelihood of future actions. Representations of the
diagnosis state are potentially quite complex, but need not be. For example, Ref. 54 shows
how experimental observations inferences of an operator's mental model during simulation
exercises can be mapped as a trajectory on a fairly simple two-dimensional matrix in which
the rows and columns of the matrix represent different levels of abstraction along the
"whole-part" and "means-ends" dimensions. The first dimension corresponds to the
diagnosis state, as it defines where the operator thinks the current problem is (e.g., at plant
level, at system level, at train level, etc.). The second dimension is more concerned with
the actions the operator is thinking of taking to deal with the problem; this corresponds to
the planning state, discussed shortly.
The internal condition of the crew, called the crew's "quality state," characterizes the
crew's ability to efficiently perform tasks. This condition is defined by such factors as time
pressure, workload, and crew group structure, which can affect crew performance and can
change over time. (Note that a variety of organizational factors, e.g., training, can affect
crew performance, but are not explicitly included since they will remain static through the
course of the scenario. These factors provide initial conditions for the analysis.) The
operator stress models discussed in Refs. 29 and 51 illustrate potential approaches for
quantifying one important aspect of the crew's quality state. Models for the dynamics of
characteristics other than stress (e.g., communication effectiveness), need to be developed
and integrated into the analysis. Refs. 50 and 51 provide some initial steps in this
direction.
The actions planned by the operators define the "planning state" for the crew. In the
highly proceduralized environment of current plants, the planning state is strongly affected
by the procedural requirements on the operators. Of course, deviations in procedure
following can occur, and have been observed in actual incidents. (Ref. 55 presents a
taxonomy of error types associated with procedure following.) Note also that the separate
treatment of diagnosis and planning can lead to situations where the correct steps are
taken, although an incorrect diagnosis has been made (such situations have been observed
in simulator exercises).
Following these ideas, the general characteristics of the dynamic event trees used in
this study are given in Table 3.2. Comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.2, it can be seen that this
study's inclusion of operator state variables in the branching set allows a more general
treatment of stochastic variability in operator behavior than that used in DYLAM. A
second advantage of this discretized state approach to operator modeling is that a complex,
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high fidelity simulation of operator cognitive activity is not necessarily required. Here, an
analysis can proceed if experts knowledgeable about operator behavior during accidents are
available. Thus, the approach is similar to that used in a conventional human reliability
analysis for current PRAs (the difference being that here, the time-dependent context for
the operator actions is directly available to the experts).
Figure 3.2 shows how the characteristics listed in Table 3.2 are implemented in an
accident scenario analysis. (It is important to observe that this figure applies to a single
scenario within a single time step; the same process is applied repeatedly during the
simulation for all scenarios and all time steps.) As shown by this figure, the first task in
the analysis is the deterministic computation of the plant process variables. The next task
is to stop the branching process if an absorbing state, as defined by the needs of the
analysis, is reached. Absorbing states can represent the successful completion of the
scenario, or the achievement of a particular undesired physical state, e.g., primary coolant
saturation. In the next task, the new set of possible hardware states, and their associated
likelihoods, are generated. Changes in hardware states can occur when process variables
reach their associated setpoints and when operators start/stop equipment (based on the
planning state from the previous time step). Note that errors in executing actions are
reflected at this step, rather than when determining the crew planning state. In the fourth
through sixth tasks, branchings associated with the crew diagnosis, quality, and planning
states are generated. Although it might be philosophically argued that, given detailed
enough information about the operating crew at the previous time step, the crew states can
be defined deterministically, the dynamic event tree implementation discussed here clearly
does not provide such detail, and the state transitions must be handled stochastically. In
the seventh task, a check is made to determine if the scenario has a reasonable potential to
be risk significant. This means that, not only should the scenario be reasonably likely at
this stage of the analysis, it should also have a non-negligible frequency of leading to an
undesired state. Scenarios with low risk potential are screened out. In the last task, the
scenario is checked to determine if it is similar to other scenarios being modeled, where
"similarity" is defined by the analyst. Similar scenarios are grouped together, to reduce
the degree of "scenario explosion" [26] inherent in the dynamic event tree approach. If the
sole criterion for scenario similarity is based on hardware states, a structure quite similar
to conventional event tree structure will be recovered. Note that the seventh and eighth
tasks are performed for every scenario developed in the given time step.
3.4 Discussion
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 indicate some of the key characteristics of the dynamic
event tree analysis method (DETAM) as applied to accident scenario analysis. These
characteristics supply some of the constraints on the detailed models that can be used in an
actual analysis, and also affect the practicality and accuracy of the approach.
As implied by Figure 3.2, a large number of branches can be generated for a given
accident scenario; the computerized model implementing the dynamic event tree must
therefore be capable of handling the many branches and their links (the latter are necessary
to preserve the scenario history, since this can be a strong factor in determining the
likelihood of various operator actions). Furthermore, for a practical analysis, the
computerized model must be able to process the many branches and links efficiently. Since
the computational requirements associated with the simulation of physical plant behavior
far outweigh those associated with generation and manipulation of the logical tree
structure, an efficient analysis requires that the plant physical model satisfy three
conditions.
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First, the model must be simple enough to perform the required computations for
each time step within a short time (much faster than real time). Second, the model must
be able to function in a dynamic event tree setting, i.e., it must be able to input some
summary representation of the plant state at a given point in time and update the plant
state over the next time step. To minimize computer storage requirements, this implies
that the plant physical state should be characterized with as few process variables as
possible (since a different set of values must be stored for each branch or node in the
dynamic event tree). Third, the model must be reasonably accurate.
The idea behind the third condition is not necessarily trite. During an analysis, the
physical model is used to determine the time-dependent values of the plant process
variables. These values, in turn, are then used to determine if and when various automatic
and operator actions are called for. It can be seen that, if there are inaccuracies in the
physical model, situations can arise where the model predicts that a setpoint is never
reached, whereas it would certainly have been reached in an actual accident. Clearly, in
such situations, the predicted dynamic plant response can differ greatly from the actual
response, since the automatic/manual actions in response to a setpoint's exceedance can
send the plant along a new trajectory in phase space (temperature, pressure, hardware
state, operator state, etc.). This can, in turn, lead to a requirement for operator actions (in
the model's simulation) that are completely out of phase with the plant operating
procedures (which are designed to respond to the correct ordering and timing of key events
during the accident). Care should therefore be employed when creating a physical model
that also satisfies the first two conditions.
A second implication of the large number of branches associated with a DETAM
analysis is that an equally large number of rules governing the branchings, and the
frequencies of these branchings, must be generated. For example, rules must be provided
to determine the likelihood that operators will properly transfer from one emergency
operating procedure to another, given the current instrumentation readings, their initial
scenario diagnosis, etc. Other rules/models must be employed to determine the length of
time required to perform various actions (e.g., the length of time required to execute each
step in the operating procedures). It can be seen that the DETAM analysis requires a large
amount of analyst effort to either: supply the detailed context-specific rules for each
scenario, or develop a set of meta-rules that can be used by the simulation to generate the
context-specific rules.
Table 3.2 shows that a DETAM analysis for accident scenarios contains two implicit
assumptions. These assumptions are made to reduce the size of the problem, recognizing
that a dynamic analysis must sacrifice some level of detail (even details normally treated
by conventional PRA analyses) to cover time-dependent scenarios. First, it is assumed
that a reasonable analysis can be made with plant systems as basic entities, rather than
components. Second, it is assumed that the process variables can be treated
deterministically. The DETAM application described in Chapters 4 and 5 shows that
although the first assumption can be reasonable, the second one can lead to problems
related to the issue of physical model accuracy discussed above.
More specifically, if the physical model is inaccurate, and if the state of knowledge
uncertainties in the modeling accuracy are not treated, then the analysis may not cover
with any probability the actual accident progression. An uncertainty analysis will not
improve the basic accuracy of a model, but it can reduce the sensitivity of the analysis
results to modeling inaccuracy.
In general, formal quantification of the uncertainties in the predictions of thermal
hydraulic models for accident progression (prior to core damage) is not done routinely in
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PRA studies. Instead, sensitivity analyses are often used to develop some sense of the
possible output variability associated with variations in input parameter values. One
exception is provided by Ref. 56, which describes a response-surface based approach to
quantify the uncertainties associated with the event sequence diagram analysis discussed in
Ref. 12. More recently, Ref. 57 presents a methodology to improve the uncertainty
analysis for thermal-hydraulic codes, although this methodology is not directly aimed at
PRA applications. Both Refs. 56 and 57 concentrate on the problem of propagating model
parameter uncertainties through a given model structure; the uncertainty in the model
structure itself is not quantified. Methods for formal quantification of modeling
uncertainties have been developed for other areas of PRA application (e.g., see Ref. 58),
but are not generally employed in accident scenario analysis. Future applications of the
DETAM approach may need to address this issue, as well as the more basic structural issue
of how uncertainties can be efficiently treated in a dynamic event tree framework.
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Table 3.1 - Dynamic Event Tree Characterization of DYLAM
* branching set:
* plant state:
* branching rules:
* expansion rules:
* tools:
indicator variables for components and certain operator
actions (indicating if a lapse does/does not occur)
defined by branching variables, process variables, operator
stress, salience of cues, operator state of knowledge
branching occurs at fixed points in time (the algorithm
presented in Ref. 23 allows branching when the frequency of
remaining in a system state is a user-specified fraction of
the initial state frequency)
sequences associated with multiple simultaneous
independent failures, sequences whose total number of
failures exceeds a user-defined value, and sequences with
frequencies lower than a user-defined value are truncated;
sequences exhibiting similar physical behavior are grouped
problem-specific models for physical plant behavior, stress,
salience of cues, operator knowledge base
Table 3.2 - Characteristics of Dynamic Event Trees for Accident Scenario Analysis
* branching set:
e plant state:
e branching rules:
* expansion rules:
* tools:
variables indicating status of plant systems, crew diagnosis
state, crew quality state, and crew planning state
defined by branching variables and plant process variables
branching occurs at fixed points in time
low frequency sequences are truncated; "similar" sequences
are grouped
problem-specific models for physical plant behavior, stress,
conditional frequency of operator state changes
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4.0 DETAM APPLICATION - MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter provides the basic framework for the application of DETAM
to an accident scenario analysis. This chapter demonstrates DETAM by constructing a
dynamic event tree model for the analysis of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR)
accidents at a hypothetical 4-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor.
Section 4.2 describes the nominal progression of an SGTR accident and discusses two
PRA models for SGTR. The remaining sections provide additional details on key portions
of the DETAM model for SGTR. Section 4.3 describes the simple thermal hydraulic model
used to model plant response to a steam generator tube rupture and compares the results of
this model with those of PRISM, a fast PC-based PWR simulation code [59]. Section 4.4
describes the plant systems modeled (these determine the hardware-related branchings in
the tree). Section 4.5 covers the simple operator crew model, describing how the concepts
of "diagnosis state" and "planning state" are employed in the SGTR analysis. (Note that
the crew "quality state," although briefly discussed, is not treated in this demonstration
analysis.) Section 4.6 discusses the data used for the branching frequencies. Sections 4.7
and 4.8 discuss the branching rules and the expansion limiting rules, respectively. Finally,
Section 4.9 briefly describes the computer code written to actually perform the analysis
(DETCO-SGTR), and Section 4.10 provides summarizing remarks.
4.2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Events: Description and Analysis
There are several reasons for selecting the SGTR scenario as the case study. First,
the scenario can involve considerable interactions between the operating crew and the
plant, and therefore provides a natural situation for examining tools designed to treat
dynamic scenarios. Second, the scenario is safety significant because it can lead to a direct
release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. Ref. 5 shows that SGTR can be a significant
contributor to early fatality risk. Finally, a reasonable amount of information on the
scenario is available. The information includes reports of actual events (e.g., [60-64]),
observations of simulator training exercises, a fast PC-based PWR simulation model that
treats SGTR [59], relevant emergency operating procedures [65-69], and PRA analyses of
accidents following an SGTR initiating event (e.g., [5,6,70]).
This section discusses the general progression of the SGTR event for a particular
plant. It also describes two conventional, plant-specific PRA analyses of SGTR. The
Seabrook study [6] uses the "event tree with boundary conditions" approach (also called
the "large event tree/small fault tree" approach). The Sequoyah Unit 1 study [5}, done in
support of the NUREG-1150 study, uses the "fault tree linking" approach (also called the
"small event tree/large fault tree" approach). Both the Seabrook and Sequoyah plants use
Westinghouse 4-loop pressurized water reactors.
4.2.1 SGTR General Progression
This subsection briefly describes the general characteristics of a nominal SGTR
accident (where all systems work as intended) and some of the options available to the
operator crew if some of the systems fail for a specific plant. Ref. 65 provides additional
details. Risk assessment analyses of SGTR (e.g., [5,6]) are also useful because they provide
additional information on SGTR scenarios that deviate from the nominal accident
progression.
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A steam generator tube rupture accident breaks the barrier between the reactor
coolant and the secondary side of the steam generator. The difference in pressure between
the primary system and the steam generators causes the reactor coolant to flow from the
primary into the secondary side of the faulted steam generator. As a result of this loss of
primary coolant, the pressurizer pressure and pressurizer level drop (the rate of decrease
depends on the size and the number of ruptures). The decrease in primary pressure will
eventually result in a reactor trip.
The leakage of the contaminated primary coolant increases the activity of the
secondary side, causing radiation monitors to actuate. The leakage also increases the level
and pressure of the faulted steam generator; the rate of increase depends on the size of the
rupture. Moreover, the leakage leads to a reduction in feedwater flow, in order to
compensate for the high steam generator level in the faulted steam generator.
The reactor trip causes the core power to rapidly decrease to decay heat levels, the
steam flow to the turbine to terminate, and the steam dump (i.e., the turbine bypass)
system to actuate. Soon afterwards, the continued decrease in primary pressure leads to
actuation of the safety injection (SI) signal. The SI signal causes the isolation of the main
feedwater system (MFWS) and initiates the high pressure injection system (HPIS) and the
emergency feedwater system (EFWS).
Following the reactor trip, the operator crew's concerns are to: a) establish a
secondary heat sink, b) identify and isolate the faulted steam generator, c) cooldown and
depressurize the primary system, and d) provide for long term cooling. Refs. 65-69
describe the specific tasks that must be accomplished to address these concerns. It should
be noted that this study assumes that there is an additional system available to help the
operators: the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). As the operator crew performs
its tasks, it should monitor the states of the critical safety functions through the SPDS
color-coded status trees (more details on the SPDS are provided in Section 4.4). The
color-coded status trees serve as a backup system to help the crew diagnose the plant
condition and subsequently lead the crew to the appropriate procedure. The trees are
particularly useful if the crew misdiagnoses the event or if the procedure being followed is
insufficient to handle the event (e.g., during multiple-failure situations).
The emergency feedwater system (EFWS) provides the cooling water to the steam
generators for heat removal from the primary system under nominal accident conditions. If
the EFWS fails, the operators can provide water to the steam generators through the
condensate system; however, this requires depressurization of at least one intact steam
generator. If water cannot be provided to the steam generators (so that the steam
generators are not available), "bleed and feed" cooling can be performed. Bleed and feed
cooling involves the letdown of primary coolant through the pressurizer power-operated
relief valve (PORV), and the injection of water into the reactor coolant system using the
HPIS. Failure to establish a heat sink through one of these mechanisms will result in core
damage.
The identification and isolation of the faulted steam generator is essential to control
the release of radioactive coolant outside of the containment building. The faulted steam
generator can be identified by an unexpected rise in the steam generator level (specifically,
a rise in the narrow range level), high radiation measurements for the steam line, or high
radiation measurements from steam generator samples. Once identified, isolation of the
faulted steam generator requires closing of the steam generator relief valves, blowdown
isolation valves, upstream drain valves, and main steamline isolation and bypass valves.
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After isolating the faulted steam generator, the operator crew must initiate cooldown
and depressurization of the primary system. The main objective of this task is to equalize
the primary system and faulted steam generator pressures and thus reduce the leakage from
the primary side to the secondary side. The cooldown ensures that the primary coolant
does not reach saturation conditions during depressurization. Cooldown utilizes the
turbine bypass valves and the atmospheric relief valves on the intact steam generators.
Depressurization involves the use of the pressurizer normal spray, pressurizer auxiliary
spray, or pressurizer PORV. Once the pressures are equalized, the high pressure injection
flow must be terminated to prevent the primary pressure from increasing.
Once it has accomplished the previous tasks, the operator crew initiates long term
cooling to cold shutdown to enable repair of the broken tube(s). A wide variety of options
is available to perform this task. To limit the scope of the DETAM demonstration, this
study does not treat this phase of the SGTR event. In principle, this truncation of the
analysis removes potential core damage scenarios. However, when this phase is reached,
the critical safety functions have already been addressed and the operator crew has a
considerable amount of time to perform remaining tasks. Non-recoverable failures or
human errors leading to core damage are therefore not expected. Note that Ref. 6 assigns a
value of 10-6 to the likelihood that operators will fail to correctly perform long term cooling
actions (top event ON in that study's event tree for SGTR).
Comparing the above nominal description with real events, it is useful to observe
that the sequences of events in both North Anna Unit 1 (July 15, 1987) [63] and Prairie
Island 1 (October 2, 1979) [64] SGTR incidents were indeed similar to the general
progression described above. In both incidents, the operators followed the procedure and
the safety systems functioned as designed. In the Ginna SGTR incident (January 25, 1982)
on the other hand, there were two operator actions that deviated from the procedures
[60,61]. The first deviation occurred when the operators delayed the depressurization of the
primary system. This caused multiple demands on the PORV and the subsequent failure
of the PORV to reclose. The operator crew delayed the depressurization of the primary
system partially due to confusion caused by the formation of steam bubbles in the reactor
vessel. (An earlier improper isolation of the ruptured steam generator caused the steam
bubbles to form.) The second deviation occurred when the operators delayed the
termination of HPIS flow. This late action resulted in the opening of the ruptured steam
generator safety relief valve and the subsequent release of radioactivity outside of the
containment. This incident shows that delayed actions need to be treated; these are
accommodated in the dynamic event tree model through the use of the "planning state," as
discussed in Section 4.5.6.
4.2.2 Seabrook SGTR Model
Conventional PRA analyses of SGTR provide additional insights concerning possible
evolutions of the plant in response to the initial failure. The Seabrook study [6] employs a
three-stage event tree model. The first stage models the support systems (e.g., electric
power, service water). Given a specific initiating event, the support system event tree
estimates the conditional frequencies of various unique support system states. The support
system end states are then grouped according to their effects on the frontline systems (e.g.,
EFWS, HPIS). The second stage is the frontline early event tree. This event tree models
the early response of the frontline systems and the operating crew to the SGTR initiating
event. As in the case of the support system tree, the resulting end states are grouped
according to their impact on the succeeding tree, the frontline long term event tree.
Depending on the plant condition after early response, the long term event tree evaluates
either: the plant response, if recirculation is required, or the operability of the containment
systems, if core melt occurs. The long term event tree ends in either a successful core
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cooling state or a specific plant damage state that serves as input to the subsequent core
and containment response analysis.
The support system and the frontline long term event trees are generally applicable
to all initiating events (although the conditional branching frequencies/split fractions may
differ). On the other hand, each initiating event has a unique frontline early event tree. In
the case of an SGTR event, the frontline early event tree has 16 top events (see Table 4.1).
Figure 4.1 shows portions of the Seabrook SGTR early event tree leading up to the
cooldown and depressurization of the primary system. Dashed lines indicate portions of the
tree not considered in this comparlzun (the corresponding top events are assumed
successful). Some of the top events in Figure 4.1 are purely hardware-related; others
involve operating crew response. For example top events TT1 (Turbine Trip) and RV
(Reactor Vessel Intact) are essentially hardware top events. Top event OR (Operator
Controls Break Flow), on the other hand, involves both hardware and operator responses.
If all systems respond as designed, OR entails the opening of the intact generators'
atmospheric relief valves to cool down the primary coolant, closing of relief valves when the
primary temperature reaches the desired level, and pressurizer spray actuation to
depressurize the primary system to the ruptured steam generator pressure. Otherwise, OR
involves bleed and feed cooling.
It is interesting to note that the Seabrook model incorporates scenario dynamics to a
limited extent. For example, order-dependence issues arise in the analysis of top event SL
(No Secondary Leak to the Atmosphere). This top event is used to model a number of
events that: a) are sequentially interrelated, and b) can lead to a variety of failure scenarios
if failed. A special event tree (see Figure 4.2) is constructed to determine the SL split
fraction. This tree, which has 11 specific top events, covers the potential of an early leak
due to failure to isolate the ruptured steam generator and a late leak due to operator failure
to control the break flow. Thus, top event OR, which comes before SL in the SGTR tree,
also appears in the SL tree; however, OR is used as a boundary condition (it only takes
either a successful or an unsuccessful state). Recall from Section 4.2.1 that, nominally, the
ruptured steam generator is supposed to be isolated before actions to control the break flow
are performed.
By careful definition and ordering of the top events, the Seabrook SGTR tree also
reflects, to some extent, the timing of events. For example, top event OR represents the
cooldown and depressurization process up until the point where primary and ruptured
steam generator pressures equalize. Top event OD, on the other hand, takes the
depressurization up to the point when long term cooling measures can be initiated.
The two dominant sequences in Figure 4.1 are: a) the sequence involving the failure
of both OD (operator depressurizes the reactor coolant system and provides makeup) and
EF (emergency feedwater actuation), and b) the sequence involving the failure of NL (no
reactor coolant pump seal LOCA). These correspond to Sequences 14 and 12, respectively,
in Figure 4.1. Note that Sequence 14 involves the failure of the emergency feedwater
system and of bleed and feed cooling.
4.2.3 Sequoyah SGTR Model
The Sequoy ah study [6] is a demonstration of the Accident Sequence Evaluation
Program (ASEP). The intent is to use less resources for analysis (as compared with
standard Level 1 risk studies), yet produce results that closely approximate standard
Level 1 results. Thus, simple models are used for parts of the analysis not judged to have a
significant impact on risk.
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Unlike the Seabrook study, the Sequoyah study uses the "fault tree linking method."
A portion of the Sequoyah SGTR event tree is shown in Figure 4.3. Table 4.2 defines the
top events shown in that tree. As might be expected, the top events are defined somewhat
more broadly than those in the Seabrook tree. For example, top event Q, which refers to
the ruptured steam generator integrity, is the counterpart of Seabrook's top event SL (for
which the entire SL event tree applies). Top event Od refers to the cooldown and
depressurization of the primary system, and is comparable to top events OR and OD in the
Seabrook tree. Furthermore, the Sequoyah tree includes support system response (as
modeled by the system fault trees for the top events), early frontline system response, and
long term frontline system response.
Because of its intentional simplicity, Figure 4.3 models less of the plant dynamic
response than does Figure 4.1. For example, regardless of the status of the top events, one
set of time windows is used to establish the frequency of failure of critical safety functions
or operator actions. The operator has 10 minutes to start the cooldown and
depressurization of the primary system and 45 minutes to depressurize the primary system;
otherwise, it is assumed that core damage occurs. Furthermore, bleed and feeling cooling is
not treated.
The Sequoyah study finds SGTR to account for 3% (by initiating event) of the total
mean core damage frequency per year. There are three sequences with point estimate
frequencies equal or greater than 1.0*10-7 per reactor year (sequences with pre-recovery
likelihoods less than 1.0*10-7 are not further analyzed). The most dominant sequence,
Sequence 6 in Figure 4.3, involves both the failure of top events Od (the operator fails to
depressurize the primary system within 45 minutes) and Qs (loss of steam generator
integrity, which leads to the depletion of the refueling water storage tank).
The second dominant sequence, Sequence 9 in Figure 4.3, involves the failure of top
event L (the emergency feedwater system). In the event that emergency feedwater fails
and the operator fails to restore main feedwater flow, core damage is assumed to ensue.
Stating that bleed and feed cooling results in primary pressure increase and thus
counteracts efforts to control the break flow, the study does not consider the possible
success of bleed and feed cooling. Note that the analysis does consider the possibility that
the operator will open the PORV to help depressurize the primary system in the event that
pressurizer sprays are not sufficient.
The third dominant sequence, Sequence 14 in Figure 4.3, involves the failure of the
manual scram to actuate. The Sequoyah study assumes that failure of the manual scram,
when combined with the steam generator tube rupture, cannot be mitigated and leads to
core damage.
4.3 Thermal-Hydraulic Model for SGTR
Figure 3.2 shows that, upon entering a new time step in the DETAM simulation, the
plant process variables must be updated. This section describes the simple model
developed for this demonstration analysis to simulate the plant behavior, lists the process
variables being monitored, and compares the model results with those of PRISM [56], a
fast-running PC-based PWR simulation code that has many of the physical models and
control algorithms built into an actual PWR plant simulator. The simple model, which is
partially based on similar models described in Refs. 12, 25 and 71, is somewhat specialized
towards the analysis of SGTR in a Westinghouse 4-loop PWR. However, it can be
modified to handle other relatively slowly progressing accidents in other PWRs.
63
4.3.1 Description
The model divides the plant into four nodes: the primary node, the pressurizer, the
ruptured steam generator, and the intact steam generators (see Figure 4.4). The model
determines the coolant thermodynamic properties (e.g., temperature and pressure) of each
node for each branch at each time step. Although, as discussed in Section 4.7, dynamic
event tree branchings are allowed to occur every 30 seconds, the thermal-hydraulic model
uses a simulation time step of 1 second. Thus, the thermal hydraulic-model performs 30
iterations for each time step (i.e., 30 seconds) and considers the results of the 30th iteration
as the process variable magnitudes for the time step. Within each node, the model assumes
that the thermodynamic properties of water are uniform. Appendix A provides the
important equations employed in the model. Note that some of these equations are results
of modifications performed to approximate the results of PRISM [59].
The primary node includes the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant system (RCS)
piping. It is assumed to always contains subcooled liquid; saturation is considered to be an
absorbing state for the purpose of sequence development. The model also assumes that the
primary node pressure equals the pressurizer node pressure. An energy balance equation
estimates the RCS temperature, where energy gains are from an internal source (the core)
and energy losses are to the steam generator node. The temperature calculation accounts
for the heat capacity of fuel cladding and structural material. Once the pressure and
temperature are known, other thermodynamic properties can be determined. As shown in
Figure 4.4, coolant mass can leave the primary node by outsurge to the pressurizer, by
leakage through the ruptured tube, or by leakage through the PORV (if open). Mass can
enter by insurge from the pressurizer or by injection from the HPIS, if it is running.
The treatment of the pressurizer node similar to that in Ref. 71. The model assumes
that both the liquid and the vapor in the pressurizer are maintained at saturation
conditions. Mass and energy balance equations serve to determine the pressurizer pressure
and the liquid mass. The mass balance includes the net surge flow rate from the primary
node (e.g., when the coolant expands or contracts), the pressurizer spray rate (a flowrate of
42.18 kg/s or 92.80 lb/s is assumed), and the rate of mass loss through the PORV (PORV
flowrate depends on the pressurizer pressure).
The steam generator nodes model the secondary side coolant; the primary side
coolant in the steam generator tubes is part of the primary node. The model includes two
steam generator nodes. The intact steam generator node has three times as much capacity
as the ruptured steam generator node. While the main feedwater system (MFWS) is on,
the rate of feedwater flow entering the steam generators equals the rate of steam leaving
the steam generators. When the MFWS is off, the maximum capacity of the emergency
feewater system (EFWS) (the model uses 12.6 kg/s or 27.7 lb/s) limits the rate of
feedwater inflow to the steam generators.
The model assumes the steam generator nodes to be at saturation at all times. Any
heat added to the nodes serves to convert liquid to steam which, in turn, goes to either the
turbine or the condenser. Nominally, the rate of steam leaving the steam generator equals
the rate of steam produced due to the heat from the primary system transferred through
the heat exchanger and the tube rupture flow. Once the reactor has tripped, the capacity
of the steam dump valve limits the amount of steam generated. If the heat added can
produce more steam than the steam dump can pass, the surplus heat raises the steam
generator coolant temperature; the pressure adjusts accordingly to maintain the saturation
state. On the other hand, if the enthalpy of the feedwater is less than that of the steam
generator liquid, the steam generator liquid temperature (and pressure) decreases to
compensate for the cold feedwater.
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In the event that steam generator atmospheric relief valves (ARVs) open, the rate of
steam leaving through the relief valves increases the rate of steam exiting the steam
generators. The model assumes the rate of steam leaving through the relief valves to be
constant. The model uses a flowrate value of 4.0 kg/s (8.8 lb/s) for each relief valve.
It is important to recognize that, in a dynamic event tree analysis, many scenarios
are being processed in parallel, and that process variable updating must be performed for
each scenario. Thus, the physical model must be fast running. This requirement provides
one reason for the simplicity of the 4-node formulation described above. Another reason is
provided by a second key requirement. The model must be able to function in a dynamic
event tree setting. Thus, it must be able to start its calculations upon entering a tree node
(i.e., the calculations cannot run continuously from time t = 0 for each scenario). To keep
the computer memory requirement associated with the analysis within practical limits, the
model must therefore be able to characterize the current plant physical state with a limited
number of process variables.
The physical variables used to characterize the plant physical state appear in
Table 4.3. Note that, in addition to the process variables themselves, the list includes the
time derivatives of the process variables as well. This allows a limited treatment of
scenario history when updating the process variable values. Note also that the complete
list of variables treated by the model is much longer than the list shown in Table 4.3, as
shown by Table A.1 of Appendix A. Variables not carried in the analysis are assigned
nominal values when entering a new node. Of course, greater accuracy can be obtained by
increasing the modeling detail and by carrying a larger number of variables. Either
approach will increase the computational requirements for the analysis.
4.3.2 Model Validation
To check the accuracy of the simple 4-node model, its predictions have been
compared (for a limited number of initial conditions) against those of PRISM [56].
Figure 4.5 shows the plots for predicted primary node pressure from the two models when
it is assumed that all systems function successfully. The absence of the drastic pressure
drop in the 4-node model prediction is due to its simple treatment of the heat transfer from
the primary side to the secondary side. The model assumes that the current rate of heat
transfer always depends on the current power the core produces. In reality, there is a lag
time between the change in core power and the heat transfer rate to the secondary side, as
depicted by the drastic pressure drop in the PRISM results. On the other hand, the
4-node model predicts a time to reactor trip following tube rupture of 210 seconds, which
differs from the PRISM prediction by less than 10 seconds. The comparisons indicate that,
at least for the cases considered, the simple model's predictions match the PRISM results
reasonably well prior to reactor trip. After reactor trip, the 4-node model results
qualitatively match (at least in terms of general trends) those of PRISM.
There are situations, however, where quantitative inaccuracies limit the usefulness of
the simple model. For example, delaying cooldown and depressurization for too long
should result in the ruptured steam generator relief valves being demanded due to rising
ruptured steam generator pressure. Figure 4.6 indicates that the simple model's simulation
of this situation does not lead to the expected outcome.
To further check the accuracy of the 4-node model, it is applied towards the analysis
of actually experienced SGTR events. When applied to the Prairie Island SGTR event
(October 10, 1979) [64], the simple model predicts a reactor trip time 50 seconds earlier-
than that observed. Similarly, its predicted reactor trip time is 30 seconds later than that
for the Ginna event and 90 seconds earlier than the manual reactor trip in the North
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Anna 1 SGTR event. The late reactor trip in the North Anna 1 event was partially due to
a turbine load reduction performed by the operator crew. The predicted reactor trip time
is also 22 seconds earlier than that given in Ref. 65 for a double ended tube rupture event.
In general, the simple 4-node model appears to be adequate for predicting the
primary side response to SGTR in the early stages of the accident. Once saturation is
reached, the model is no longer satisfactory. The model is also not very good at predicting
the secondary side response, due to its use of a homogeneous steam generator sub-model.
As a result, the steam generator pressure rise and resulting challenges to the atmospheric
relief valves (which could stick open, leading to a potential containment bypass scenario)
are underestimated. As further discussed in Section 4.8, these weaknesses prevent the full
simulation of accident scenarios leading to core damage, and clearly limit the immediate
usefulness of this study's results in managing risk. However, for the purpose of
demonstrating DETAM, the simple model is sufficiently accurate.
4.4. Hardware Model
The explicit treatment of the time dimension in a dynamic event tree analysis can
require the processing of much larger amounts of information than treated in a static
analysis of comparable detail. Given that conventional PRA models are already quite large
and that computing resources are finite, a practical dynamic analysis must sacrifice some
level of detail in the hardware, process physics, and operating crew models. In this
analysis, the following hardware-related assumptions are made to limit the amount of
information to be processed.
First, the hardware states in the model are defined by the status of a limited number
of frontline systems. Support systems are not treated, nor are individual trains or
components within the frontline systems. Event tree branches can be generated for only
those hardware systems (or groups of systems) which can significantly affect the behavior
of the plant during the early part of the steam generator tube rupture event (starting from
the initiation of the steam generator tube rupture and culminating when cooldown and
depressurization of the primary system commences). These include the emergency
feedwater system (EFWS), the high pressure injection system (HPIS), the safety injection
signal (S-signal or SI), the start-up feed pump (SUFP), the pressurizer power-operated
relief valves (PORV), the 40% steam dump valves that bypass the turbine and condensate
system (SDV), and the atmospheric relief valves on the ruptured and intact steam
generators (ARV1 and ARV2).
The EFWS provides water to the steam generators during abnormal conditions. SI
actuation initiates the EFWS (it also turns off the main feedwater system). The SUFP
serves as a backup to the EFWS. In the event of EFWS failure, bleed and feed cooling,
using the HPIS and PORV, is a possible way of restoring the secondary heat sink. The
HPIS is assumed to include both centrifugal charging pumps and safety injection pumps.
The PORV can depressurize the primary system in case the pressurizer spray fails. The
ARVs and SDV are used to cool down the primary system prior to depressurization. The
ARVs are assumed to include the 10% atmospheric dump valves and the safety relief
valves. These systems are listed in Table 4.4.
The effect on scenario development of systems not on this list (e.g., reactor trip and
turbine trip) are also modeled. However, these systems are assumed to function as
designed (i.e., their indicator variables are not included in the branching set). Other
systems treated in this manner include the main feedwater system (MFWS), the
pressurizer spray (SPRY), and the radiation alarm monitor (RAM). The Safety Parameter
Display System (SPDS) is also one of the systems assumed to work correctly for the
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duration of the accident. An example SPDS is described in Ref. 72. Through color-coded
status trees, the SPDS informs the operator crew of the current status of the critical safety
functions. There are four possible color indicators which help the crew recognize abnormal
conditions and take appropriate measures. A "red" color indicates that the critical safety
function is in danger and that immediate operator action is necessary. This will require the
operator crew to go to the specific procedures designed to restore the safety function. An
"orange" color indicates that the safety function is severely challenged and prompt
operator action is necessary. A "yellow" color means that the safety function is not fully
satisfied and operator action may be required eventually. A "green" color requires no
operator action. Figure 4.7 shows a sample logic tree for the secondary heat sink critical
safety function. A red indicator for the heat sink occurs if the EFWS fails.
A second hardware-related modeling assumption is that only failures on demand
require treatment. The demand can be due to an operator action or to an automatic signal
sent when a process variable reaches a setpoint. Failures during operation are generally of
lower likelihood and are neglected; equipment unavailability due to testing or maintenance
can be treated as an initial condition for the analysis, and need not be simulated
dynamically. As mentioned in Section 3.3, operator errors in executing planned actions are
included in the hardware state branching frequencies. For example, if the crew is supposed
to close the ruptured steam generator relief valve ARV1, the likelihood of proceeding along
the ARV1 failure branch (at the hardware branching step shown in Figure 3.2) includes the
frequency that the crew errs in closing the valve and the hardware failure rate for ARV1,
which is independent of crew performance.
It is useful to observe that hardware-related branchings need not be binary. The
status of a system depends on its functional state (e.g., on, off, closed, open) as well as its
operational state (e.g., good, failed). One feature of the DETCO-SGTR code (described in
Section 4.9) is that two types of system failures are distinguised: minor failures and major
failures. Minor failures are those that are recoverable; major failures are unrecoverable for
the duration of the accident. A minimum repair time for each system is defined by the
analyst. If the time since the discovery of the minor failure is greater than the required
repair time of a particular system, that system is assumed repaired; else, the system
remains failed. The minimum repair time and the likelihood of minor failure given system
failure for each system are user input.
In the following analysis of SGTR, the full capabilities of DETCO-SGTR are not
exercised. It is assumed that: a) hardware failures are not recoverable, and
b) instrumentation failures do not occur. These assumptions do not result from structural
limitations in the code or in the dynamic event tree methodology; they are simply
employed to limit the scope of the analysis.
4.5 Operator Crew Model
This section describes the operator crew model incorporated in the SGTR application
of DETAM. The implementation of the three crew substates mentioned in Chapter 3, i.e.,
crew diagnosis state, crew quality state and crew planning state, is discussed. This section
also briefly discusses the operator crew's actual implementation of the tasks planned.
4.5.1 Basic Formulation
As discussed in Section 1.3, much of the motivation for the dynamic event tree
approach is provided by three considerations: a) plant operators and plant components are
interacting parts of an overall system that responds dynamically to upset conditions, b) the
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actions of operators are dependent on their beliefs as to the current state of the plant, and
c) the operators have memory; their beliefs at any given point in time are influenced (to
some degree) by the past sequence of events and by their earlier trains of thought. The
3-substate model for the operating crew employed in this study is designed to carry the
information needed to deal with these issues in a dynamic event tree format.
The 3-substate model builds on work performed by other investigators interested in
human behavior during nuclear power plant accidents.
Ref. 73 points out that, in the course of a scenario, the operator crew performs four
fundamental activities: monitoring, explanation building, action planning, and action
implementation. Monitoring involves keeping track of the different indicators and
instrumentation. Explanation building refers to crew efforts to understand the ongoing
scenario. Planning refers to the crew's building of a strategy or set of actions in response
to the situation. Implementation entails the actual execution of planned tasks or strategy.
Note that the actual ordering of these tasks may vary (e.g., operators may start to plan
actions before they have completely explained the situation).
This representation of crew activities is quite similar to the operator action tree
(OAT) notion, originally described in Ref. 74 and applied in a number of PRAs (e.g., [6]).
A typical OAT (e.g. [75]) has three top events: diagnosis, action, and rediagnosis. Ref. 76
uses an OAT with four top events; the time-dependent event trees in Ref. 53 can be viewed
as extensions of the OAT idea. The tasks of monitoring, explanation formulation, and
planning are included in the diagnosis. top event in the OAT. The action implementation
activity, on the other hand, corresponds to the action top event in the OAT.
It can be seen that two of the tree substates used in the DETAM model for the
operating crew cover these concepts. For example, the diagnosis state models the results of
the monitoring and the explanation building activities described in Ref. 73; the planning
state models the results of the planning activitiy. Of course, the repetitive application of
these substates in a dynamic simulation render the rediagnosis top event in the OAT
unnecessary. The third substate, the crew quality state, models the influence of such
performance shaping factors (PSFs) as stress. These PSFs are treated in conventional
human reliability analyses, as well. In a DETAM analysis, however, the dynamic
development of these PSFs in response to the operator/plant interaction can be modeled
explicitly.
4.5.2 Crew Diagnosis State
The crew diagnosis state indicates the crew's understanding of the plant's past and
current conditions. As discussed in Ref. 54, this understanding can be represented at a
variety of levels (e.g., plant level, system level). This analysis defines the diagnosis state in
terms of two components: the crew's understanding of the general scenario and the states of
five safety functions.
4.5.2.1 General Scenario Component
The model assumes that the crew may diagnose that the plant is undergoing one of
four possible general scenarios. These scenarios are: steady state, uncertain, SGTR and
small loss of coolant accident (SLOCA). The crew thinks that the plant is at steady state
if it observes no change in the parameters being monitored. If the crew observes deviations
from the nominal levels of variables being monitored but is not definite on the specific
scenario, the scenario diagnosis is uncertain. The SGTR diagnosis indicates that the crew
is certain that the plant is experiencing a steam generator tube rupture. A SLOCA
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diagnosis indicates that the crew is confident that a small loss of coolant accident is in
progress. The SLOCA is included because its indicators closely resemble those of SGTR
[75]. In this way, this DETAM demonstration allows the crew to err in diagnosing the
general scenario.
Four indicators [secondary radiation alarm monitor (RAM), Reactor Cooling System
pressure, pressurizer level, and steam generator level] provide the basis for diagnosing the
general.scenario. Both SGTR and SLOCA lead to decreases in RCS pressure and
pressurizer level. The conditions of the RAM and the steam generator (SG) level
determine if the accident is an SGTR or a SLOCA. If either the radiation alarm is on or
the SG level is increasing, the general scenario is an SGTR. On the other hand, if the
alarm is off and the SG level is decreasing, the scenario is an SLOCA. Table 4.6 shows the
possible values of the scenario indicators. Each indicator may have three values (except
RAM which has two). These values refer to the conditions of the parameters which the
operator crew monitors. The unobserved value accounts for situations in which the crew
has not yet observed the indicator (the minimum observation times are user input).
Table 4.6 shows the nominal criteria that indicate how transitions from one scenario-level
diagnosis to another can occur. This table is based on plant emergency operating
procedures, backup documentation, and discussions with training instructors knowledgeable
about the SGTR scenario. Errors in diagnosis are discussed later in Section 4.7.
4.5.2.2 Safety Functions Component
The crew diagnosis state is further defined by the crew's understanding of the status
of five safety functions. These functions, which are also monitored by the Safety
Parameter Display System, are: primary pressure control, primary inventory control,
secondary heat sink, secondary pressure control, and secondary heat removal. Table 4.7
indicates the different possible states, along with their respective transition criteria, of
these safety functions. For example, the primary inventory control function has three
possible values. The first value is when the pressurizer and the RCS levels are normal or
unobserved. The second value is when the pressurizer level is approaching the "solid"
level. This value is a concern for the crew because a solid pressurizer reduces the crew's
ability to regulate RCS pressure through the pressurizer. The third value is when the RCS
level approaches the uncovery level. The secondary heat sink function also has three
possible states; the rest of the safety functions have four each.
Although the DETCO-SGTR code allows the safety function portion of the crew
diagnosis state to change stochastically, the demonstration model for SGTR described in
this chapter assumes that the operator crew correctly understands the status of these
functions. This assumption is consistent with the earlier assumption (see Section 4.4) that
nearly all instrumentation functions correctly, and limits the number of states to be
considered. Note that with the general scenario and five safety functions describing the
diagnosis state, 2304 diagnosis states are possible.
4.5.3 Crew Quality State
The crew quality state indicates the dynamic portion of the internal state of the crew
that affects its ability to plan and perform required tasks. It includes such factors as the
crew's group structure, emotional condition, and degree of coordination in executing the
members' respective assigned tasks. Thus, the crew quality state is intended to
accommodate performance shaping factors (e.g., stress) that are deemed important in
existing human reliability models [77-79].
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Both the general structure of DETAM and the computer code implementation
DETCO-SGTR allow the crew quality state to change stochastically. Thus, for example,
the analysis is capable of treating the dynamic stress models proposed in Refs. 29 and 51.
For the sake of simplicity, however, this demonstration does not exercise this capability.
4.5.4 Crew Planning State
The operator crew planning state refers to the set of actions that the crew plans to
perform. In keeping with crew training and plant operating policies, the DETAM
implementation crew model treats crew planning as being procedure-oriented, that is, the
crew tends to follow the procedures as closely as possible. The model also accommodates
operator actions which are not explicitly part of the actual procedure. These actions are
incorporated into the procedures, i.e. they are treated like procedure steps.
4.5.4.1 Procedure-Based Planning
In the case of procedure following, the crew planning state at any point in time can
be described in terms of two substates: the procedure substate, which indicates which
emergency procedure is to be followed, and the step substate, indicating the specific step in
the selected procedure to be performed. (Recall that, as shown in Figure 3.2, the actual
execution of planned actions affecting equipment is simulated in the next time step when
the likelihoods of the new hardware states are determined.)
The procedure substate can be any of the four emergency operating procedures,
namely: Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (E-O) [66], Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
(FR-H.1) [69], Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (E-1) [67], and Steam Generator
Tube Rupture (E-3) [68]. E-0 covers the verification of safety functions and determines
the appropriate event-specific procedure to use. FR-H.1 handles the restoration of the
secondary heat sink in case it fails or is unavailable. The secondary heat sink is necessary
for all abnormal scenarios. E-1 handles the small loss of coolant accident and other events
involving loss of coolant. E-3 mitigates the steam generator tube rupture event. These
four. emergency operating procedures are modeled because they are the likely procedures
that the crew will use for the portion of SGTR event being considered. Because
information on the appropriate procedures for crew response to warnings from the critical
safety function status trees was not obtained in this study, this demonstration of DETAM
treats the occurrence of a "red" or "orange" branch as a boundary condition, terminating
the development of the associated scenario.
The step substate refers to the specific step of an emergency procedure that the
operators are planning to execute. Tables 4.8-4.11 show the procedure steps modeled, the
assumptions taken, and the time allocated to perform each step. There are 37 E-0 steps,
16 FR-H.1 steps, 13 E-1 steps, and 18 E-3 steps modeled. An actual exercise simulating
the SGTR event (at a PWR training simulator) served as a basis in assigning step
completion time. The times allotted for steps not performed during the simulation are
assessed judgmentally. The model assumes that the successful performance of tasks in
steps which involve systems not explicitly modeled and allocates times to perform the
associated operator actions. For example, since the model does not include the system
needed to verify containment isolation (E-4 Step 6 in Table 4.8), the model assumes that
containment isolation status is normal (this is a reasonable assumption for the SGTR case)
and allots 15 seconds for the crew to perform the step.
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4.5.4.2 Non-Procedural Actions
As previously mentioned, the operators may perform actions which are not explicitly
written in the procedure. For example, the operator crew may decide to turn off the high
pressure injection system (HPIS) when the pressurizer level becomes alarmingly high in
order to prevent the pressurizer from becoming "solid." Non-procedural actions such as
this are integrated into the the analysis as pseudo-procedures or pseudo-steps within
actual procedures. Step 19 of Table 4.11 shows how the action to turn off HPIS is added to
the SGTR procedure (E-3). Thus, the modeling framework easily accommodates inclusion
of operator actions that are not included in the formal procedures.
4.5.4.3 Planning State Transitions
In this analysis, the execution of a transition between two planning states is a
two-step process. The first step involves the transition from one procedure to another, e.g.
from E-0 to FR-H.1. In implementing this transition, the model assumes that the
operator is very unlikely to transfer to a particular procedure not prescribed by the current
step and procedure being followed. In other words, transfer to a particular procedure is
possible only if the current procedure step being executed mentions that procedure as an
option. For example Step 10 in Table 4.12 suggests that the next planning states can only
have either FR-H.1 or E-0 as the procedure substate. The table does not consider
transitions to the E-1 or E-3 procedures because the step explicitly instructs the operator
crew to either proceed to FR-H.1 if the emergency feedwater system (EFWS) is failed or
remain in the current procedure (E-0) if EFWS is operating properly.
The second step involves a transfer from one step to another. The criteria for
nominal transitions appear in Tables 4.12-4.15. These tables assume that the crew follows
the procedures to the letter. However, the DETCO-SGTR code does allow the crew to
jump from one state (or step) to any other at each time step (with user-provided
likelihoods). More general transition tables are presented in Section 4.6.4.
4.5.6 Operator Error Forms That Can Be Modeled
The flexibility of the operator crew model enables DETAM to account for various
operator error forms and to evaluate the consequences of such errors1 . In particular, the
following error forms can be directly treated:
0 Improper diagnosis
0 Overly quick procedure following
0 Overly slow procedure following
9 Improper procedure following
0 Looping
a Errors of commission
These errors can be categorized into two groups: diagnosis-related and
planning-related. Diagnosis-related errors refer to the failure of the crew to diagnose the
plant condition correctly. For example, the crew may think that the plant is experiencing
an SLOCA when in reality an SGTR is in progress.
'Here, the term "error" is, for the sake of convenience, used to indicate a variance between
the operator actions and the desired actions, regardless of the reason for the variance.
Thus, for example, an error results if the operators faithfully follow faulty procedures.
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Most of the planning-related "errors" listed involve non-prescribed procedure
following. Overly quick procedure following can involve the skipping of steps in a
procedure (perhaps because the crew is sure that these steps are irrelevant). Overly slow
procedure following can involve delays in performing prescribed actions (e.g., initiating
bleed and feed cooling), perhaps due to operator reluctance to take these actions. Improper
procedure following can involve the performance of the procedures (or procedure steps) in
an incorrect order, using steps not in the procedures, or using incorrect procedures. Note
that the occurrence of these errors could be a direct or indirect consequence of a
diagnosis-related error. The DETAM model used in this analysis can account for these
errors because, as mentioned earlier, each procedure-step combinations is considered as a
potential next planning state at each time step. For example, if the current planning state
has E-0 as the procedure substate and Step 6 as the step substate, the next planning state
can have E-3 as the procedure substate and Step 4 as the step substate. The user is
required to supply the likelihood of each possible procedure-step transition. This is further
discussed in Section 4.6.
The "looping" error form refers to certain situations where the operators are
following the procedures in the prescribed manner, but the procedures are not completely
appropriate for the situation. For example, cases may arise where the cues needed to allow
transfer to a new procedure are not available (or are not observed by the operators). In
such cases, this demonstration analysis assumes that the operators remain in the procedure
(i.e., the operators are treated as automatons).
The final error form that can be treated in this modeling framework is the so-called
"error of commission." This error is closely associated with misdiagnosis errors, although
the occurrence of a misdiagnosis does not always result in an error of commission. It
appears that most, if not all, errors of commission can be treated in the same manner as
planning-related errors. For cases involving improper procedure following, an error of
commission can be viewed as a consequence. Cases not involving improper procedure
following can be treated by inserting pseudo-procedure steps into the model, as described
in Section 4.5.4.2, and then using the same modeling framework.
4.6 Frequency Assignments
The emphasis of the previous sections is on the structure of the DETAM application
to SGTR. This section discussess the assessment of branching likelihoods. Four sets of
transition rates are required: hardware failure rates, diagnosis state transition rates,
planning state transition rates, and human error rates in executing planned tasks. The
hardware failure rates and the human error rates are obtained from conventional sources
and are applied in a relatively straightforward manner. The rates of diagnosis state and
planning state transitions, on the other hand, require a considerable amount of judgment.
The assessment of the rates for operator state transitions can require, for example,
development of context-dependent likelihoods of misdiagnosis and inexact procedure
following. Well-accepted estimates for these frequencies are not yet available, and will
likely depend upon the development of advanced cognitive models for operators (e.g., [73]),
or even models for entire operating crews (e.g., [50,51]). For the purposes of demonstrating
the elements of DETAM, subjectively assessed branching frequencies, based upon the
detailed characteristics of the scenario leading up to the branching scenario, are judged to
be adequate.
It should also be pointed out that the degree of subjectivity of this analysis might, in
some cases, actually be less than that employed in conventional human reliability analyses.
Consider, for example, the top event OR (discussed in Section 4.2), used in the Seabrook
72
PRA to model operator actions to control the tube break by depressurizing the reactor
coolant system to the ruptured steam generator pressure level. This top event involves a
set of operator actions that could take from several minutes to a few hours to complete,
depending on the plant condition. It is not clear that all potentially significant
subscenarios associated with this top event are included in the analysis. The DETAM
treatment of this situation, on the other hand, treats the set of actions included in OR by
explicitly modeling the component tasks (e.g. turning on the pressurizer spray) as they
appear in the procedure. This disaggregation of the global top event facilitates the analysis
because even though expert judgment is still required, the judgments are made for more
tightly defined situations.
4.6.1 Hardware System Failure Rates
In this analysis, hardware systems are allowed to fail only when they are demanded.
Automatic demands occur when a process variable level reaches the actuation setpoint of a
system. For example, if the reactor coolant system pressure drops below 1875 psia, the
safety injection signal (SI) actuates automatically. The operators may also manually
create a demand for a system.
In principle, the hardware failure rates can be dependent on the magnitudes of the
process variables (such a case is treated by Ref. 27) and on the system's previous history.
For example, the failure rate of a relief valve can depend on the number of times it has
already cycled. In this analysis, a conventional approach is taken; system unavailabilities
taken from Ref. 6 are conservatively used as demand failure frequencies (recall that
runtime failures are expected to have a small contribution to risk, and that testing and
maintenance unavailabilities are to be treated as initial conditions). Table 4.16 shows the
assumed failure rates for the modeled systems.
4.6.2 Diagnosis State Transition Rates
If the crew and the instrumentation are perfect (i.e., the crew does not make any
mistakes in diagnosing the plant condition), the transitions between diagnosis states
become deterministic (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Since the operator crew can err in
diagnosis, however, non-nominal transitions and their corresponding likelihoods must be
addressed.
To ensure some degree of consistency in the estimation process, a two-step procedure
is followed to develop the diagnosis branching frequencies (recall the assumption that the
instrumentation is perfect). In the first step, possible transitions are assigned qualitative
likelihoods. In the second step, the qualitative likelihoods are quantified. The range of
qualitative likelihoods used in this study, along with the associated numerical values,
appear in Table 4.17.
Table 4.18 shows the diagnosis branching frequencies developed for this analysis of
SGTR. Table 4.18 was developed on the basis of a thorough study of the relevant
procedures (to determine: the indicators monitored by the operator crew, and the criteria
used by the crew to identify which scenario is in progress), walk-throughs of some
sequences to understand how the crew might treat the indicators during the event,
consultations with a training instructor knowledgeable about the SGTR scenario and crew
responses to that scenario, and discussions with an analyst experienced in human reliability
analysis. In Table 4.18, the transition likelihoods are affected by variations in the critical
SGTR indicators (radiation alarm status and ASG level), as well as by the initial diagnosis
state. For example, if the crew has a "steady state" or 'uncertain" diagnosis state at the
beginning of a time step, and if the radiation alarm actuates and the difference between the
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faulted steam generator level and the intact steam generator level rises to a value greater
than a given (user-defined) threshold during the time step, it is judged that a transition to
the SLOCA diagnosis state is very very unlikely (VVUnLKLY). Note that the physical
model employed in the analysis limits the indicators that can be used in developing the
transition frequencies.
The following assumptions are used in developing the diagnosis transition rates:
* If the initial scenario diagnosis state is neither "steady state" nor "uncertain",
transitions to either the "steady state" or "uncertain" diagnosis states is allowed.
0 Once the crew has observed a very convincing indicator of a scenario (e.g., a
pronounced difference in steam generator levels), transitions between diagnoses are
not allowed.
Both of these assumptions allow a simplified treatment of the "confirmation bias"
phenomenon. This term is used to describe situations where a person clings to an initial
diagnosis in spite of evidence to the contrary; in fact, the person distorts that evidence to
prove the truth of the initial diagnosis [80].
Although the crew's diagnosis state is defined by its knowledge of the status of the
five critical safety functions, as well as its understanding of the general scenario, this is not
reflected in Table 4.18. More generally, diagnosis state branchings associated with
instrumentation are not treated; it is assumed that all instrumentation (except the
radiation alarm monitor) always functions perfectly and that the operators correctly
observe the instrumentation readings. These assumptions need to be further examined in
more detailed applications of DETAM.
4.6.3 Planning State Transition Rates
Similar to the case of diagnosis state transition analysis, the nominal planning state
transitions rules in Tables 4.12-4.15 are sufficient if the operator crew acts in textbook
fashion. The crew may, however, advertently or inadvertently deviate from the path
prescribed by the procedures. The potential deviations can be categorized as being one of
the error forms listed in Section 4.5.
The approach used to develop context-dependent transition rates between planning
states is similar to that employed for the diagnosis transition rates. Thus, information is
gathered from the relevant procedures and from discussions with persons knowledgeable
about operator behavior and human reliabilty analysis. Transition branches are assigned
qualitative likelihoods depending on the values of key time-dependent parameters; these
qualitative likelihoods are translated into quantitative values using Table 4.17.
To help ensure consistency in assigning transition likelihoods, meta rules (or guiding
principles) are developed. Table 4.19 shows the meta rules used to assign likelihoods of
switching from one procedure to another. These rules indicate how the transition
likelihood is affected by the consistency between: a) the crew's diagnosis state and the
procedure being considered, and b) the available indicators and the procedure being
considered. Two other factors that are used to affect planning state transitions are the
relative importance of the indicators monitored and the potential consequence of the
operator action. Note that the transition likelihoods are also affected by the tendency of
the operator crew to follow procedures, but this tendency is not treated as a dynamic
characteristic (i.e., it is treated as an initial condition of the analysis).
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The second and sixth rows of Table 4.19 provide the meta-rules developed for
situations when the crew has to decide if it should transfer to a procedure consistent with
its plant diagnosis, given that the specific transfer criteria are not met. Thus, the table
shows that the crew has a greater tendency to transfer if it is currently in procedure E-0
(second row) than if it is already in an event-specific procedure (sixth row) such as E-1.
This reflects a reasonable assumption that it is easier to convince a crew that is still unsure
than a crew that has formed a diagnosis state or has committed itself to an event-specific
procedure.
A sample set of actual rules governing the transition from one procedure to another is
shown in Table 4.20. The table shows the transition rates from the E-0 procedure to the
E-3 (SGTR) procedure along with the parameters used in the estimate.
To provide examples of how the various error forms identified in Section 4.5 are
treated, Tables 4.21-4.23 provide the rules used to estimate context-dependent likelihoods
of procedure step skipping, deliberate actions to turn off safety equipment, and variations
in the timing of actions required by procedures. Table 4.21 treats three possible instances
during which an operator crew might skip steps while following the E-0 procedure. These
particular steps are chosen because of their importance; skipping any of these steps results
in the operator missing a step that checks if a transfer to another procedure is necessary.
Table 4.22 provides the rules used to determine the likelihood that the operator crew turns
off the HPIS (a non-procedural action as described in the previous chapter). This situation
may occur when the crew is attempting to prevent the pressurizer from overfilling and to
maintain control reactor coolant system pressure with the pressurizer. Table 4.23 deals
with situations where bleed and feed cooling can be performed earlier or later than specified
in the procedures. Note that although the Loss of Secondary Heat Sink procedure
(FR-H.1) [69] states that the intact steam generator wide range liquid level should be less
than 26% and the primary pressure should be greater than 2385 psig before bleed and feed
cooling is initiated, Table 4.23 only considers the steam generator level. This
simplification is used because it is very unlikely that the SGTR event will result in an
abnormal increase in primary pressure.
4.6.4 Performance Error Rates
In this study, performance errors refer to human errors in executing planned tasks.
Factors which could affect performance error rates include the crew quality state (which
accounts for, among other things, the emotional condition of the crew). Since the tasks
considered in this SGTR analysis are primarily actions that the operators have practiced
for or committed to memory, these tasks are treated as being skill-based. To make
DETAM demonstration results comparable with those of the Sequoyah study [5], the
suggested error rate of 2.7E-3 for each task executed is used [81].
4.7 Branching Rules
As shown in Table 3.2, branchings are allowed to (but need not) occur at fixed points
in time. In this analysis, uniform time steps of 30 seconds are used. This time step is
chosen largely to represent the time scale for the operator actions considered. (Note that,
as described in Section 4.3, the physical model employs 1 second time steps to ensure
accuracy.) If an event (e.g., an automatic system demand) occurs during the time step, it
is treated as occurring at the end of the time step.
Other rules used to limit branching are discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. For
example, the neglect of hardware failures during operation (due to their low likelihood)
means that hardware branching only occurs when a system is demanded. The numerous
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tables for operator state transitions also limit the number of transitions that can be
considered at any one point in time.
The regularly spaced branching intervals used in the current analysis allow a simple
treatment of the branching process, but may not be especially efficient. In future,
improved analyses, dynamic time steps (accounting for the time required by process
variables to reach key values, as well as the time required for operators to perform key
actions) might be used to reduce the computational burden. Although such a change is not
expected to significantly affect the number of branches generated (actual branching does
not occur unless a hardware system is demanded or the operating crew changes state), it
would reduce the number of calls to the branching process. Furthermore, it would reduce
the number of computations performed by the physical model for a given scenario.
4.8 Stopping Rules and Truncation Mechanisms
The development of dynamic scenarios can be stopped at three points. First, it can
be stopped when an absorbing state (either desired or undesired) is reached. Second, it can
be stopped if the potential contribution to risk from the scenario is judged to be
insignificant. Third, it can be stopped if it is similar to another scenario; in this case, all
similar scenarios are grouped and treated as a single scenario.
4.8.1 Absorbing States
The thermal-hydraulic model described in Section 4.4 largely determines the
absorbing states used in this application. This model employs a somewhat oversimplified
representation of the plant's secondary side, and is unable to deal with saturated conditions
in the reactor coolant system. Clearly, the model cannot treat such issues as the behavior
of the plant following steam generator dryout or the generation of a steam bubble in the
main loop (as observed at Ginna). Thus, the model is restricted to the early phase of an
SGTR.
The limited number of operating procedures explicitly included in the model places
additional restrictions on the analysis. For example, procedures dealing with situations
where the critical safety functions reach and pass warning levels are not incorporated. This
demonstration analysis considers the following plant conditions as absorbing states in the
analysis:
0 Successful completion of the reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization
(in Procedure E-3).
0 Successful depressurization through bleed and feed cooling.
0 Any of the critical safety functions monitored by the SPDS reaches "orange" or "red"
status. The demonstration does not model appropriate procedures to handle this
conditions.
0 The reactor coolant system node reaches saturation. This condition is undesirable
because it complicates control of the pressurizer level and core cooling can be
degraded (e.g., due to reduced or even blocked flow). The thermal-hydraulic model
implemented does not handle saturation conditions well.
* The intact steam generators reach dryout. Once the plant reaches this condition, it
loses its ability to transfer heat from the primary side to the secondary.
* The ruptured steam generator overfills. This releases radioactive coolant outside of
the containment.
0 The pressurizer overfills. The crew loses its ability to control primary pressure
through the pressurizer.
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* Bleed and feed cooling cannot be initiated successfully on demand. This indicates the
failure of the crew to restore the secondary heat sink.
By truncating scenarios when these absorbing are reached, severe physical modeling
inaccuracies, which will lead to incorrect modeling of hardware demands and operator
actions, are avoided. On the other hand, the full set of accident sequences is not modeled.
Although some of the above absorbing states represent undesirable conditions, they are far
less severe than core damage. Moreover, the conditional frequency of core damage, given
each undesired absorbing state, varies from state to state. Thus, the overall results of the
analysis are not directly comparable with those of conventional risk studies (which
compute the likelihood of core damage). This makes comparison of the dynamic event tree
approach with conventional methods a difficult task. Improved physical models must be
incorporated into the DETAM analysis to avoid this problem.
4.8.2 Scenario Truncation on Low Likelihood
In Figure 3.2, the seventh task to be performed in a DETAM analysis checks if the
scenario being analyzed has a reasonable potential to be risk significant. This means that
not only should the scenario have a reasonable likelihood at the current time step, it should
also have a non-negligible conditional frequency of leading to core damage.
This demonstration analysis employs the simple approach of truncating scenarios
whose frequency (at the current time step) falls below a user-specified threshold. In more
advanced applications, where the number of dynamic scenarios may be very large, more
sophisticated "risk potential" truncation methods (e.g., methods that estimate the
conditional frequency of core damage) may be need to be developed.
4.8.3 Similarity Grouping
As pointed out in Ref. 26, one strategy to reduce the size of a dynamic event tree is
to group scenarios that are "similar." Such grouping is often done in conventional PRA
event sequence analysis as well (the concept of "pinch points" between event tree modules
is discussed in Ref. 82).
Grouping can be done at a variety of levels of approximation. For example, in a
strict case, two sequences might be grouped only if all they have identical hardware and
operator states and if the values of the plant associated process variable are dose. In a
liberal case, sequences might be grouped on the basis of hardware states alone. This
approach reduces the dynamic event tree to an event sequence diagram of the form
suggested by Ref. 12. In this demonstration analysis, a relatively strict policy is used; at
any given time step (see Figure 3.2), scenarios are grouped only if: i) they have identical
hardware and operator crew states, and ii) their primary pressure and temperature values
are within 5 psia and 50F, respectively. As in the case of low risk potential scenario
truncation, more powerful methods for grouping scenarios may need to be developed for
more detailed applications of DETAM.
4.9 DETAM Computer Code for SGTR (DETCO-SGTR)
The DETAM approach, being simulation oriented, is implemented via a computer
code. A computer code, called DETCO-SGTR, has been constructed to perform a
DETAM analysis for the SGTR scenario, subject to the boundary conditions discussed in
the previous sections of this chapter. DETCO-SGTR is application-specific; significant
changes in the analysis assumptions (e.g., in the tables for transition rates between
operator crew substates) will require some programming modifications.
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Figure 4.8 shows a flow chart of the DETCO-SGTR. The code includes the following
elements:
* A routine that defines possible branchings at any given node due to variations in
hardware state (e.g., system successes or failures on demand).
* A routine incorporating the thermal hydraulic model that simulates the dynamic
behavior of process variables over a given time step.
* A routine that models the responses of the hardware systems to changes in process
variables and to operator crew actions. The routine also eliminates plant states that
are impossible according to the branching rules. This routine, for example, removes
branchings associated with the failure of a backup system if the physical model
routine does not indicate a demand for the system and if the operator crew does not
try to start the system.
0 A routine that models the operating crew. The operator crew model takes as input
the current plant status (defined in terms of hardware, process variables, and
operator crew state) and provides as output possible operator actions, possible
changes in operator crew state, and the likelihoods of these different actions and
states.
* A routine that estimates the risk potential of sequences and removes sequences with
low risk potential.
* A routine that groups event sequences whose projected future paths are similar. Like
the previous routine, this routine aims to control the combinatorial explosion
problem inherent with the dynamic event tree approach.
DETCO-SGTR is written in C (it has approximately 6000 lines). On a 20 Mhz
386-class PC, longer runs take on the order of 30 minutes to execute; other runs can finish
much more quickly. Due to the large number of sequences generated, the computer
currently used cannot accommodate the entire SGTR analysis (memory limits are reached
sometime during the simulation). Therefore the runs performed (discussed in Chapter 5)
involve conditional analyses in which a specific frontline system (or set of systems) is
assumed to fail.
The input required by DETCO-SGTR includes the initial values of all variables
describing the plant state, the thermal-hydraulic model parameters, the simulation time
duration, setpoint values, the number of possible states of each branching variable, and
hardware failure and human error rates. DETCO-SGTR produces as output all dynamic
event tree nodes, along with their associated likelihoods and values of relevant plant state
variables, created during the simulation. The user needs to post-process the output to
construct a dynamic event tree (run turnaround times could be substantially reduced by
automating most of this post-processing).
4.10 Summary Remarks
This application of the general dynamic event tree analysis method to steam
generator tube rupture accidents has a number of potentially significant limitations. First,
it employs a very simple 4-node model to simulate the thermal hydraulic response of the
plant to the tube rupture. The 4-node model's shortcomings are such that an entire core
damage scenario cannot be simulated; this increases the difficulty of comparing the results
of this analysis with those of conventional studies. Second, hardware branchings are
performed only for frontline system failures; the potentially confusing effects of support
system failures and instrumentation failures are not addressed. Third, two of the three
crew substates (diagnosis and planning states) are treated very simply. The third substate
(quality state) is not treated at all. Improved modeling is likely to be needed in this area
for in-depth applications. Fourth, a very large number of judgments concerning the
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operator state transition frequencies are required of the analyst. The analysis burden is
likely to increase with more complicated cognitive models, unless a wider set of meta-rules
for assigning frequencies can be developed. Fifth, the transition frequency assignments are,
with only a few exceptions, independent of scenario history. This is not necessarily a
significant limitation, but further work is required to determine if the dynamic event tree
framework, as shown in Figure 3.2, carries enough information to allow this approximation.
D.espite its limitations, however, this application of DETAM analysis leads to some
useful insights concerning the SGTR accident. These insights are presented in Chapter 5.
79
Table 4.1 - Seabrook PRA SGTR Top Events [6]
To Event Description
TT Turbine Trip
EF Emergency Feedwater Actuation
OM Operator Controls Emergency Feedwater Flow
NL No Reactor Coolant Pump Seal LOCA
RW Refueling Water Storage Tank Available
HP High Pressure Injection
OP Operator Action to Control HPI Flow
RV Reactor Vessel Intact
OR Operator Controls the Break Flow
SL No Secondary Side Leak to Atmosphere
OD Operator Depressurizes the Reactor Coolant System and
Provides Makeup
ON Operator Provides Long Term Stability
RA/RB RWST Isolation Valves
L1/L2 Residual Heat Removal System Operation, Train A/Train B
LR Loop Recirculation Operation of the RHR System
CA/CB Containment Building Spray Operation, Train AFrain B
Table 4.2 - Sequoyah PRA SGTR Top Events [5]
Top Event Description
SGTR (Tsg) Initiating Event - Steam Generator Tube Rupture
RPS (K) Failure of Reactor Protection System
HPI (D1) Failure of Charging Pump System in High Pressure Injection Mode
AFW (L) Auxiliary Feedwater; failure of 1/3 AFW pumps to 1/2 Steam Generators
in SGTR
Oper Depress Operator Fails to Depressurize RCS During Small Break Initiators and
(Od) Steam Generator Tube Rupture
RCI (Q1) Failure of Pressurizer SRV/PORV to Close After Transient
SGI (Qs) Loss of Steam Generator Integrity Via a Relief Valve, AFW Steam Line,
Decay Heat Removal Line, or Blowdown Line
LPR (H3) Failure of Low Pressure Safety Injection System in Recirculation Mode
HPR (H2) Failure of Charging Pump System in High Pressure Recirculation Mode
Table 4.3 - Process Variables Carried In Dynamic Event Tree Model for SGTR
Variable
Pp Pp
Tp, Tp
Mpzr
a, a
Msgi, Msgi
Psgi
Tsgi, Tsgi
Msg2, Msg2
Psg2
Tsg2, T sg2
Definition
Primary node pressure and derivative
Primary node temperature and derivative
Primary node mass and derivative
Pressurizer mass
Pressurizer vapor volume fraction and derivative
Faulted steam generator mass and derivative
Faulted steam generator pressure
Faulted steam generator temperature and derivative
Intact steam generators mass and derivative
Intact steam generators pressure
Intact steam generators temperature and derivative
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Table 4.4 - Systems Included in DETAM SGTR Analysis
System [ Notes
High Pressure Provides primary coolant from the Reactor Water Storage Tank
Injection (HPI)* (RWST) upon actuation of safety injection signal. If emergency
feedwater system fails, bleed and feed cooling requires HPI. Includes
centrifugal charging pumps, safety injection pumps, and RWST.
Pressurizer Relieves primary pressure. Opens when primary pressure reaches
Power-Operated setpoint . Serves to depressurize the primary system when pressurizer
Relief Valve spray system fails or during bleed and feed cooling.
(PORV)*
Safety Injection Actuation of this signal creates a demand for other systems (see
Signal below). Signal actuates when RCS pressure drops below 1875 psia.
(S-signal)*
Main Feedwater Provides water to the steam generators during normal operation. Water
System comes from the condenser hot well. Automatically isolates when
(MFWS)** S-signal, high-high steam generator level signal, or low Tavg signal
occurs.
Emergency Provides water to the steam generator when MFWS is isolated or off.
Feedwater Automatically starts on S-signal. Includes the condensate storage tank
System (CST) from where water comes.
(EFWS)*
Start-Up Feed Serves as a back up to the MFWS and the EFWS pumps.
Pump (SUFP)* Automatically starts when both MFWS pumps trip with no S-signal or
high-high steam generator level signal or loss of offsite power. In case
of S-signal and the failure of EFWS, SUFP can provide water to the
steam generator. Takes suction from the CST. Ref. P-I treats SUFP
as part of the EFWS. DETAM treats SUFP separately since it is a back
up to EFWS.
Pressurizer Includes both the normal and auxiliary sprays. Actuates when the
Spray pressurizer pressure reaches its set point or when the operator decides
(SPRY)** to reduce primary pressure.
Steam Dump Removes heat from secondary coolant. Includes turbine bypass valves
Valve and (40% dump). Turbine bypass actuates following reactor trip.
Condensate
System (SDV)*
Atmospheric Provide secondary cooling when the SDVs are unavailable or
Relief Valves insufficient. The valves' combined capacity is 10% of the maximum
(ARV)* steam flow. Actuate due to overpressure or operator action.
Main Steam Include main steam isolation valves and check valves. Control the flow
Isolation Valves of steam from the steam generator to the turbine and the condenser.
(MSIV)** Isolation of the ruptured steam generator (to prevent any release of
radioactive coolant outside of the containment) includes closing of the
MSIV of that loop.
Radiation Alarm Checks and monitors'main steamline radiation, and condenser effluent
Monitor radiation. Abnormal secondary radiation level suggests that a steam
(RAM)** generator tube rupture has occurred.
Safety Monitors the status of the different safety functions. Serves as a back
Parameter up to the procedure,e.g. indicates to the crew the safety functions that
Display System need to be attended.
(SPDS)**
*Allowed to fail if initially operational.
** Maintains its initial status, i.e., available or unavailable.
Table 4.5 - Scenario Transition Parameters
Parameter Possible Values
__ _[ 1 2 3 4
Radiation Alarm Off On Not Applicable Not Applicable
(RA)
Pp (PP) Unobserved Decreasing Increasing No Change
Pzr Level (PL) Unobserved Decreasing Increasing No Change
SG1 Level (SL) Unobserved Decreasing Increasing No Change
Table 4.6 - Scenario Transition Criteria
Current Potential States
State Steady State Uncertain SGTR SLOCA
Steady No change in Criteria for SG level is SG level is
State Pzr level,SG SGTR, SLOCA increasing, Pp decreasing, Pp
level & Pp and & Steady State & Pzr level are & Pzr level are
RA is off are not met decreasing and decreasing and
RA is on RA is off
Uncertain Neither SGTR SG level is SG level is
nor SLOCA increasing, Pp decreasing, Pp
criteria are met & Pzr level are & Pzr level are
decreasing and decreasing and
RA is on RA is off
SGTR SG level is SG level is
increasing, Pp decreasing, Pp
& Pzr level are & Pzr level are
decreasing and decreasing and
RA is on RA is off
SLOCA SG level is SG level is
increasing, Pp decreasing, Pp
& Pzr level are & Pzr level are
decreasing and decreasing and
RA is on RA isoff
Table 4.7 - Diagnosis State Parameters
Parameter Potential Values 4
_ _1 _ _ _23 1 4
Primary Pressurizer Pressurizer Pressurizer Pressurizer
Pressure PORV and Spray is failed PORV is failed PORV and
Control Spray are Spray are failed
OK/unobserved_
Primary Pressurizer and Pressurizer level RCS level is
Inventory RCS levels are is approaching approaching
Control OK/unobserved "solid" level uncovery level
Secondary Heat Unobserved On (MFWS, Off (MFWS,
Sink (MFWS is off EFWS or SUFP EFWS & SUFP
& SUFP is off is on) are Off)
& EFWS is
unobserved)
Secondary ARVI and ARVI is failed ARV2 is failed ARVI and
Pressure ARV2 are ARV2 are failed
Control OK/unobserved
Secondary Heat Both SGs are At least one SG At least one SG One SG
Removal OK/unobserved approaches approaches approaches
dryout overfill dryout and the
other SG
approaches
overfill
Scenario Steady State Uncertain SGTR SLOCA
Component I I I
Table 4.8 - Response to Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Procedure Steps (E-0)
Model E-0 Assumptions/Comments Allotted
Step # Step # I Time(s)
i 1 Reactor successfully trips. Reactor automatically trips when low pressure setpoint is 15
reached. Operator manually trips the reactor when subcooling or pressure limits are
reached. This step is combined with step 2 in the implementation
1 2 Turbine trip is always successful. This step is combined with step 1 in the implementation 15
2 3 Power to AC emergency busses is available. This step is combined with step 4 in the 15
implementation.
2 4 SI successfully actuates. This step is combined with step 3 in the implementation. 15
3 5 MFW always isolates successfully. This step is combined with step 6 in the 15
implementation.
3 6 Containment isolation is not explicitly modeled, yet time is allotted for this step. 15
4 -7 Operating EFW pumps indicate success of EFWS. If EFWS is failed, repair or 15
restoration starts as soon as the failure is discovered. This step is combined with step 8 in
the implementation.
4 8 CC and SI pumps are considered similar. Pump status determines the he HPI system 15
status. If HPI is failed, recovery starts upon failure discovery.
5 9 PCCW pumps are running. This step is combined with step 10 in the implementation. 15
5 10 Ultimate heat sink is not explicitly modeled, but time is alloted to verify heat sink status. 15
6 1 SW cooling trains to diesels are established. This step is combined with step 12 in the 15
implementation.
6 1T At least one containment enclosure cooling fan is running. Time is allotted to verify 1T
containment fan status.
7 13 Only SG pressure is used to check if main steamline should be isolated. 30
8 14 Containment pressure remains less than 18 psig. Time to verify this is allocated. 30
9 15 ECCS flow is considered part of HPI system. RHR is not explicitly modeled. 30
10 16 EFWS flow less than 500 gpm to at least 2 SGs implies that EFWS is failed. This step is 15
combined with step 17 in the implementation.
10 17 Proper emergency alignment of EFW valves is part of EFWS success. Time is allotted to 15
verify proper emergency valve alignment.
11 18 Proper emergency alignment of ECCS valves is part of HPI success. 30
12 19 RCS Tave is expected to trend to 555 F for the demonstration sequence. 30
13 20 Checks for modes of Pzr PORVs and Spray Valves 30
14 21 RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
T 22 Uncontrolled depressurization of an intact SG is unlikely during the event of interest. 15
Occurrence of uncontrolled depressurization, requires transfer to procedure for Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation (E-2) which is not modeled in the implementation. This step is
combined with step 23 in the implementation.
15 23 If instrumentation is good, abnormal radiation level, indicative of faulted SG U-tubes, is 15
observed.
16 24 Containment radiation monitor to check RCS integrity is not explicitly modeled, but time 15
is allotted to check if RCS is intact. This step is combined with step 25 in the
implementation.
17 25 Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced. 30
18 26 SI termination at this is juncture is considered an undesireable state because SGTR has 30
yet to be addressed.
19 27 Monitoring of critical safety function status trees starts at this step. An orange or red 15
indicator requires the operator crew to go procedures which are not modeled in the
implementation. This step is combined with step 28 in the implementation.
19 28 SG level greater than the initial level indicates potential SGTR. 15
20 29 If instrumentation is good, abnormal secondary radiation level indicating SGTR, is 15
observed. This step is combined with step 30 in the implementation.
20 30 Auxiliary building radiation monitors are not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to 15
check them.
20 31 PRT is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to check PRT conditions. 30
22 32 Time is allotted to reset SI. This step is combined with step 33 in the implementation. 15
22 33 Time is allotted to reset containment isolation phases A and B. 15
23 34 Reestablishment of instr air supplies is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted for it. 30
24 35 RHR pumps are not explicitly modeled. Potential transfer to LRSC, however, is 15
accounted for. This step is combined with steps 36 and 37 in the implementation.
24 36 Emergency diesel generators are not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to check them. 15
24 T1 This step is just an instruction to return to step 19
Table 4.9 - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Procedure Steps (FR-H-1)
Model FR- Asssumptions/Comments Allotted
Step # H.1 Time(s)
Step #
1 1 Model carries only the RCS average temperature. 30
2-7 2 System repair starts the first time operator crew discovers that the system is failed. EFW 210
repair continues as SUFP is set up or repaired. Attempt to establish SUFP flow to SG
starts shortly after new attempts to restore EFWS fail. Restoration of EFWS or SUFP
continues throughout this procedure even after Feed and Bleed has been initiated.
8 3 RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
T 4 CCPs are considered part of the HPI system. No distinction is made between a HPI 30
pump and a CCP pump.
10-11 5 Attempt to establish SUFP flow. Power is available to SUFP. CST level is adequate. 60
12 6-9 Establishment of feed flow from the condensate system is not modeled. Time is used to 30
check if Feed and Bleed must be initiated and to restore EFWS, SUFP or both.
13-14 These steps are added to implement the procedure instruction to return to step 1. This 60
time, as step 1 is performed, restoration of EFWS and SUFP continues.
15 10 SI actuation has already occurred. This step is combined with step 11 in the 15
implementation.
15 11 CCP and HPI are treated similarly. 15
16 12 Time is allotted to reset SI. 30
17 13 Containment isolation is not explicitly modeled, yet time is allotted for this step. 30
18 14 Power is available to PORVs. Two PORVs must open for F&B to be successful. 30
19-2 15-16 End of sequence of interest. If PORVs open F&B is considered successful and plant state 60
is FB OKAY. If PORVs fail to open, restoration or repair ensues.
21 This step is added to account for the crew action to turn off the HPI. 30
22 This step is added for the possibility of crew turning off the EFWS. 30
Table 4.10 - Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Procedure Steps (E-1)
Model E-1 Asssumptions/Comments Allotted
Step # Step # Time(s)
1 1 RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
2 Uncontrolled depressurization of an intact SG is unlikely during the event of interest. 15
Occurrence of uncontrolled depressurization, requires transfer to procedure for Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation (E-2) which is not modeled in the implementation. This step is
combined with step 3 in the implementation
1 3 Potential transfer to SGTk procedure if SG level is greater than the initial level. 15
3 4 If instrumentation is good, abnormal radiation level, indicative of faulted SG U-tubes, is 30
observed.
4 5 Check Pzr PORVs and block valves. This step is combined with step 6 in the 15
implementation.
4 6 Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced. 15
5 7 SI termination at this is juncture is considered an undesireable state because SGTR has 30
yet to be addressed.
6 8 Containment spray is not explicitly modeled but time is allocated to check if spray should 30
be stopped.
7 9 RHR pumps are not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted for this step. This step is 15
combined with step 10 in the implementation.
7 10 Checks RCS and SG pressures. 15
8 11 Emergency diesel generators are not explicitly modeled but time is allotted to check if the 30
generators should be stopped.
9-10 12 Initiate evaluation of plant status. Time is allotted to check equipment that are not 60
explicitly modeled.
11 13 Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required;. This is the end of sequence of 30
interest. Paths reaching this point are considered UNDESIRED because the event being
investigated, SGTR, should not end here.
Table 4.11 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure Steps (E-3)
Model E-3 Assumptions/Comments Allotted
Step# Step # Time(s)
1 1 RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
2 2 Ruptured SG is assumed identified. The basis of transfer from E-0 to E-3 is uncontrolled 30
rise in SG NR level or abnormal secondary radiation level.
3-6 3 Ruptured SG is successfully isolated. This step includes successful turning off of the 120
EFWS for SG1, the assumed ruptured SG.
7 4 EFWS is turned off as part of step 3. This step is combined with step 5 in the 1
implementation.
7 5 Check of Pzr PORVs and block valves is combined with step 4 in the implementation. 15
8 6 Uncontrolled depressurization of an intact SG is unlikely during the event of interest. 30
Occurrence of uncontrolled depressurization, requires transfer to procedure for Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation (E-2) which is not modeled in the implementation. Time is
allotted for this step.
9 7 Intact SG levels are expected to be within limits. 30
10 8 Time is allotted to reset SI. This step is combined with step 9 in the implementation. 15
10 9 Time is allotted to reset containment isolation phases A and B. This step is combined with 15
step 8 in the implementation
11 10 Reestablishment of instrument air supplies is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted 30
for it.
12 11 Time is allotted to verify all AC busses. This step is combined with step 12 in the 15
implementation.
11 12 RHR pumps are not explicitly modeled, but time is allocated to perform this step. This 15
step is combined with step 11 in the implementation.
1T 13 Ruptured SG pressure less than 225 psig is very unlikely during the event of interest. Its 30
occurrence requires transfer to a more specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3.1, which is
not modeled. Time is allocated for this step.
14 14 This step marks the start of RCS cocidown. Transfer to the next step is allowed only if 30
the primary temperature drops below the limit.
15 15 Ruptured SG pressure is expected to be stable or increasing. Otherwise transfer to a more 15
specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3.1, which is not modeled, is required. Time is
allocated for this step.
15 16 RCS Subcooling is expected to be greater than 60. Otherwise transfer to a more
specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3.1, which is not modeled, is required. This step is
combined with the previous step in the implementation.
16 17 Depressurization of the RCS using pressurizer spray. 30
17 18 Depressurization of the RCS using the pressurizer PORV. 30
18 This step is added to mark the end of the demonstration sequence. If a path reaches this 30
point with the primary pressure less than or equal the ruptured SG pressure and either
EFWS or SUFP working successfully, the plant state is considered DESIRED.
19 This step is added to account for the crew action to turn off the HPI. 30
20 This step is added for the possibility of crew turning off the EFWS. 30
Table 4.12 - Nominal Transitions from Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Procedure (E-0)
Old New State
Step Pcdr Step Criteria Pcdr Step Criteria Pcdr Step Criteria
1 E-0 1 RT does E-0 2 RT occurs
not occur
2 E-0 2 SI does E-0 3 S1
not actuate actuates
3 E-0 4
4 E-0 5
5 E-0 6
6 E-0 7
7 E-0 8
8 E-0 9 ___ _______
9 E-0 10
10 LSHS I EFWS E-0 II EFWS is
fails good
11 E-0 12
12 E-0 12 Tp<555 & E-0 13 Tp >=555
decreasing
13 LRSC 1 PORV E-0 14 PORV is
fails open good
14 E-0 15 .
15 SGTR 1 sec. rad. E-0 16 sec. rad.
alarm is alarm is
on noton
16 E-0 17 RCS is LRSC 1 RCS is
intact not intact
17 E-0 19 subcoling E-0 17 Pzr level E-0 18 none of
is < 40 F, < 5%; else the
intact SG 0. previous
NLevel criteria is
<5%,or met
Ppis
decreasing
18 E-0 18
19 SGTR 1 SG level E-0 20 SG level
>initial is not
and increasing
increasing or >initial
20 SGTR 1 sec rad E-0 21 sec rad
alarm is alarm is
___ ____on no on____
21 E-0 22 on noon
22 E-0 23
23 E-0 24
24 LRSC 1 Pp <260. E-0 12 RCS
press. >=
260.
Table 4.13 - Nominal Transitions from Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (FR-H. 1)
Old 1New State
Step Pedr Step Criteria IPcdr Step Criteria I Pcdr IStep Criteriaf Pcdr Step Criteria
1 LSHS 1 SG2 LSHS 2 SG2
press.> press.<=
Pp Pp
2 , LSHS 2 __
T- Fffh T EWST L-SH T4 -EF-W i
is failed good _
4 E-0 11
5 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 15 EFWS LSHS 7 no
good on and and previous
EFWS is SUFP criterion
failed fail and is met
F&B is and
required SUFP
failed last
time step
TL1HS 5 no
previous
criterion
is met
-6 LSHS 4
7T SI T-6 W~ s- _E S* HUP SI 15 'TPW3- T=T T8 no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criterion
fails fail and is met
F&B is
required
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criterion
fails fail and is met
F&B is
. required;
9 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 15 EFWS LSHS 10 no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criteriaon
fails fail and is met
F&B is
grequired
10 LSHS 4 ~EFWSis LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 13 EFWS LSHS 11 no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criterion
fails fail and is met
F&B is
II~~LHS~ ~4~EWSis -LSS ~ UPis ~~HT ~13~ ~~ SHS ~T no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criteriaon
fails fail and is met
F&B is
required,
12 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS ~3 EFWS LSHS 13 no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criteria is
fails fail and met
F&B is
required;
Table 4.13 (cont.)
Old New State
Step Pcdr Step Criteria Pcdr Step Criteria Pcdr Step Criteria Pcdr Step Criteria
13 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 15 EFWS LRSC I Psg2 >
good on and and Pp
EFWS SUFP
fails fail and
F&B is
____grequired; ____
EHS~ 14 no
previous
criterion
is met I
14 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUEP is LSHS 15 EFWS LSHS 14 no
good on and and previous
EFWS SUFP criterion
fails fail and is met
F&B is
required;
T I ~ EFWE s~~IS 6 SUFP"is TTSHS ~ IT TSHW 16 HPI T
good on and and OK and
EFWS SUFP F&B is
fails fail and required
F&B is
___ 
required;
TLTIS 15 HPI is LSHS 14 TI~ -is
FAILED OK and
and F&B F&B is
is not not
required required
16 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 17 no
good on and previous
EFWS criterion
fails is met
17 TSHS 4 EFW is TT TSS SUFP is rLriS 18 no
good on and previous
EFWS criterion
fails is met
-T L~TS- 4 EFWS is ~HS~ 6 SUFP is ~~IHS- P-- RV is -T51TWS- no
good on and good previous
EFWS criterion
fails is met
19 LSHS 4 EFWS is LSHS 6 SUFP is LSHS 20 PORV is LSHS 19 no
good on and good previous
EFWS criterion
fails is met
20 LSHS 20 1 _ I I
Table 4.14 - Nominal Transitions from Loss of Reactor or Secondary
(E-1)
Coolant Procedure
Old New State
Step Pcdr_ Step Criteria_ Pcdr Step Prob | Pcdr Step Criteria
1 LRSC 2
2 SGTR 1 SG level LRSC -3 previous
> initial criteria are
level and not met
is
increasing
3 SGTR 1 sec rad LRSC 4 sec rad
alarm is alarm is
on not on
4 LRSC 6 subcoolin LRSC 5 none of
g is < previous
40F, SG2 criteria
level < occurs
5.0, Pp is
decreasing
or Pzr
level <
5.0
5 LRSC 5
6 LRSC 7
7 LRSC 8 Pp <= LRSC 1 Pp > 260. LRSC 8 none of
260. and (SG1 the
level g, previous
SG2 level criteria is
or Pp is met
dreasing)
8 LRSC 9
9 LRSC 10
10 LRSC 11 1
11 LRSC 11 M I I II
Table 4.15 - Nominal Transitions from Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure (E-3)
Old New State
Step Pcdr Step Criteria | Pcdr Step Prob Pcdr Step Criteria
1 SGTR 2
2 SGTR 3
3 SGTR 4
4 SGTR 5
5 SGTR 6
6 SGTR 7
7 LRSC I PORV is SGTR 8 PORV is
failed closed
open
8 SGTR 9
9 SGTR 1 intact SG SGTR 10 previous
level > criterion
initial is not met
level
10 SGTR 11
11 SGTR 12
12 SGTR 13 ruptured SGTR 2 previous
SG is criterion
isolated is not met
13 SGTR 14
14 SGTR 14 Tp>= SGTR 15 Tp<
required required
T TP
15 SGTR 16
16 SGTR 16 SPRY is SGTR 17 SPRY is SGTR 18 no
good & failed previous
(Pp >Psg criterion
or Pzr is met
level >
75% or
subooling
< 40)
17 SGTR 17 Pp >Psg SGTR 18 previous
or Pzr criterion
level > is not met
75% or
subcooling
<40
18 SGTR 18
Hardware Systems Failure Frequencies
System Frequency Seabrook PRA [6]
_ _ 
(per demand) Page (Source)
EFWS 1.73E-4 (hardware) D.9-18
HPI 1.03E-6 D.8-80
PORV 1.05E-2 D.10-5
SUFP 4.46E-3 D.9-16
ARV 4.27E-3 (to open) D.10-8
2.50E-2 (to close) D.10-8
Table 4.17 - Qualitative Likelihoods
Likelihood* Description Value
CRTN NO Certain No 0.00
VVUnLKLY Very Very Unlikely 0.01
VUnLKLY Very Unlikely 0.10
UnLKLY Unlikely 0.30
EVEN Even 0.50
LKLY Likely 0.70
VLKLY Very Likely 0.90
VVLKLY Very Very Likely 0.99
CRTN YS Certain Yes 1.00
* If a number appears before a qualitative likelihood, the numerical value is
multiplied by that number. Any number appearing after the likelihood is in
hundredths and is added to the numerical value of likelihood. For example,
EVEN 10 has a numerical value of .60, whereas 2VUnLKLY has a value of
0.02.
Table 4.16
Table 4.18 - Likelihood of Incorrect Scenario Diagnosis During An SGTR Event
Old State New State Pzr Level Ruptured Rad A SG Probability**
SG Alar Level*
Pressure m
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing On < Limit VUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit UnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit UnLKLY10
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit CRTN NO
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On <Limit CRTN NO
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit VVUnLKLY
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit 5VVUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On < Limit 2VUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit EVEN10
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit VLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On < Limit 5VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit UnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off <Limit UnLKLY10
*A SG Level is the difference between the increasing ruptured steam generator level and the
intact steam generator level; limit is a user input.
**The numerical values of qualitative likelihoods are user input.
Table 4.19 - Meta Rules for Procedure Transitions
Current Diagnosis State Indicator Consistent Qualitative
Procedure Consistent with with Potential Likelihood
Potential Procedure Procedure
E-0 Y Y CRTNYS
E-0 Y N UnLKLY
E-0 N Y LKLY10
E-0 N N CRTNNO
Event-Specific Y Y CRTN YS
Event-Specific Y N 5VVUnLKLY
Event-Specific N Y LKLY10
Event-Specific N N CRTN NO
Table 4.20 - Transition Likelihood from Procedure E-0 to E-3
Scenario Step Rad Alarm ' Ruptured SG SG Level Probability
Diagnosis Number Level Difference
SGTR 15 On NA NA CRTNYS
SGTR 15 Off NA NA UnLKLY
SLOCA 15 On NA NA LKLY10
SLOCA 15 Off NA NA CRTN NO
Uncertain 15 On NA NA VVLKLY
Uncertain 15 Off NA NA CRTN NO
SGTR 19 On Increasing > Limit CRTN YS
SGTR 19 On Increasing < Limit VVLKLY
SGTR 19 Off Increasing > Limit VVLKLY
SGTR 19 Off Increasing < Limit VLKLY
SLOCA 19 On Increasing > Limit LKLY10
SLOCA 19 On Increasing < Limit LKLY
SLOCA 19 Off Increasing > Limit EVEN10
SLOCA 19 Off Increasing < Limit EVEN
Uncertain 19 On Increasing > Limit VVLKLY
Uncertain 19 On Increasing < Limit VLKLY05
Uncertain 19 Off Increasing > Limit VVLKLY
Uncertain 19 Off Increasing < Limit LKLY10
SGTR 20 On* NA NA CRTN YS
SGTR 20 Off NA NA UnLKLY
SLOCA 20 On NA NA LKLY10
SLOCA 20 Off NA NA CRTNN
Uncertain 20 On NA NA VVLKLY
Uncertain 20 Off NA NA CRTN NO
Table 4.21 - Likelihood that the Operator Crew Skips A Step While in E-0 Procedure
Scenario Step Action Missed Probability
Diagnosis Number I
SGTR 9 Check for LSHS VUnLKLY
SLOCA 9 Check for LSHS VUnLKLY
Uncertain 9 Check for LSHS 5VVUnLKLY
SGTR 14 Check for SGTR 5VVUnLKLY
SLOCA 14 Check for SGTR VUnLKLY
Uncertain 14 Check for SGTR 5VVUnLKLY
SGTR 17 Check for SGTR 5VVUnLKLY
SLOCA 17 Check for SGTR VUnLKLY
Uncertain 17 Check for SGTR 5VVUnLKLY
Table 4.22 - Likelihood that the Operator Crew Turns Off HPIS
HPI is FB New Pzr Old Pzr Probability
On Cooling Level* Level
Needed
No No CRTN NO
No Yes CRTN NO
Yes Yes CRTN NO
Yes No > HHLvl > HHLvl CRTN NO
Yes No > HHLvl < HHLvl VLKLY
Yes No > HLvl > HLvl CRTNNO
Yes No > HLvl < HLvl UnLKLY
Yes No < HLvl I CRTN NO
* The demonstration assumes a value of 92% for HHLvl and 75% for HLvl
Table 4.23 - Likelihood that the Operator Crew Starts Bleed and Feed Cooling
BF Cooling Old Intact SG New Intact SG Probability
Initiation Level Level
Criteria Met?
Yes <.6*Setpoint* <.6*Setpoint CRTN NO
Yes > .6*Setpoint <.6*Setpoint VLKLY05
Yes <.8*Setpoint > .6*Setpoint CRTN NO
Yes > .8*Setpoint <.8*Setpoint LKLY
Yes < Setpoint > .8*Setpoint CRTNNO
Yes > Setpoint < Setpoint UnLKLY10
No < 1.08*Setpoint > Setpoint CRTN NO
No > 1.08*Setpoint < 1.08*Setpoint VUnLKLY
No > 1.08*Setpoint CRTN NO
* Setpoint has a value of 26% in the demonstration
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Figure 4.2 - Event Tree for Seabrook Top Event SL [6]
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Figure 4.4 - Simple 4-Node Physical Model
P : Primary Node
Pzr: Pressurizer Node
SG1 : Steam Generator Node (Faulted SG)
SG2: Steam Generator Node (Intact SG)
Whpi : High Pressure Injection Mass Flowrate (to P node)
Wik : Leakage Mass Flowrate (to SG node)
Wfw : Feedwater Mass Flowrate (to SG node)
Wsu : Surge Mass Flowrate (to Pzr node)
Ws : Steam Mass Flowrate (from SG node)
Wspry : Spray Mass Flowrate (to Pzr node)
Wporv : PORV Mass flowrate (from Pzr node)
Qrx : Core Heat Generation Rate
Qsg : Heat Transfer Rate to SG node
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Figure 4.5 - Comparison of Primary Pressure Predictions
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Figure 4.6 - Comparison of Ruptured Steam Generator Pressure Predictions
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Figure 4.7 - Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree [70]
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Figure 4.8 - DETCO-SGTR Flowchart
5.0 DETAM APPLICATION (RESULTS)
5.1 Introduction
One of the concerns about the DETAM approach is that is can easily lead to overly
large dynamic event trees. This chapter describes the results obtained using the
demonstration steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) dynamic event tree model described
in Chapter 4. It is shown that DETAM can be a practical methodology for treating
dynamic interactions between the plant and operators. Furthermore, it is shown that,
despite the limitations of the demonstration model, useful results concerning improvements
in operating procedures, the importance of instrumentation, and groups of dependent
failures, can be obtained. This chapter also provides a limited quantitative comparison of
the results generated by DETAM with the results of conventional analyses (the Seabrook
[6] and Sequoyah [5] models for SGTR described in Chapter 4).
5.2 DETCO-SGTR Runs Performed and Results Obtained
A variety of DETCO-SGTR runs are performed to check the feasibility of the
DETAM approach in a practical application. The runs and their associated assumptions
are listed in Table 5.1.
It should be noted that Runs 2, 4, 6 and 7 are separate parts of a single analysis.
Runs 2, 4, 6, and 7 are performed separately because DETCO-SGTR cannot treat an
entire SGTR analysis in a single pass (the tree becomes too large for computer memory).
It is also simpler to perform the runs separately, since this reduces the difficulty of
post-processing the large amount of output generated by a single DETCO-SGTR run.
Each run is performed assuming that a certain subset of the systems that are demanded
when the safety injection signal (SI) actuates' will fail on demand; the final results are
obtained by combining the weighted results of all runs, where the weights are computed
using the system failure frequencies. Note also that Runs 2, 4, 6 and 7 do not cover the
following failure combinations: HPIS, SDV, HPIS/SDV, and EFWS/HPIS/SDV. The
potential consequences of these scenarios are either similar to or less complicated than
those treated in Runs 2, 4, 6, and 7.
The other runs in Table 5.1 are used to check the sensitivity of the analysis (both
modeling and results) to various assumptions. Run 1 does not treat human error (and is
very much like a simple DYLAM analysis). Runs 3 and 5 are performed to demonstrate
how instrumentation can be accommodated in the analysis, and to determine the
importance of the radiation alarm monitor. In Run 8, the pressure setpoint for the
atmospheric relief valves on the faulted steam generator is lowered. The remainder of this
section provides additional details on the characteristics of the different runs.
Run 1 assumes that the crew follows the procedures exactly. It also assumes that the
atmospheric relief valves on the faulted and intact steam generators (ARV1 and ARV2)
function properly. Run 1 allows the emergency feedwater system (EFWS), the steam
dump valves (SDV), and the high pressure injection system (HPIS) to fail. There is no
minimum sequence likelihood limit below which sequence development is terminated. This
run serves to determine the ways in which the plant reaches an undesired state even if the
crew follows the procedures.
'The HPIS, EFWS, and SDV are demanded when SI actuates.
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Runs 2 through 8 treat operator errors. These runs allow the pressurizer
power-operated relief valve (PORV), ARV1, ARV2, and the startup feedwater pump
(SUFP) to fail when demanded. They also assume that the main feedwater system
MFWS), the pressurizer spray (SPRY), the safety injection signal (SI), and the reactor
protection system (RPS) function successfully. Run 2 develops sequences in which the
EFWS, the HPI and the SDV are operational. This run produces the nominal SGTR
sequence. The cut-off frequency is 1.0*10-6 per reactor year given that SGTR occurs.
Table 5.2 shows that the most frequent undesired end state is the overfilling of the
ruptured steam generator. This is primarily due to a delay in the cooldown of the reactor
coolant system (RCS) which, in turn, is caused by ARV2 failing to open.
Except for the initial unavailability of the radiation alarm monitor (RAM) which is
critical in diagnosing SGTR events, Run 3 is identical to Run 2. Run 3 assesses the effects
of the instrumentation on the sequences generated and their likelihoods. The cut-off
frequency is 1.0*10-4 per reactor year (given that SGTR occurs and that the RAM is
unavailable). The dominant end state is, again, the overfilling of the ruptured steam
generator. The unavailability of the RAM makes the diagnosis of the SGTR event more
difficult. Consequently, the likelihood of ruptured steam generator overfill increases (with
a decrease in the likelihood of successful cooldown and depressurization) due to an increase
in the likelihood of delayed initiation of cooldown and depressurization.
Run 4 is conditioned on the assumption that the EFWS fails when demanded. Once
the EFWS fails, the scenario can lead to the demand for bleed and feed cooling. Thus, the
results of this run serve as bases in comparing the SGTR application of DETAM and PRA
studies in terms of their treatment of bleed and feed cooling. Table 5.2 shows two
undesirable end states. The "red" indication for the secondary heat sink critical safety
function results from the crew's failure to perform the step that verifies the status of the
EFWS (this initiates the restoration of the secondary heat sink). The drying out of intact
steam generators, on the other hand, results from the late initiation of bleed and feed
cooling.
Run 5 is similar to Run 4 with an initially unavailable RAM. The cut-off frequency
for Run 4 is 1.0*10-5 per reactor year (given that SGTR occurs and the EFWS fails); for
Run 5, the cut-off frequency is 1.0*10-4 per reactor year (given that SGTR occurs, the
EFWS fails, and the RAM is unavailable). Like Run 3, Run 5 determines the changes in
the sequences generated and in their likelihoods due to an unavailable RAM.
Table 5.2 reveals several differences between the Run 4 and Run 5 results. One
difference is the expected decrease in the likelihood of successful cooldown and
depressurization. Another difference is the decrease in the likelihood of a "red" secondary
heat sink indication. Since it is more difficult to diagnose the plant condition, the crew
becomes more cautious in following the procedures, thus resulting in a lower likelihood of
skipping the step that checks the status of the EFWS. The RAM unavailability also
generates new important end states. The termination of the cooldown and depressurization
process with the RCS pressure still greater than the ruptured steam generator pressure
happens because the E-3 procedure directs the termination of cooldown and
depressurization if the pressurizer level reaches a specified level (75%). The pressurizer
attains the specified level due to the C&D delay caused by the difficulty in diagnosing the
event (due to unavailable RAM). The pressurizer could overfill (or become "solid") if the
crew ignores the rising pressurizer level. It is also judged possible that the crew could turn
off the HPIS (to prevent the overfilling of the pressurizer as in the TMI-2 incident)
although the procedures do not specifically mention this action.
105
Run 6 assumes that both the EFWS and the SDV fail on demand. A cut-off
frequency of 1.0*10-4 per reactor year (given that SGTR occurs and both the EFWS and
the SDV fail) is used. Table 5.2 shows that no desirable endstates are reached. Since the
failure of the SDV significantly reduces the ability of the crew to cooldown and
depressurize the RCS, the ruptured steam generator overfills before the RCS is
depressurized. In the event that ARV2 fails, the increase in the ruptured steam generator
pressure could result in the demand for the relief valve on the faulted steam generator
(ARVI) to open, resulting in a potential path for radioactivity release to the environment.
Run 7 assumes that both the EFWS and the HPIS fail on demand, and that the SDV
is successful. Run 7 has a cut-off frequency of 1.0*10-4 per reactor year (given that SGTR
occurs and both the EFWS and the HPIS fail). The resulting dominant end states are the
saturation of the RCS and a "red" indication for the secondary heat sink critical safety
function. The simulation lasts only 750 seconds. If simulation goes beyond 750 seconds,
unrealistic process variable values result (e.g., at 810 seconds the RCS pressure becomes
negative). This outcome has two implications. One, the thermal-hydraulic model needs
improvement to handle sequences involving primary coolant saturation. Two, the
procedures should be modified to better handle multiple-failure situations. Otherwise, the
operator crew may have to depend heavily on the critical safety function status trees to
mitigate multiple-failure events.
Run 8 illustrates a situation in which a hardware parameter is modified. Except for a
lower ARV1 setpoint (1100 psia instead of the normal 1140 psia), this run is identical to
Run 2. The purpose for this sensitivity analysis is to see if varying the relief valve setpoint
can compensate for the simplistic steam generator model used in this analysis. The
setpoint of ARV1 becomes important when dealing with scenarios involving delayed
cooldown and depressurization. Delayed cooldown and depressurization should lead to a
slowly increasing ruptured steam generator pressure and to an eventual demand for the
ARV1 to open. Since, as shown in Figure 4.6, the simple model predicts pressures for the
ruptured steam generator that are much lower than those predicted by PRISM [56],
lowering the relief valve setpoint (by an amount equal to the difference between the
PRISM results and the simple model's results) should lead to a better representation of the
timing of key events in the scenario. However, the results of this analysis indicate that the
setpoint change does not lead to a relief valve challenge. The pressure predicted is too low
and does not rise quickly enough over time.
5.3 Practicality of DETAM
One of the important requirements for a dynamic scenario analysis methodology is
that its results be manageable (in terms of size) and understandable. Figure 5.1 shows the
dynamic event tree for a scenario involving the failure of EFWS (Run 4). Appendix B
walks through Sequence 1 of Figure 5.1 and discusses in detail the events in that sequence.
In principle, with 128 possible hardware states (7 binary systems plus the EFWS
assumed failed), 324 possible crew planning states, and 2304 possible crew diagnosis, there
are approximately 9.6*107 distinct possible plant states to which each plant state can
transfer at each time step. The relatively small tree shown in Figure 5.1 is attributable to
the modeling assumptions and cut-off frequencies used. Assumptions involving the neglect
of the runtime failures of hardware systems, the treatment of crew behavior as being
heavily influenced by available procedures, the high level treatment of operator diagnosis
states, and the neglect of instrumentation failures trim the problem considerably. The
cut-off frequencies are quite low (recall that the sequences quantified are all conditioned on
the occurrence of SGTR; many are further conditioned on the failure of a hardware system
as well), but also have a significant effect on reducing the tree size.
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Although it is much larger than that produced using the current event tree method
(Figure 4.1 represents the scenarios shown in Figure 5.1 with 12 sequences; Figure 4.3 uses
1 sequence), the dynamic event tree shown in Figure 5.1 is still manageable and
understandable. Thus, it shows that the dynamic event tree analysis need not imply an
enormously large number of sequences. Of course, if operator errors are not treated, the
number of sequences reduces tremendously; Figure 5.2 shows the dynamic event tree
associated with Run 1, in which the operators are assumed to invariably follow available
procedures. (Such a tree could be useful in preliminary design studies.)
5.4 Capabilities of DETAM
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss, in broad terms, the capabilities of the dynamic event tree
methodology for treating complex accident scenarios in which the interaction between the
plant and the operators is important. This section demonstrates these capabilities using
the analyses listed in Table 5.1.
5.4.1 Treating Event Ordering and Timing
Since it involves a simulation of accident scenarios, DETAM naturally accounts for
the actual ordering and timing of events, which could affect the likelihood of subsequent
events. In conventional event tree analyses, on the other hand, event timing is not treated
and the ordering of top events does not always reflect the actual event ordering.
Considering the issue of event ordering, the Seabrook study event tree for SGTR (see
Figure 4.1) places top event SL (No Secondary Leak to the Atmosphere) after top event
OR (Operator Controls the Break Flow). The likelihood of SL success (or failure) is then
determined conditioned on the success (or failure) of top event OR. This ordering of the
top events treats one source of dependency between the two top events; if the operators fail
to depressurize the reactor coolant system, flow into the secondary side of the faulted
steam generator will continue, increasing the likelihood that a steam generator relief valve
will be challenged and open. On the other hand, the relevant operating procedures require
the operator crew to perform actions to isolate the ruptured steam generator (which should
be included as part of the SL top event) prior to the actions for controlling the break flow.
Examination of the Ginna [60,61] and North Anna 1 [63] SGTR events shows that the
order of actual operator actions is that suggested by the procedures. In other words, there
is a two-way dependence between top events OR and SL which is not modeled in Ref. 6.
A very similar example of the event ordering problem is provided by the Sequoyah
study event tree for SGTR (see Figure 4.3). This tree places top event Qs (which
represents the loss of integrity of the ruptured steam generator due to the opening of a
relief valve) after top event Od (which models the initiation of the primary system
cooldown and depressurization within 15 minutes after the initiating event). This ordering
accounts for changes in the likelihoods of relief valve challenges and failures, given the
success or failure of Od. However, the E-3 procedure for SGTR [68] indicates that the
operator crew should close the relief valves in question (as well as a steam generator
blowdown isolation valve that is also modeled in Qs), before it initiates cooldown and
depressurization (i.e., before top event Od is questioned). Moreover, failure to isolate the
ruptured steam generator can affect the likelihood of a successful cooldown and
depressurization. It is believed that in the Ginna event, faulty steam generator isolation
actions led to complications and delays during depressurization [61].
The actual timing of events, as well as the ordering, can affect the likelihood of key
scenarios because event timing can affect: a) the physical development of the scenario, and
b) the diagnosis, quality, and planning state of the crew. A DETAM analysis provides the
107
timing of events as a natural intermediate output. Moreover, since event timing can vary
from scenario to scenario, DETAM can provide the distributions for the occurrence times
of key events. Table 5.3, for example, displays the distribution of the time to start
cooldown and depressurization (for Run 2 of Table 5.1). This information can be useful for
conventional PRA analyses, which compare the time required to perform certain actions
against the time available (e.g., [14]), and for risk management.
5.4.2 Operator Error Forms
As discussed in Section 4.5.6, the DETAM approach provides a natural framework
for analyzing a variety of diagnosis-related and planning-related error forms:
0 Improper diagnosis
0 Overly quick procedure following
0 Overly slow procedure following
9 Improper procedure following
0 Looping
0 Errors of commission
The dynamic event tree treatment of the first five forms are demonstrated by the
DETAM application model described in Chapter 4. Figure 5.3, a reduced Version of
Figure 5.1, illustrates these various error forms. For example, Sequences 3 through 5 result
from late initiation of bleed and feed cooling. Sequence 5 models a situation where the
operator crew fails to start the process before the intact steam generators boil dry. The
"looping" error form refers to situations where the cues needed to allow transfer to a new
procedure are not available (or are not observed by the operator crew). In such cases, it is
assumed that the operator crew remains in the procedure (i.e., the operators are treated as
automatons). Sequence 7 represents a situation where looping could occur if the secondary
heat sink safety function indicator does not alarm; here, the procedures are written in such
a way that a crew blindly following procedures will remain in the current procedure until
steam generator dryout occurs. A final error form, not shown in Figure 5.3, is the so-called
"error of commission." This error is closely associated with misdiagnosis errors, although
the occurrence of a misdiagnosis does not always result in an error of commission. Since
DETAM allows branching based on misdiagnosis, it can account for any erroneous action,
e.g. turning off the HPIS when it is actually needed, that occurs after the initial
misdiagnosis. Put another way, DETAM allows the analyst to provide a causal model for
errors of commission. This will aid the quantification of such errors, and will also aid the
development of specific schemes to reduce the impact of the more significant errors.
5.4.3 Consequences of Operator Actions
One of the problems with the current event tree method, as discussed in Chapter 1, is
that dynamic operator actions during an accident scenario are treated in a binary fashion,
much the same as hardware performance. Operator action top events (e.g., OR in
Figure 4.1), which can include many separate tasks, are either successful or failed. This
approach does not treat the fact that top event success (and failure) can usually be
achieved in many different ways, and the manner in which success (failure) is achieved can
affect the likelihood of the success (failure) of subsequent top events. DETAM, on the
other hand, treats a spectrum of detailed operator behaviors and actions (state changes),
some of which may be classified as "successes," and some of which may be classified as
"failures." This treatment enables a causal (although not necessarily deterministic)
analysis of the consequences of the remainder of the sequence following the action.
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Consider, for example, the middle portion of Figure 5.1. This structure represents
the consequences of a misdiagnosis - the operators believe that the plant is undergoing an
SLOCA accident, rather than an SGTR accident. Not surprisingly, this portion of the tree
differs radically from that following a correct diagnosis (the upper part of Figure 5.1).
To continue the example, Figure 5.4, which is an edited version of Figure 5.1, shows
the branching points where the crew is supposed to initiate cooldown and depressurization
(C&D) by opening the atmospheric relief valves on the intact steam generators (ARV2).
The subtrees following these branching points model the subsequent plant and operator
responses. Figure 5.4 indicates that these two situations eventually lead to different
subtrees, even though the hardware states associated with each of the branching points are
identical (EFWS is failed in both). More specifically, consider the initial downward branch
for each of the two subtrees. This branch represents the failure of the atmospheric relief
valves on the intact steam generators to open when demanded by the operator crew.
Examination of the process variables associated with the lower subtree shows that the
pressurizer level is approaching 100%, a condition not observed in the upper subtrees. In
fact, the lower subtree can lead to a requirement for the operator crew to turn off the high
pressure injection system (because the primary system pressures and pressurizer levels are
significantly different). In the upper subtree, cooldown and depressurization is always
performed in time. A conventional analysis, in which sequences are defined only by top
event status, is likely not to distinguish these two situations.
5.4.4 Context For Likelihood Assignment
Another problem with the conventional event tree analysis method is that the success
(failure) frequencies for operator related top events are quantified based on the current
hardware state of the plant. As shown in the previous section, complete knowledge of the
hardware state does not imply complete knowledge of the plant state; entirely different
accident scenarios can involve the same hardware failures.
The capability of DETAM to treat process variables and operator state changes
explicitly in the analysis allows the analyst to better determine the context for operator
actions. This improved context should be helpful to analysts attempting to assess the
likelihood of specific operator actions. With the information provided by DETAM, the
analyst knows what the crew currently believes concerning the plant status (and also how
the crew's state of knowledge developed over the scenario), what the crew is planning to do
(and what it has already done), and how key plant parameters are behaving. Such
information can be useful when attempting to identify situations where "errors of
commission" might occur with non-negligible likelihood (such as the TMI-2 accident).
The price associated with this more detailed analysis is that more explicit judgments
are required. This burden can be reduced only if models/rules to automatically estimate
the branching frequencies are developed.
5.4.5 Modeling Actual Incidents
Chapter 2 points out that event tree models are not meant to be literal simulations of
the dynamic response of a plant to an initiating event. As a result, it is sometimes difficult
to prove (or disprove) that a given event tree adequately models a real accident. With
DETAM, on the other hand, direct comparisons can be made between the DETAM model
and the actual course of events observed.
To compare the results of the SGTR application of DETAM with actual scenarios,
two SGTR incidents are considered. They are the North Anna Unit 1 (July 15, 1987) [63]
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and the Ginna (January 25, 1982) [64] SGTR events. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the
chronologies of important events during the North Anna Unit 1 and the Ginna incidents,
respectively. Figure 5.5 shows a dynamic event tree for the nominal condition (i.e., all
systems work as expected and required) and traces the North Anna and the Ginna
incidents.
It can be seen that the North Anna Unit 1 sequence of events matches the DETAM
tree better than Ginna sequence. The reason for this is that the North Anna crew followed
the procedures more closely than the Ginna crew. One operator error in the Ginna incident
was the delayed tripping of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), which in effect delayed the
depressurization. Figure 5.5 does not show the delayed tripping of the RCPs because the
demonstration DETAM analysis does not explicitly model the RCPs.
It can also be seen that the DETAM predicted event occurrence times differ from
those of the actual incidents. For example, the North Anna trace reaches depressurization
earlier than the DETAM nominal scenario. This timing difference is partially due to the
differences in hardware systems, e.g. the number and volumes of steam generators, and in
the details of the incident. In the North Anna 1 incident, the crew performed a turbine
load reduction. The reduction of turbine load slowed down the primary pressure decrease,
thus delaying the automatic reactor trip. In fact, the crew manually tripped the reactor.
It is reasonable to expect that as long as a DETAM model includes the systems and
operator actions involved in an actual event, it can capture much (if not all) of the
important qualitative behavior of the incident. However, the accuracy of the predicted
timing of events will depend heavily on the accuracy of the physical model used. Further,
as discussed earlier, inaccuracies in physical model predictions can also lead to scenario
predictions that are qualitatively incorrect.
5.5 Comparison of DETAM and Conventional PRA Results
Because of the differences in scope and sequence modeling assumptions between the
DETAM and conventional SGTR analyses, and because there is considerable uncertainty in
the detailed branching frequency assignments made in the DETAM analysis, a direct
quantitative comparison of results is difficult. This section provides a limited comparison
of the DETAM, Seabrook, and Sequoyah analysis results. Differences in selected end state
and partial sequence frequencies are discussed.
5.5.1 End State Comparison
Table 5.6 shows the likelihoods of two end states and the dominant se uences leading
to those end states predicted by the DETAM, Seabrook [6], and Sequoyah [51 models. The
two end states are ruptured steam generator overfill and failure of bleed and feed cooling.
The former state is undesirable, since it leads to the release of radioactive coolant to the
environment. On the other hand, it does not guarantee the occurrence of core damage.
The latter state does eventually lead to core damage (unless other sources of heat removal
are found).
Comparing the dominant sequences leading to the steam generator overfill end state,
the Seabrook analysis identifies the failure to control break flow (OR) and the occurrence
of a secondary side leak (SL), whereas the Sequoyah analysis identifies the failure to
cooldown and depressurize (Od) followed by the loss of steam generator integrity (Qs).
Both of these sequences are quite similar. Note, however, that although the Seabrook
analysis predicts a higher frequency of occurrence, it does not assume that core damage
necessarily ensues. On the other hand, the Sequoyah analysis assumes (with substantially
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lower frequency when recovery actions are included) that core damage will occur in this
situation. The DETAM analysis produces a dominant sequence that is similar in a broad
sense to those treated in the Seabrook and Sequoyah analyses, but somewhat different in
detail. This sequence involves: correct diagnosis of SGTR, successful identification and
early isolation of the ruptured steam generator (SG), failure of the intact SG atmospheric
relief valves to open on demand, and procedure-directed throttling of high pressure
injection to prevent the pressurizer from filling up. In this scenario, the ruptured steam
generator overfills because the primary coolant system has not been sufficiently
depressurized.
In the case of the unsuccessful bleed and feed cooling end state, the Seabrook analysis
predicts a dominant sequence involving the failures of emergency feedwater (EF) and bleed
and feed cooling (OR), while the dominant Sequoyah sequence only includes the failure of
emergency feedwater (L). Ref. 5 states that bleed and feed cooling results in primary
pressure increase and thus counteracts efforts to control the break flow; therefore, that
study does not consider the possible success of bleed and feed cooling. The dominant
DETAM sequence for this end state involves failure of -mergency feedwater and operator
failure to initiate bleed and feed cooling in time; this scenario represents one subscenario of
the Seabrook scenario.
Table 5.6 indicates that although the qualitative scenario descriptions are at least
roughly comparable, the quantitative DETAM risk predictions appear to be generally less
conservative than those from the conventional analyses. In the case of the more severe end
state, unsuccessful bleed and feed cooling, the DETAM frequency predictions are lower by
two orders of magnitude. In the case of the steam generator overfill end state, the end
state frequency is higher than that resulting from the Sequoyah analysis including recovery
actions. However, as argued in Ref. 6, even after this end state is reached, a considerable
amount of time is available to attempt recovery; additional failures in the long term
response of the plant to the accident are required before core damage can result.
The reduced conservatism in the DETAM results is not surprising, given that the
DETAM analysis explicitly treats procedure-directed "recovery actions" that may not be
included in conventional analyses. However, it cannot be expected that a DETAM analysis
will always yield lower results than those provided by conventional event trees. In fact,
the quantitative comparison of the frequencies of partial sequences described in the next
subsection provides examples where the DETAM predictions are higher than those
obtained in the conventional analyses. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter 1, the concern
motivating the development of DETAM is that conventional analyses may, in some
situations, not correctly (or even conservatively) treat dependencies between multiple
failure events.
5.5.2 Partial Sequences
The quantitative end state/sequence level comparison between the DETAM and
conventional event tree results shown in Table 5.6 should be viewed with some caution.
Differences in analysis scope and baseline assumptions, rather than methodology, are
responsible for some of the variations observed. Furthermore, there are significant
uncertainties in the values of some of the parameters used in the DETAM calculations;
these uncertainties have not been propagated through the DETAM model. As an alternate
approach to quantitatively compare the DETAM and event tree results, the conditional
frequencies of partial sequences can be used. In the simplest case, this involves the
comparison of conditional frequencies of top event failures (the "conditional split
fractions"). In more complicated cases, the conditional frequencies of multiple top event
failures can be compared. Relevant partial sequence frequencies appear in Table 5.7.
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The first comparison involves the results of Run 2, in which it is assumed that
emergency feedwater, high pressure injection, and the steam dump are successful. The
most frequent end states are "successful cooldown and depressurizat'on" and "overfilled
faulted steam generator." Table 5.2 indicates that the conditional I:equency of successful
cooldown and depressurization is 0.97 per reactor year; thus, the conditional frequency of
unsuccessful cooldown and depressurization (C&D) is given by
Fr{CU ISGTR,EFWS,HPIS,SDV} = 1.0 - Fr{C&D I SGTR,EFWS,HPIS,SDV}
= 0.03
This situation is similar to the failure of the Seabrook top event OR (operator controls the
break flow) which has a conditional frequency of 0.05 (see Table 5.7). In the Sequoyah
study, the comparable top event is Od (operator fails to cooldown and depressurize the
RCS); this has a conditional frequency of 0.02.
Ref. 5 estimates the likelihood of top event Od using the Accident Sequence
Evaluation Program (ASEP) method documented in Ref. 81. This methodology considers
the failures involved in a sequence, the nominal timing of events (e.g., alarms, indications),
the time available to operators for diagnosis and action, the frequency that the operator
fails to diagnose the event, and the stress level of the operator. The Seabrook study
considers these issues within the framework of an operator action tree. The DETAM
analysis, on the other hand, simulates not only the nominal scenario but also variations on
the scenario. The specific tasks, such as the opening of the relief valves on the intact steam
generators to cooldown the RCS, are treated explicitly. Nevertheless, the above
comparison shows that the estimated conditional frequencies of unsuccessful cooldown and
depressurization are not very different.
The Run 2 sequence that ends in ruptured steam generator overfill is similar to the
sequence with unsuccessful cooldown and depressurization and loss of ruptured steam
generator integrity. The DETAM analysis results in a conditional frequency for this end
state of 2.6*10-2 (Row 2, Table 5.2).
In the Seabrook study, the counterpart sequence involves the failure of top events OR
and SL (No Secondary Leak to Atmosphere). Since recovery is embedded in split fractions
in the Seabrook study, the sequence conditional likelihood, which includes recovery, is
calculated as follows:
Fr{0U,STSGTR} = Fr{URJSGTR}*Fr{ST |U,SGTR}
(5.0*10-2)*(5.77*10-3) (from Table 5.7)
= 2.9*10-4
(The frequencies above and those following are conditioned on the successes of other top
events; this dependence is not shown explicitly for the sake of brevity.)
In the Sequoyah study, the counterpart sequence (Sequence 6 in Figure 5.4, which
involves the failure of top events Od and Q,) has a conditional frequency which can be
calculated as follows:
Fr{UO7,I SGTR} = Fr{ QsGR)0
= 1.1*10 4/1.0*10 2 (from Table 5.7)
= 1.1*10-2
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If the calculation includes long term recovery actions, the conditional frequency becomes
Fr{~O7,jSGTR} = 1.6*10-6/1.0*10-2 (from Table 5.7)
= 1.6*10-4
In this case, the conditional frequency computed by DETAM is comparable to the value
used in the Sequoyah analysis when recovery actions are not treated. However, it is two
orders of magnitude higher than the Seabrook and Sequoyah values after recovery actions
are included.
The second comparison involves the results of Run 4, in which the emergency
feedwater system (EFWS) is assumed to fail on demand. The partial sequence examined in
this run involves the success of bleed and feed cooling, given that SGTR occurs and the
EFWS fails. The DETAM conditional frequency for this partial sequence, given by Line 6
of Table 5.2, is 5.3*10-3.
Owing to potential complexities in modeling plant response to the feed and bleed
process, the Sequoyah study assumes that the loss of EFWS leads to core damage (if
recovery actions aimed at restoring main feedwater are not performed). Thus, the
conditional frequency of the partial sequence implicitly used by the Sequoyah study is 0.0.
The Seabrook study models bleed and feed cooling (B&F) by combining related
tasks, integrating operator tasks with hardware states through an operator action tree, and
assigning conservative failure or error rates. The conditional frequency of the partial
sequence is given by (see Figure 5.3)
Fr{B&F,EFWSISGTR}
= Fr{EFWISGTR}*Fr{HPIS ISGTR,EFW5}*Fr{ORISGTR,EFWS,HPIS}
*Fr{SL I SGTR,EFWS,HPIS,OR}
= (4.34*10-4)*(1 - 1.0*10-6)*(1 - 5.0*10-2)*(i - 1.1*10-4)
= 4.1*10-4 (values from Table 5.7)
This calculation assumes that EFWS failure includes SUFP failure. The base DETAM
model treats the SUFP as an independent system, rather than as part of the EFWS.
Modifying the DETAM value to account for this modeling difference,
Fr{B&F,EFWSISGTR} = Fr{B&F,EFW,U1FFISGTR}
Fr {SUFF}
Fr{EFW5i SGTR}*Fr{B&F , SUFPSGTR,EFWS}
Fr{~SUFF}
(1.7*10 -4)*(5.3*10-3)
(4.5*10-3)
= 2.1*10-4
where the EFWS and SUFP failure frequencies are obtained from Table 4.16. It can be
seen that the new computed value is comparable to that used in Ref. 6.
The above calculations show how the DETAM predictions can be compared against
the predictions of conventional event trees, despite the inability of the DETAM SGTR
model to treat core damage. The comparisons, themselves, are inconclusive. In some
cases, the dynamic event tree predictions are higher than the conventional values; in other
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cases, the dynamic event tree values are lower. Until the weaknesses in the current
DETAM SGTR model are rectified, definitive conclusions concerning the relative accuracy
of the two methods cannot be drawn 2.
5.6 Other Results
Although the SGTR analysis documented in this report is constructed to demonstrate
the DETAM approach, and although the demonstration model has a number of weaknesses
that affect the accuracy of its predictions, a number of useful results are obtained from this
analysis. These results cover the current operating procedures pertaining to SGTR, the
importance of instrumentation in this accident, and dependencies between events.
5.6.1 SGTR Procedures
In a DETAM application to accident analysis, it is necessary for the analyst to
explicitly model the written procedures. This modeling provides the primary basis for the
detailed definitions of the possible crew planning states and the transitions between states.
As a byproduct of the modeling process, two potential weaknesses in the current SGTR
procedures have been identified.
The first potential weakness is the absence of steps in the E-3 (SGTR) procedure
which will allow the operator crew to transfer to the FR-H.1 (loss of secondary heat sink,
or LSHS) procedure when the emergency feedwater system (EFWS) fails and the crew
initially fails to recognize LSHS (Sequence 7 of Figure 5.6). Without these steps, the crew
must rely on a warning from the Safety Parameter Display System (the failure of EFWS, if
unmitigated, eventually leads to the SPDS secondary heat sink indicator turning "red" or
"orange" and alerts the Shift Technical Advisor that the plant is not responding as
desired). Further, if the SPDS does not alarm, the procedures are written in such a way
that a crew blindly following procedures could remain in the current procedure until the
intact steam generators dry out. If the time delay associated with the activation of the
SPDS alarm is important, or if the likelihood of SPDS failure is significant (neither issue is
investigated in this analysis), the current procedure may require some modification to
ensure that the crew transfers to FR-H.1 in a timely manner.
A second potential weakness arises when both the EFWS and the startup feedwater
pump (SUFP) fail during an SGTR. In this condition, the emphasis in the FR-H.1
procedure is on the restoration of the secondary side cooling through bleed and feed cooling.
The procedure does not mention the need to mitigate the SGTR. Thus, it seems that the
crew will again have to depend on the SPDS critical safety function status trees in order to
mitigate the SGTR situation. Although the crew may be trained for this multiple failure
scenario, the explicit treatment of these situations in the procedures could help the crew
better handle actual events.
In general, it appears that the provision of redundancy in a few spots in the
procedure, through the addition of backup checks for key symptoms and of additional
procedure transfer steps, could improve the effectiveness of procedures. A DETAM
analysis can identify: if changes are needed, where the changes should be made, and if the
added redundancy provided by these changes outweighs the associated negative effects
2Differences also arise because a different groups of analysts are developing the branching
probabilities for the DETAM and conventional analyses. More comparable, and
interesting, results might be obtained using a single group of analysts to use both
approaches to address a given problem.
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(e.g., possible increases in crew response times).
5.6.2 Impact of Instrumentation
Instrumentation, being the primary link between the operators and the plant,
intuitively is an important factor in the development of an accident scenario. Faulty or
failed instrumentation could lead to an incorrect diagnosis of the plant condition and hence
erroneous crew actions. For example, instrumentation readings serve as primary bases not
only in selecting the procedure to follow but also in making decisions within a procedure
(e.g., whether to initiate bleed and feed cooling or not). Despite this importance,
instrumentation failures are rarely treated in conventional PRA studies.
To show the impact of instrumentation failures, consider Runs 2 and 3, listed in
Table 5.1; the only difference between these two is that the RAM is assumed failed in the
latter. The results of these runs are provided in Table 5.2. It can be seen that when the
RAM is failed, the conditional frequency of successful cooldown and depressurization (given
SGTR) drops from 0.97 to 0.89. Furthermore, the conditional likelihood of ruptured steam
generator overfill increases from 0.026, in the case of Run 2, to 0.088 in Run 3.
Runs 4 and 5 provide a similar comparison. In both cases, the EFWS is assumed
failed. In Run 5, the RAM is also assumed to be failed. Here, the conditional frequency of
successful cooldown and depressurization drops from 0.89 (Run 4) to 0.72 (Run 5). Note
that in Run 5, the unavailable RAM also leads to the generation of new sequences, as
discussed in Section 5.2.
Thus, the DETAM analysis of SGTR not only confirms the importance of a
particular piece of instrumentation (the radiation alarm monitor, or RAM), it also provides
a quantitative measure for the risk associated with the failure of the RAM. Furthermore,
it can be seen how the analysis can be extended to treat more general sets of
instrumentation failures. Thus, the dynamic event tree approach provides a useful
framework for evaluating the risk significance of instrumentation.
5.6.3 Dependent Failures
As discussed in Chapter 1, the identification of dependent system failures is key to
quantitative risk assessment. The DETAM approach explicitly treats human and process
variable related causal links between failure events. Thus, it can identify groups of
dependent failures that are not necessarily treated by conventional event tree analyses.
One direct example is provided by the discussion on the ordering of failure events in
Section 5.4.1. It is shown that there is a two-way dependence between the actions
associated with depressurizing the reactor coolant system (top events OR and Od in the
Seabrook and Sequoyah studies, respectively) and the integrity of the faulted steam
generator (top events SL and Qs in the Seabrook and Sequoyah studies, respectively). The
conventional event tree analyses treat the dependence of SL/Qs on OR/Od, but not the
dependence of OR/Od on SL/Qs. DETAM, by virtue of its simulation-based approach,
treats the two-way dependence directly.
A more interesting example of a dependent failure group is provided by the earlier
discussion on instrumentation failures. As stated in Section 5.6.2, the failure of the
radiation alarm monitor (RAM) increases the difficulty of correctly diagnosing the SGTR,
and increases the likelihood of faulted steam generator overfill. In other words, there is a
link between the failures of the RAM and of the faulted steam generator atmospheric relief
valves (considered as part of the top event SL in the Seabrook SGTR model, and as part of
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the top event Qs in the Sequoyah SGTR model). Furthermore, when the emergency
feedwater system is failed (see Runs 4 and 5), the DETAM analysis predicts that the loss
of the RAM increases the likelihood that the high pressure injection system (HPIS) will be
turned off by the operators. This affects the Seabrook top event HP and the Sequoyah top
event D1.
This latter example indicates that the failures of RAM, SL/Qs, and HP/Di are
dependent. Because neither the Seabrook study nor the Sequoyah model the RAM, the
direct links between the RAM and SL/Qs and between the RAM and HP/DI are not
treated. More significantly, the link between SL/Qs and HP/D 1 , which are now correlated
through the RAM failure, is not treated. Thus, the DETAM analysis indeed can identify
sources of dependency between event tree top events that are not modeled in current
analyses.
5.7 Summary
The results of the DETAM application to SGTR accidents described in this chapter
demonstrate that:
0 the dynamic event tree approach can be a practical tool for modeling the dynamic
interaction between the plant and operators, and
0 even simple dynamic event tree models can provide useful insights (e.g., concerning
the effectiveness of procedures, the importance of specific instrumentation, the timing
of key events, and dependencies between key events).
Regarding the first point, Chapter 3 points out that the general DETAM
methodology provides the information needed to assess the likelihood of operator actions at
any point in an accident scenario, and also provides a framework for treating a wide variety
of operator behavior patterns ("error forms") that can influence subsequent scenario
development. This chapter shows that the actual modeling of the operators (in terms of
operator state definitions and transitions between states) can be done at a useful level of
detail without the development of an unmanageably large and complex tree.
This chapter also shows that modeling improvements are required before extensive
quantitative comparisons between the results of a DETAM model and those of a
conventional event tree analysis can be performed. These modeling improvements are
discussed in the following chapter.
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Table 5.1 - DETAM Runs Performed
Run # Unavailable Systems Allowed to Fail Cut-off Operator Error
System Frequency* 'Treated ?
1 None EFWS, SDV, HPI 0.0 No
2 None PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP, 1.E-6 Yes
EFWS, HPI,SDV
3 Rad Alarm PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP, 1.E-4 Yes
Monitor EFWS, HPI,SDV
4 EFWS PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP, 1.E-5 Yes
HPI,SDV
5 EFWS, Rad PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP, 1.E-4 Yes
Alarm Monitor HPI,SDV
6 EFWS, SDV PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP,HPI 1.E-4 Yes
7 EFWS,HPI PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP,SDV 1.E-4 Yes
8 None (lower PORV,ARV1,ARV2,SUFP, 1.E-6 Yes
ARVI setpoint) EFWS, HPI,SDV I
*Cut-off frequencies are conditional on the unavailability of systems
column 2 and on the occurrence of SGTR
indicated in
Table 5.2 - Most Frequent End States, Runs 2-7
Run Plant End State Likelihood*
Number
2 Successful Cooldown and Depressurization (total) 9.70E-1
Successful Cooldown and Depressurization (crew 9.32E-1
perfectly follows the procedures)
Ruptured Steam Generator Overfills 2.61E-2
3 Successful Cooldown and Depressurization 8.91E-1
Ruptured Steam Generator Overfills 8.79E-2
4 Successful Cooldown and Depressurization 8.93E- 1
Successful Bleed and Feed Cooling 5.32E-3
Intact Steam Generator Dries Out 1.09E-3
Secondary Heat Sink Indicator Turns "Red" 1.OOE- 1
5 Successful Cooldown and Depressurization 7.16E- 1
Secondary Heat Sink Indicator Turns "Red" 8.96E-2
Cooldown and Depressurization Terminated with 8.23E-2
RCS Pressure > Ruptured Steam Generator
Pressure
Cooldown and Depressurization Terminated with 3.28E-2
RCS Pressure > Ruptured Steam Generator
Pressure and HPI Turned Off
Successful Cooldown and Depressurization With 6.40E-2
HPI Turned Off
Pressurizer Becomes Solid 8.44E-4
6 Ruptured Steam Generator Overfills 8.96E- 1
Secondary Heat Sink Indicator Turns "Red" 9.85E-2
Ruptured Steam Generator Relief Valve Demanded 4.20E-3
7 Primary Coolant Reaches Saturation Point 9.06E- 1
Secondary Heat Sink Indicator Turns "Red" 9.38E-2
*Likelihoods are conditional on the occurrence of SGTR and the
unavailability of relevant systems
Table 5.3 - Distribution of the Time to Initiate Cooldown and Depressurization (Run 2)
Time Likelihood
(seconds)
1080 9.11E-2
1110 8.47E-1
1140 4.56E-3
1170 4.12E-2
1200 4.93E-3
1230 8.6E-4
1350 2.54E-4
1380 2.34E-3
1410 4.51E-4
1440 2.39E-4
1470 2.57E-4
1500 1.09E-4
1530 5.20E-5
1560 3.47E-5
1590 5.58E-6
1830 1.84E-5
Table 5.4 - North Anna Unit 1 SGTR Chronology of Events [63]
Time Event
(seconds)
0 Secondary alarm actuated
300 Reactor tripped (manual); turbine tripped
343 Safety injection actuated
345 MFWS tripped; EFWS started
360 Charging pump started
600 Operator crew transferred to SGTR procedure
960 Isolated ruptured steam generator
1140 Started cooldown
1620 Started depressurization through the pressurizer spray
2040 Ended Depressurization
Table 5.5 - Ginna SGTR Chronology of Events [60,61]
Time Event
(seconds)
0 Secondary alarm actuated
210 Reactor tripped due to low pressure
240 RCP trip requirement met
640 RCP tripped (pressurizer spray became unavailable)
900 MSIV closed as part of ruptured steam generator isolation
1680 Depressurization should have been started using the
PORV; PORV unavailable due to isolation of instrument air
system
1920 PORV became available for depressurization
2340 Ruptured steam generator narrow level reached 100%
2550 PORV opened to depressurize RCS
2730 Safety injection should have been terminated; RCS
pressure reached 1300 psig
4500 Ruptured steam generator safety valve blew
5520 PRT rupture disc broke
Table 5.6 - Comparison of Conventional and Dynamic Event Tree End State Conditional Frequencies
Study
___ 4 4
Seabrook [6]
Sequoyah [5]
DETAM
Conditional
Frequency 1
5.OE-2 2
1.1E-2/1.6E-4 2
4.3E-3
I I I
Seabrook [6]
Sequoyah [5]
DETAM
2.2E-5 2
5.3E-4/4.2E-52
4.8E-7
Dominant Scenario Description
OR (Failure to control break flow),
SL (Secondary leak to atmosphere)
Od (Failure to cooldown and depressurize),
Qs (Loss of faulted steam generator integrity)
Correct diagnosis as SGTR, relief valves on intact
SGs fail to open, HPI turned off to avoid
pressurizer overfill
EF (Emergency feedwater unavailable),
OR (Failure to control break flow)
L (Emergency feedwater unavailable)
Correct diagnosis as SGTR, relief valves on intact
SGs fail to open, HPI turned off to avoid
pressurizer overfill
i I
Notes:
1) End state conditional frequencies are conditioned
2) Value includes results of recovery analysis.
on the occurrence of SGTR.
0
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w
0
(U
0U
(U
Table 5.7 - Conditional Split Fractions [5,6]
PRA Study Top Event Split Fraction
Seabrook EFWS 4.34E-4
OR 5.OOE-2
SL (nominal) 1.08E-4
SL (failed OR) 5.77E-3
HPI 1.03E-6
Sequoyah SGTR 1.OOE-2
Od 2.20E-2
SGTR, Od, Qs 1.1OE-4
(Without Recovery)
SGTR, Od, Qs 1.60E-6
(With Recovery)
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6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
6.1 Introduction
The key issue in nuclear power plant probabilistic accident scenario analysis is the
treatment of dependencies between top event (e.g., system) failures. Improper treatment
can lead to the incorrect screening of accident scenarios and inaccurate estimates of risk.
The conventional event tree/fault tree methodology currently used in PRA studies is
naturally suited for modeling common-cause initiating events, functionally coupled top
events, and shared-equipment dependencies, but does not directly provide all of the
information needed to handle other types of dependencies. In particular, the event
tree/fault tree methodology, which does not simulate the dynamic response of the
plant/operating crew system to an accident, does not explicitly treat process variables,
operator states, detailed scenario history, or time. These factors are important when
treating complex accident scenarios.
A review of candidate methodologies for dynamic accident scenario analysis shows
that two methodologies have particular promise: the dynamic event tree analysis method
(DETAM) and discrete event simulation. The latter methodology has the flexibility to
handle arbitrarily complex scenarios. However, its useful application in a PRA study
requires improvements in the detailed modeling of operator behavior and in simulation
technology (e.g., in sampling and decomposition techniques). DETAM, which can be
viewed as a generalization of the DYLAM approach [26], provides a somewhat more limited
but more immediately practical treatment of dynamic scenarios. It allows the use of
relatively simple operator models, and its structure is similar to that of conventional event
trees, allowing easy interpretation of the model and its results.
This report describes the general DETAM approach for treating accident scenarios
and its application to an analysis of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accidents. The
remainder of this chapter discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the approach,
results obtained from the SGTR application, potential applications, and future work.
6.2 Advantages and Disadavantages of DETAM Approach
There are three positive characteristics of the DETAM approach that deserve
emphasis. First, DETAM provides a more comprehensive definition of plant state than
that provided by conventional event trees. Process variable magnitudes and the operator
crew state, in addition to the plant hardware state, are used to characterize the overall
plant state. Furthermore, the dynamic variations in plant state are explicitly modeled.
This means that the predictions of DETAM can be directly compared against actually
occurring events, allowing an evaluation of modeling accuracy not easily performed with
conventional models [17]. The importance of this ability to compare predictions with
operating experience should not be overlooked; without such comparisons, the accident
scenario models used in PRAs remain only hypotheses.
A second, related characteristic is that DETAM integrates an operator crew model
with a plant physical model. Thus, the environment in which operator decisions must be
made is modeled explicitly. DETAM accounts for the processes leading to crew actions,
the actions themselves, and the consequences of these actions. This provides a much more
comprehensive framework for an analyst to estimate the likelihoods of actions than that
provided by event trees models.
Third, DETAM has a flexible, modular structure. This means that a DETAM model
can be constructed (and improved) incrementally. Any submodel for a stage in the
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analysis (see Figure 3.2), e.g., the thermal-hydraulic model, can be constructed or modified
with minimal effects on other models. This enables the analyst to divide complex modeling
tasks into more manageable parts. The flexibility of the approach also means that
DETAM can be implemented to the level of detail required. For instance, in situations in
which the operator actions are not critical, a DETAM implementation with the operator
actions disregarded can be constructed (see Figure 5.2).
The primary drawback with DETAM is a practical one: a considerable amount of
effort is required to construct a dynamic event tree. Physical models must be developed
(or adapted), operating procedures must be explicitly modeled, and branching probabilities
must be developed. Since the analysis results are quite sensitive to the accuracy of the
physical model employed (modeling inaccuracies can lead to situations where the
qualitative, as well as the quantitative, predictions of scenario development are wrong), the
analyst needs to ensure that the models used are quite accurate. Regarding operator
modeling, the analyst is required to study the operating procedures and to become familiar
with any relevant informal procedures used by the crew. Based on the information
collected, the possible diagnosis states and planning states (and their transitions) are
identified and the likelihoods of the state transitions are assessed.
Generally speaking, these tasks are not very different from the tasks performed in the
human reliability analysis portion of a conventional PRA. Plant physical models are often
used to determine time windows and top event success criteria, and analysts must study
the written procedures and training procedures to develop an understanding of the crew
behavior during the accident. The additional work in a DETAM analysis arises because
DETAM requires that these issues be treated formally within the framework of a dynamic
event tree.
6.3 SGTR Application Results
The primary result of the DETAM application to the SGTR problem is that the
DETAM can indeed be a practical tool. (Given the potential for scenario explosion
inherent in the methodology, this is not necessarily an obvious result.) With reasonable
assumptions concerning level of analysis detail (e.g., system level versus component level)
and operator behavior (assumed to be largely procedure-oriented), useful qualitative and
quantitative results can be obtained. Some examples of the types of results obtained in the
SGTR application are as follows:
0 identification of scenarios for which knowledge of the plant hardware state alone is
insufficient to determine the possible end states,
* identification of an instrumentation-related dependency between event tree top
events not included in conventional analyses,
e identification of two potential improvements in emergency procedures, and
0 a probability distribution for the time required to perform a key set of actions.
The DETAM application also demonstrates the potential of the methodology for
treating a wide variety of operator error forms, including errors in diagnosis, errors in
planning, and errors in execution.
The quantitative, scenario-level results of the DETAM application are less
conclusive, largely due to the fact that simplifications in the physical model employed
prevent a full analysis of core damage scenarios. This makes comparisons with the results
of conventional PRA models more difficult. A limited comparison of end state frequencies
indicates that the conventional model predictions may be somewhat conservative, but
analyses of the conditional frequencies of conditional split fractions and partial sequences
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indicates that this is not always the case. Additional work is needed before more definite
conclusions can be provided.
6.4 Potential Applications
In principle, dynamic event trees can be used in place of conventional event trees to
analyze all possible accident scenarios in nuclear power plant risk assessments. In practice,
the implementation tools required (e.g., the operator state transition models) are not ready
for immediate application. Moreover, it is not clear that future developments of DETAM
should be aimed at replacing event tree analysis. Dynamics do not play an important role
(and need not be explicitly analyzed) in all accident sequences. Conventional event trees
handle a wide variety of modeling issues (e.g., the impact of support system losses on
frontline system performance) that would be computationally inefficient to include in a
DETAM analysis.
Thus, DETAM should be viewed as a tool to supplement the current,
hardware-based event tree models for accident sequences, rather than as a replacement.
As a supplementary tool, DETAM can be used to support current human reliability
analyses (e.g., by providing scenario-sensitive distributions for the time available to
perform actions, and for the time actually required to perform these actions), to identify
situations where qualitatively different scenarios can result despite the same hardware
failures, to identify less than obvious sources of dependencies between top events, and even
to provide scenario-dependent failure probabilities (conditional split fractions) for selected
top events. DETAM also appears to be weil-suited for assessing the risk associated with
the use of completely automatic control systems, since the definition of operator crew
states would not be an issue.
Aside from PRA applications, DETAM can be used to evaluate operating procedures.
It can be used to determine if there is sufficient time to follow the as-written procedures,
and if the procedures handle all potentially significant scenarios. The difference between a
DETAM evaluation and a conventional evaluation, of course, is that the DETAM
evaluation delineates all possible scenarios (with significant likelihood), rather than a few
nonimal ones.
DETAM might also be useful for analysis of severe accidents progressing beyond the
core damage stage and for devising strategies to deal with these accidents. Many of the
issues addressed in the currently used Accident Progression Event Trees (e.g., [13]) belong
to the general categories of methodological issues raised in this report. An application of
DETAM could provide the framework needed to better integrate operator actions into the
analysis, and to identify improved, scenario-dependent courses of action.
6.5 Future Work
The DETAM application work discussed in this report has been aimed at developing
a prototype dynamic event tree model that demonstrates the degree of practicality of
DETAM and provides some useful intermediate results. Because of the added
computational burden required by the DETAM approach, three modeling simplifications
have been employed in constructing the prototype model. The first simplification involves
the use of a simple 4-node model for treating the physical behavior of the plant during the
accident. As discussed earlier, the limitations in this model prevent treatment of a full
core damage scenario. Furthermore, inaccuracies in the model (e.g., in the treatment of
steam generator behavior) can lead to predicted scenario evolutions that differ qualitatively
from those of the actual scenarios. The second simplification involves the treatment of a
limited number of hardware systems (e.g., support systems and plant instrumentation are
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not treated) and operator states. This is done to limit the number of branches that can be
generated at any point in time. The resulting model, however, clearly cannot treat the risk
associated with issues not treated (e.g., dynamic development of the crew quality state).The third simplification is due largely to the first; the analysis is truncated at absorbing
states that are often far less severe than core damage. This avoids the use of physical
models in regimes for which they are not designed (e.g., reactor coolant system saturation).On the other hand, particularly since the conditional frequency of core damage (given each
absorbing state) varies from absorbing state to absorbing state, the overall results of the
analysis are difficult to compare with those of conventiofial analyses.
To address these simplifications, and to assure that the resulting model can still be
practically applied, additional work is needed in the following areas:
9 the plant physical model,
e the operator model,
e the plant instrumentation model,
0 the treatment of uncertainties, and
0 methods to limit the tree size.
As discussed earlier, the plant physical model currently used is adequate for
predicting the primary side response to SGTR in the early stages of the accident. Once
saturation is reached, the model is no longer satisfactory. The model is also not very good
at predicting the secondary side response, due to its use of a homogeneous steam generator
sub-model. As a result, the steam generator pressure rise and resulting challenges to the
atmospheric relief valves (which could stick open, leading to a potential containment
bypass scenario) are underestimated. Work is needed to integrate an improved physical
model, capable of predicting core uncovery, into the dynamic event tree analysis.
The finite-state crew model employed lies somewhere in-between the current
operator reliability models used in conventional PRAs, which do not explicitly treat the
internal state of the crew, and advanced cognitive models currently being developed (e.g.,[51,83]). Conceptually, therefore, it appears to provide a near-term solution to the
crew/plant interaction problem discussed in the beginning of this report. In practice, more
work on operationalizing the different crew states (and their transitions) needs to be done.
It is important that a multidisciplinary team be involved in order to assure that the state
definitions adequately reflect current knowledge [84]. Advanced cognitive models could be
useful in this process. Further, although the SGTR application of DETAM allows for
dynamic variations in crew quality state, this capability has not been exercised yet. Work
is needed to incorporate these variations, at least in a simple manner, to allow comparison
of the dynamic event tree predictions with those of conventional models (which routinely
incorporate such performance shaping factors as stress).
Regarding plant instrumentation, the current model only treats the effect of failed
secondary side radiation monitors (all are assumed to operate correctly or to fail together).
Because the dynamic event tree method explicitly treats the dynamic response of the
operators to available indications, the area of instrumentation should be one where
DETAM is visibly superior to conventional methods. Work is needed to determine if this
expectation is indeed correct.
The model for SGTR described in this report does not treat uncertainties in the
predictions of its simplistic 4-node physical model. Given that a DETAM analysis requires
a fast-running thermal hydraulic simulation, it is likely that any physical model that can
be practically used will yield predictions that are significantly uncertain. Efficient methods
to quantify and propagate these uncertainties need to be developed and applied. Of course,
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state-of-knowledge uncertainties in other parts of the model (e.g., in the operator state
transition rates) need to be addressed as well. (The dynamic event tree branchings treat
stochastic uncertainties.)
Finally, when the more detailed models described above are implemented, it is likely
that more powerful methods for grouping and truncating scenarios will be required. One
idea that may be worth pursuing is the development of a formal methodology for
estimating the conditional frequency of an undesired state (e.g., core damage), given the
current state of the plant. If dynamic estimates of this conditional frequency can be
obtained for each scenario as the simulation progresses, they can be combined with the
current likelihoods of the scenarios to estimate their "risk potential," which can then be
used to truncate scenarios. (Note that the current scenario truncation methodology, which
only uses the current frequency of the scenario, can be viewed as an application of a general
truncation methodology in which the conditional frequency of core damage is set equal to
unity.)
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APPENDIX A. THERMAL-HYDRAULIC MODEL
This appendix lists the thermal-hydraulic model equations incorporated in
DETCO-SGTR. The model, which is partially based on similar models described in Refs.
25, 26, and 71, is somewhat specialized towards the analysis of SGTR in a Westinghouse
4-loop PWR. However, it can be modified to handle other relatively slowly progressing
accidents in other PWRs. The model divides the plant into four nodes: the primary node,
the pressurizer, the ruptured steam generator, and the intact steam generators (see Figure
A.1). The model determines the coolant thermodynamic properties (e.g., temperature and
pressure) of each node for each branch at each time step. Within each node, the model
assumes that the thermodynamic properties of water are uniform. Note that some of the
equations are results of modifications to approximate the results of PRISM [59].
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Table A.1. VARIABLES USED
IN THE THERMAL-HYDRAULIC MODEL EQUATIONS
Notation
Cp
CPsg
delMp
EFW
EFW1
hefw
hmfw
hp
HPI
hporv
hrwst
hs1
hs2
hsg 1
hsg2
hsp
hsu
MFW
Mp, dMp/dt
Mpo
Mpzrf, dMpzrf/dt
Mpzrfo
Mpzrg, dMpzrg/dt
Meaning
primary coolant specific heat capacity
secondary coolant specific heat capacity
primary mass change due to density change
indicates if EFWS is on (1) or off (0)
indicates if EFWS1 is on (1) or off (0)
emergency feedwater enthalpy
main feedwater enthalpy
primary coolant enthalpy
indicates if HPI is on (1) or off (0)
PORV flow enthalpy
RWST flow enthalpy
ruptured SG vapor enthalpy
intact SG vapor enthalpy
ruptured SG liquid enthalpy
intact SG liquid enthalpy
pressurizer spray flow enthalpy
surge flow enthalpy
indicates if MFWS is on (1) or off (0)
primary node coolant mass and its time derivative
initial primary node coolant mass
pressurizer liquid mass and its time derivative
initial pressurizer liquid mass
pressurizer steam mass and its time derivative
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Msg1, dMsgl/dt
pMsg2, dMsg2/dt
Msglo
Msg2o
MSIV1
MSIV2
PORV
Pp, dPp/dt
Psg1, dPsg1/dt
Psg2, dPsg2/dt
Qrxo
Qrx
Qsgl
Qsg2
Qpnet
Qhpi
Qsu
Qlk
Qfwl
Qfw2
Qsglnet
Qsg2net
Qs1
Qs2
Rho
RPS
ruptured steam generator liquid mass and its time derivative
intact steam generator liquid mass, and its time derivative
initial ruptured steam generator liquid mass
initial intact steam generator liquid mass
indicates if MSIV1 is open (1) or closed (0)
indicates if MSIV2 is open (1) or closed (0)
indicates if PORV is open (1) or closed (0)
pressurizer node pressure and its time derivative
ruptured steam generator pressure and its time derivative
intact steam generator pressure and its time derivative
initial reactor power
reactor power
heat transfer rate to the ruptured SG
heat transfer rate to the intact SG
net heat rate produced in the primary node
heat rate transferred from HPI system to the primary node
heat rate transferred due to surge flow
heat rate transferred through the leak
heat rate transferred to the ruptured SG through EFWS
heat rate transferred to the intact SG through EFWS
net heat rate transferred to the ruptured SG
net heat rate transferred to the intact SG
heat rate of the steam leaving the ruptured SG
heat rate of the steam leaving the intact SG
primary coolant density
indicates if the reactor has tripped (0) or not (1)
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SPRY
STRHTCAP
t
tsh
tsgtr
Tp, dTp/dt
Tpo
Tsg1, dTsg1/dt
Tsg2, dTsg2/dt
uf, duf/dp
ug, dug/dp
vf, dvf/dt
vg, dvg/dp
Vp
Vpl
Vpo
Warv
Wefw1
Wefw2
Whpi
Wlk
indicates if pressurizer spray is on (1) or off (0)
structural materials heat capacity
time
time reactor tripped
time SGTR started
primary node coolant temperature and its time derivative
initial primary node coolant temperature
ruptured steam generator liquid temperature and its time
derivative
intact steam generator liquid temperature and its time derivative
internal energy of saturated liquid and its pressure derivative
internal energy of saturated vapor and its pressure derivative
specific volume of saturated liquid and its pressure derivative
specific volume of saturated vapor and its pressure derivative
primary mass volume
current primary mass volume
previous primary mass volume
atmospheric relief valve rate of flow rate
emergency feedwater flow rate into the ruptured SG
emergency feedwater flow rate into the intact SG
flowrate from the HPI system into the primary node
leak flow rate from the primary system to the secondary
A-4
Wmfwl main feedwater flow rate into the ruptured SG
Wmfw2 main feedwater flow rate into the intact SG
Wporv PORV flow rate
Wsl steam flow rate from the ruptured SG
Ws2 steam flow rate from the intact SG
Wsu surge flow rate
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Table A.2. PRIMARY NODE EQUATIONS
dTp/dt Qpnet /(Mp*Cp*STRHTCAP)
Qpnet = Qrx + Qhpi - Qsgl - Qsg2 - Qsu + Qlk , if Pp < Psg1
Qrx + Qhpi - Qsgl - Qsg2 - Qsu , if Pp > Psg1
Qsu = Wsu*(hsu - hp)
Wsu = Whpi - Wlk + delMp
delMp = Rho*(Vpl - Vpo)
Vp = Mp/Rho
Qhpi = Whpi*(hrwst - hp)
Whpi = 66.*HPI
Qik = Wlk*(hp - hsg1), if Wlk > 0
= 0., if Wlk < 0.
Wlk = (Wlko/1250)*(Pp - Psg1), if t > tsgtr
= 0., if t < tsgtr
dMp/dt = max(Wsu + Mpzrf, 0.), if Wsu < 0.
= max[min(Wsu, Mpo - Mp), 0.1, if Wsu > 0
Qrx = Qro*.066*(t - tsh)-.2
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HEAT TRANSFER RATES TO THE SECONDARY SIDE
= .25*Qrx , if Tsgl < 555. F
- max[Qrx*.25*(Tp - Tsgl)/(Tpo - 555.), Qrx*.25],
if Tsgl > 555 "F
S.75*Qrx , if Tsg2 < 555.* F
= Qrx*.75*(Tp - Tsg2)/(Tpo - 555.), if Tsg2 > 555. F
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Qsg1
Qsg2
Table A.3.
PRESSURIZER NODE EQUATIONS
= Ksu*Wsu + Ksp*Wsp - Kporv*Wporv
(hsu - uf + (ufg*vf/vfg))/K
= (hsp - uf + (ufg*vf/vfg))/K
= (hporv - uf + (ufg*vf/vfg))/K
Mpzrf*duf/dp + Mpzrg*dug/dp - dvf/dp*Mpzrf*ufg/vfg -
dvg/dp*Mpzrg*ufg/vfg
= vg - vf
= ug - uf
dMpzrg/dt = [Wporv*vf - (Mpzrf*dvf/dp + Mpzrg*dvg/dp)*dPp/dt -
Wsu*vf] /vfg
dMpzrf/dt = Wsu + Wsp - Wporv - dMpzrg/dt
Wporv = PORV*(34.02 + 3.426E-2*Pp)
Wsp = SPRY*42.18*2.205
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dPp/dt
Ksu
Ksp
Kporv
K
vfg
ufg
Table A.4.
Table A.5. RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR NODE EQUATIONS
dTsgl/dt
dMsg1/dt
Qsglnet
Qfwl
Qs1
Wmfwl
Wefwl
Ws1
Wsla
= Qsglnet/(Msgl*CPsg)
= Wlk + Wefwl + Wmfwl - Ws1
= Qfwl + Qlk + Qsgl - Qsl
= Wefwl*(hefw - hsg1) + Wmfwl*(hmfw - hsg1)
- Ws1*(hs1 - hsg1)
= MFW*Wsla
= EFW*EFW1*MSIV1*min(Wefw*2.205, Wsla)*Msglo/Msgl
= MSIV1*(Wsla + Wslb) + ARV1*Warv*2.205 , if RPS = 1
= ARV1*Warv*2.205 + max(630., Wsla +Wslb)*MSIV1*SDV,
if RPS = 0
= [Qsgl + max(Qlk, 0.)]/(hsl - hmfw*MFW), if RPS = 1
= [Qsg1 + max(Qlk, 0.)]/[hsl - hefw*EFW - hsgl*(1 - EFW)],
if RPS = 0
= max(Qlk, 0.)/(hsl - hsg1)Ws1b
INTACT STEAM GENERATOR NODE EQUATIONS
dTsg2/dt = Qsg2net/(Msg2*CPsg)
dMsg2/dt = Wefw2 + Wmfw2 - Ws2
Qsg2net = Qfw2 + Qsg2 - Qs2
Qfw2 = Wefw2*(hefw - hsg2) + Wmfw2*(hmfw - hsg2)
Qs2 = Ws2*(hs2 - hsg2)
Wmfw2 = MFW*Ws2
Wefw2 = (EFW + SUFP)*min(3.*Wefw*2.205, Ws2)*Msg2o/Msg2
Ws2 = Qsg2/(hs2 - MFW*hmfw), if RPS = 1
= min(630.*3., Ws2calc)*SDV*MSIV2 + ARV2*3*Warv*2.205,
if RPS = 0
Ws2calc = Qsg2/[hs2 - hefw*EFW - hsg2*(1 - EFW)]
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Table A.6.
Wporv
Wspry Pzr
Wsu
Ws2 *-
Wfw2 3
SG2
(Intact) Qsg2
1T
Qrx
i
Whpi
Wik
--- +
SG1
(Faulted
-Ws1
(--Wfw 1
Figure A.1 - Simple 4-Node Physical Model
P : Primary Node
Pzr: Pressurizer Node
SG1 : Steam Generator Node (Faulted SG)
SG2: Steam Generator Node (Intact SG)
Whpi: High Pressure Injection Mass Flowrate (to P node)
Wik : Leakage Mass Flowrate (to SG node)
Wfw : Feedwater Mass Flowrate (to SG node)
Wsu : Surge Mass Flowrate (to Pzr node)
Ws : Steam Mass Flowrate (from SG node)
Wspry Spray Mass Flowrate (to Pzr node)
Wporv PORV Mass flowrate (from Pzr node)
Qrx Core Heat Generation Rate
Qsg: Heat Transfer Rate to SG node
P
APPENDIX B. SEQUENCE WALK-THROUGH
Figure B.1 shows a portion of the dynamic event tree for a SGTR event
with failed EFWS. Sequence 1 represents the scenario in which all demanded
systems 'work and the operator crew follows correctly the procedures. The
scenario starts with the plant running at steady state condition. Initially
the operator crew has "Steady State" as its diagnosis of the plant. The
different scenario diagnosis states, as well as their criteria, that the
operator crew may form appear in Table B.1. After 10 seconds the tube rupture
occurs. Owing to the rupture, the radiation alarm actuates, the pressurizer
level drops, the ruptured steam generator pressure increases, and the ruptured
steam generator level rises. The operator crew correctly diagnoses the sce-
nario as a SGTR event. Likelihoods of the crew misdiagnosing the scenario
appear in Table B.2. The parameters used in this table are the pressurizer
level, the steam generator pressure, the radiation alarm, and the difference
between the levels of the intact and ruptured steam generators. The different
qualitative likelihoods, whose values are user input, are in Table B.3. As
the scenario progresses the values of the parameters change, and subsequently
the operator crew may modify its diagnosis. In this scenario the operator
crew maintains its initial diagnosis state throughout the event. At 210
seconds the reactor successfully trips due to low primary pressure. At this
point the operator crew starts to follow the Response to Reactor Trip or
Safety Injection (E-0) procedure. The E-0 procedure verifies the status of
the different safety functions.and guides the operator to the appropriate
event-specific procedure. Table B.4 describes the E-0 steps that are modeled
and the time allotted for the performance of each step. Table B.5 shows Steps
B- 1
7 and 8 of the E-0 procedure. Tables B.6 and B.7 illustrate how E-0 Steps 7
and 8 are implemented in DETCO-SGTR.
The further decrease in primary pressure results in SI actuation at 300
seconds. SI actuation isolates the MFS, closes the SDV, and actuates the
EFWS. Of the eight combinations of main hardware systems, the tree (Figure
B.1) focuses on the expansion of the failure of EFWS with the other systems
functioning successfully. The first branching after the EFWS failure repre-
sents the situation in which the operator reaches the step that checks EFWS
status. The operator performs this step (upper branch), discovers that the
EFWS is failed and transfers to the procedure for the restoration of secondary
heat sink. safety function (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Procedure or FR-H.1).
The EFWS flow indicates if transfer to FR-H.1 is required.
There are several ways to restore the secondary heat sink. These mea-
sures include the recovery EFWS, the initiation of the start up feed pump
(SUFP), the use the MFS, and the establishment of condensate flow.
DETAM-SGTR models only the recovery of EFVS and the initiation of SUFP.
Failure to recover the secondary heat sink will require the crew to use bleed
and feed cooling. In Sequence 1 the crew successfully actuates the SUFP and
returns to E-0 procedure as directed by the procedure. The crew continues on
with the E-0 steps trying to determine the event and the associated
event-specific procedure that must be used. Soon, the crew determines that
the event is SGTR. The parameter used in the step that checks for SGTR event
is the secondary side radiation level. The flow of coolant from the primary
side to the secondary side has raised the latter's radiation level. Subse-
quently, the crew transfers to the SGTR or E-3 procedure. Table B.8 shows the
E-3 steps modeled.
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There are three primary procedure-directed primary tasks that the crew
performs: isolation of the ruptured steam generator, cooldown of the RCS, and
depressurization of the RCS. Isolation of the ruptured steam generator is
necessary to prevent the release of radioactivity outside of the containment.
The isolation involves the closing of the SG ARV valve, steam supply valve, SG
blowdown isolation valve from ruptured SG, and MSIV. Before the crew can
isolate the ruptured steam generator, it must first identify the ruptured
generator. The indicators employed to identify the ruptured steam generator
are the steam generator pressure and level. The ruptured steam generator
should have a higher pressure and level than the intact steam generators.
After the crew has isolated the ruptured steam generator, it starts the cool-
down of the RCS. Cooldown of the RCS involves opening of the intact genera-
tors' relief valves. The relief valves function successfully in this
sequence. The RCS temperature must drop below a predetermined level (which is
a function of the saturation temperature of the ruptured steam generator)
before the crew depressurizes the primary system. When the primary tempera-
ture drops to the required RCS level, the crew successfully closes the relief
valves and initiates the depressurization by actuating the pressurizer spray.
If the spray fails the PORV is opened. Depressurization continues until the
primary pressure equals the ruptured steam generator pressure. This occurs at
2160 seconds. It takes the crew 720 seconds to cooldown and depressurize the
RCS.
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Table B.1. SCENARIO TRANSITION CRITERIA
B- 4
POTENTIAL STATES
CURRENT
STATE
STEADY STATE UNCERTAIN SGTR SLOCA
STEADY No change in Criteria for SG level is SG level is
STATE Pzr level, SG SGTR, SLOCA increasing, decreasing, Pp
level & Pp & steady Pp & Pzr and RA is off
state are not are not met level are
met decreasing
and RA is on
UNCERTAIN Neither SGTR SG level is SG level is
nor SLOCA increasing, decreasing,
criteria are Pp & Pzr 1 Pp & Pzr level
met level are are decreasing
decreasing and RA is off
and RA is on
SGTR SG level is SG level is
increasing, decreasing, Pp &
& Pzr level Pzr level are
are decreas- decreasing and
ing and RA is RA is off
on
SLOCA SG level is SG level is
increasing, decreasing, Pp
Pp & Pzr & Pzr level are
level are decreasing and
decreasing RA is off
and RA is on
Table B.2. LIKELIHOOD OF INCORRECT SCENARIO DIAGNOSIS DURING AN SGTR EVENT
Old State New State Pzr Level Ruptured Rad Alarm A SG Probabil-
SG Press. ity Level
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing On < Limit VUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit UnLKLY
SS/UNCTN UNCTN Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit UnLKLY10
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit CRTN NO
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On < Limit CRTNNO
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit VVUnLKLY
SGTR SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit 5VVUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On < Limit 2VUnLKLY
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit EVEN10
SLOCA SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit VLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On > Limit VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing On < Limit 5VVUnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off > Limit UnLKLY
SS/UNCTN SLOCA Decreasing Increasing Off < Limit UnLKLY10
*D SG Level is the difference between the increasing ruptured steam generator level
and the intact steam generator level; limit is a user input
**The numerical values of qualitative likelihoods are user input
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Table B.3. QUALITATIVE LIKELIHOODS
Likelihood* Description Value
CRTNNO Certain N 0.00
VVUnLKLY Very Very Unlikely 0.01
VUnLKLY Very Unlikely 0.10
UnLKLY Unlikely 0.30
EVEN Even 0.50
LKLY Likely 0.70
VLKLY Very Likely 0.90
VVLKLY Very Very Likely 0.99
CRTNYS Certain Yes 1.00
* If a number appears before a qualitative likelihood, the numerical value is
multiplied by that number. Any number appearing after the likelihood is in
hundredths and is added to the numerical value of likelihood. For example, EVEN10
has a numerical value of .60, whereas 2VUnLKLY has a value of 0.02.
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Table B.4 - Response to Reactor Trip or Safety injection Procedure Steps (E-0)
Model Assumptions/Comments AlloTed
Step# Step # Time(s)
1 1 Reactor successfully trips. Reactor automatically trips when low pressure setpoint is 15
reached. Operator manually trips the reactor when subcooling or pressure limits are
reached. This step is combined with step 2 in the implementation
1 2 Turbine trip is always successful. This step is combined with step 1 in the implementation 15
2 3 Power to AC emergency busses is available. This step is combined with step 4 in the 15
implementation.
2 4 SI successfully actuates. This step is combined with step 3 in the implementation. 15
3 5 MFW always isolates successfully. This step is combined with step 6 in the 15
implementation.
3 6 Containment isolation is not explicitly modeled, yet time is allotted for this step. 15
4 7 Operating EFW pumps indicate success of EFWS. If EFWS is failed, repair or 15
restoration starts as soon as the failure is discovered. This step is combined with step 8 in
the implementation.
4 8 CC and SI pumps are considered similar. Pump status determines the he HPI system 15
status. If HPI is failed, recovery starts upon failure discovery.
9 PCCW pumps are running. This step is combined with step 10 in the implementation. 15
5 10 Ultimate heat sink is not explicitly modeled, but time is alloted to verify heat sink status. 15
6 11 SW cooling trains to diesels are established. This step is combined with step 12 in the 15
implementation.
6 12 At least one containment enclosure cooling fan is running. Time is allotted to verify 15
containment fan status.
7 13 Only SG pressure is used to check if main steamline should be isolated. 30
8 14 Containment pressure remains less than 18 psig. Time to verify this is allocated. 30
9 15 ECCS flow is considered part of HPI system. RHR is not explicitly modeled. 30
10 1 EFWS flow less than 500 gpm to at least 2 SGs implies that S is failed. This step is 15
combined with step 17 in the implementation.
10 17 Proper emergency alignment of EFW valves is part of EFWS success. Time is allotted to 13
verify proper emergency valve alignment.
11 18 Proper emergency alig nent of ECCS valves is part of HPI success. 30
12 19 RCS Tave is expected to trend to 555 F for the demonstration sequence. 30
13 20 Checks for modes of Pzr PORVs and Spray Valves 30
14 71 RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
15 2 Uncontrolled depressurization of an intact SG is unlikely during the event of interest. 15
Occurrence of uncontrolled depressurization, requires transfer to procedure for Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation (E-2) which is not modeled in the implementation. This step is
combined with step 23 in the implementation.
15 23 If instrumentation is good, abnormal radiation level, indicative of faulted SG U-tubes, is 15
observed.
16 24 Containment radiation monitor to check RCS integrity is not explicitly modeled, but time 15
is allotted to check if RCS is intact. This step is combined with step 25 in the
implementation.
17 25 Checks if ECCS flow should be reduced. 30
18 26 SI termination at this is juneture is considered an undesireable state because SGTR has 30
yet to be addressed.
19 27 Monitoring of critical safety function status trees starts at this step. An orange or red 15
indicator requires the operator crew to go procedures which are not modeled in the
implementation. This step is combined with step 28 in the implementation.
19 28 SG level fgreater than the initial level indicates potential SGTR. 15
20 29 If instrumentation is good, abnormal secondary radiation level indicating SGTR, is 15
observed. This step is combined with step 30 in the implementation.
20 30 Auxiliary building radiation monitors are not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to 15
check them.
20 31 PRT is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to check PRT conditions. 30
22 32 Time is allotted to reset SI. This step is combined with step 33 in the implementation. 15
22 73 Time is allotted to reset containment isolation ases A and B. 15
23 Reestablishment of instr air supplies is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted for it. 3
24 3 RHR pumps are not explicitly modeled. Potential transfer to LRSC, however, is 15
accounted for. This step is combined with steps 36 and 37 in the implementation.
24 36 Emergency diesel generators are not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted to check them. 15
24 37 This step is just an instruction to return to step 19 0
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Table B.5. PORTION OF E-0 PROCEDURE SHOWING STEPS 7 AND 8
B- 8
STEP ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
7 Verify EFV Pumps Running:
a. Motor-driven pump - RUNNING a. Manually start pump
b. Turbine-driven pump - RUNNING b. Manually open at least
one open steam supply
path OR reset trip valves
as necessary
- MS-V127 - OPEN
- MS-V128 - OPEN
- MS-V393 - OPEN
- MS-V394 - OPEN
- MS-V395 - OPEN
- Trip valve MS-V129 - OPEN
8 Verify ECCS Pumps Running: Manually start pumps
- CCPs - TRAIN A AND B
- SI pumps- TRAIN A AND B
- RHR pumps - TRAIN A AND B
Table B.6. ACTUAL DETCO-SGTR LINES
IMPLEMENTING PLANNING STEP TRANSITION FROM E-0 STEPS 7 & 8
case 4 :/*Steps 7 & 8 - Verify EFWS and Verify ECCS pumps*/
if (new->iOAStep == opr->iOA_Step) PrStep = 1.0 - PrOA;
break;
where,
new->iOA Step refers to the planning state step in the next time
increment
opr->iOA Step refers to the next step (i.e., case 5)
PrStep is the likelihood that the next planning state step is
opr->iOA Step
PrOA is the likelihood that next planning state step is not step
opr->iOAStep
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Table B.7 ACTUAL DETCO-SGTR LINES
IMPLEMENTING THE CREW ACTIONS IN E-0 STEPS 7 & 8
case 4 :/*Steps 7 & 8 - Verify EFWS and Verify ECCS pumps*/
if (old->sEFWS.iMode == OFF) opr->sEFVS.iMode O N;
if (old->sHPI.iMode OFF) opr->sHPI.iMode = ON break;
where,
old->sEFWS.iMode indicates if EFWS is running or not
opr->sEFWS.iMode indicates the action that the operator crew should
take
old->sHPI.iMode indicates if HPI is running or not
opr->sHPI.iMode indicates the action that the operator crew should
take
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Table B.8 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure Steps (E-3)
Model E-3 Assumptions/Comments Allotted
Step # Step # Time(s)
I I RCPs successfully respond to demands. 30
2 2 Ruptured SG is assumed identified. The basis of transfer from E-0 to E-3 is uncontrolled 30
rise in SG NR level or abnormal secondary radiation level.
3-6 3 Ruptured SG is successfully isolated. This step includes successful turning off of the 120
EFWS for SG1, the assumed ruptured SG.
7 4 EFWS is turned off as part of step 3. This step is combined with step 5 in the 15
-_ implementation.
7 T Check of Pzr PORVs and block valves is combined with step 4 in the implementation. 15
8 6 Uncontrolled depressurization of an intact SG is unlikely during the event of interest. 30
Occurrence of uncontrolled depressurization, requires transfer to procedure for Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation (E-2) which is not modeled in the implementation. Time is
allotted for this step.
9 7 Intact SG levels are expected to be within limits. 30
10 8 Time is allotted to reset SI. This step is combined with step 9 in the implementation. 15
10 9 Time is allotted to reset containment isolation phases A and B. This step is combined with 15
step 8 in the implementation
11 10 Reestablishment of instrument air supplies is not explicitly modeled, but time is allotted 30
for it.
12 11 Time is allotted to verify all AC busses. This step is combined with step 12 in the 15
implementation.
12 12 RHR pumps are not explicitly modeled, but time is allocated to perform this step. This 15
step is combined with step 11 in the implementation.
13 13 Ruptured SG pressure less than 225 psig is very unlikely during the event of interest. Its 30
occurrence requires transfer to a more specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3.1, which is
not modeled. Time is allocated for this step.
14 14 This step marks the start of RCS cooldown. Transfer to the next step is allowed only if 30
the primary temperature drops below the limit.13 15 Ruptured SG pressure is expected to be stable or increasing. Otherwise transfer to a more 15
specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3. 1, which is not modeled, is required. Time is
allocated for this step.
15 16 RCS Subcooling is expected to be greater than 60. Otherwise transfer to a more 15
specialized SGTR procedure, ECA-3.1, which is not modeled, is required. This step is
combined with the previous step in the implementation.
16 17 Depressurization of the RCS using pressurizer spray. 30
17 18 Depressurization of the RCS usi the pressurizer PORV. 30
This step is added to mark the end of the demonstration sequence. If a path reaches this 30
point with the primary pressure less than or equal the ruptured SG pressure and either
EFWS or SUFP working successfully, the plant state is considered DESIRED.
19 This step is added to account for the crew action to turn off the HPI. 30
20 This step is added for the possibility of crew turning off the EFWS. 30
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